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Speech, Silence, and Structure
Jeffrey Steven Gordon
The three Articles that comprise this Dissertation explore how free expression and judicial
federalism regulate hurtful speech and promised silence. The Articles tackle torts and free
speech, contracts and free speech, and a comparative variation on those two themes. Judicial
federalism threads all three Articles. The first Article, Silencing State Courts, argues that the
current mode of enforcing the First Amendment against state common law speech torts fails
to promote cooperative judicial federalism. Second, Silence for Sale argues that state courts
should free themselves from constitutional straitjackets and recognize a robust public policy
of free expression that voids some nondisclosure agreements. Finally, Comparative Judicial
Federalism argues that the strength of a federal free speech guarantee varies with a country’s
particular species of judicial federalism. By comparing free speech and judicial federalism
in the United States and Australia, it argues that Australia’s judicial federalism augments its
implied freedom of political communication.
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The three Articles that comprise this Dissertation explore how
free expression and judicial federalism regulate hurtful speech and
promised silence. The Articles tackle torts and free speech, contracts
and free speech, and a comparative variation on those two themes.
Judicial federalism threads all three Articles. The first Article, Silenc-
ing State Courts, argues that the current mode of enforcing the First
Amendment against state common law speech torts fails to promote
cooperative judicial federalism. Second, Silence for Sale argues that
state courts should free themselves from constitutional straitjackets
and recognize a robust public policy of free expression that voids some
nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). Finally, Comparative Judicial
Federalism argues that the strength of a federal free speech guarantee
varies with a country’s particular species of judicial federalism. By
comparing free speech and judicial federalism in the United States
and Australia, it argues that Australia’s judicial federalism augments
its implied freedom of political communication.
In a flash of inspired error, Justice Thomas very recently en-
couraged the Supreme Court to reconsider New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.1 He joined the Court in denying certiorari to the plaintiff,
Kathy McKee, after the First Circuit had affirmed the dismissal of her
defamation lawsuit against Bill Cosby on Sullivan-related grounds.2
Justice Thomas raised eyebrows by condemning Sullivan and its
progeny as “policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional
law.”3 First, Justice Thomas thought each state “perfectly capable of
striking an acceptable balance” between free speech and individual
1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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reputation.4 Second, Sullivan wrongly “displace[d] vast swaths of
state defamation law.”5 Finally, Sullivan should have been decided
on a much narrower ground.6 Justice Thomas’s opinion illustrates
many of the themes of the Dissertation. In this Introduction, I will
return to it to explain why it is deeply misguided.
Speech that Hurts: Silencing State Courts
Silencing State Courts centers on the FirstAmendment’s protection of
speech that would otherwise be tortious under state common law. It
argues that there are two paradigms of First Amendment enforcement
against state speech torts, represented by the venerable Sullivan and
the more recent Snyder v. Phelps.7 In Sullivan, the elected police
commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, sued the New York Times
and four individuals for libel. The alleged libel, which contained
trivial errors of fact, criticized the conduct of the Montgomery police
during the Civil Rights Movement, but did not name the plaintiff
himself. In an opinion the importance of which is difficult to overstate,
Justice Brennan held that a public official cannot “recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”8 In Snyder, the father of a fallen Marine
sued members of the fundamentalist Westboro Baptist Church, who
had picketed his son’s funeral, for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED), intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. Chief
Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined by all but Justice Alito, held
that nonviolent speech in a public place on a matter of public concern
is protected from civil damages. The First Amendment defense to
state speech torts “turns largely on whether that speech is of public
or private concern.”9
4Id. at 682. The law blogs lit up in protest. Indeed, if Sullivan proves anything
at all, it is that sometimes the states just can’t be trusted to strike an acceptable
balance between speech and reputation.
5Id. at 680.
6Id. at 677.
7562 U.S. 443 (2011).
8New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
9Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. at 451.
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This Article attempts to drive a methodological wedge between
Sullivan and Snyder. Scholars lump Sullivan and Snyder together,10
but in fact they are paradigmatically different. Sullivan’s paradigm
is the common law. Justice Brennan’s opinion adopted the internal
point of view towards Alabama’s common law. It accepted, so far as
the Free Speech Clause permitted, the state law of libel as a guide
for conduct. Indeed, Sullivan settled a longstanding common law
debate over the existence of a conditional privilege in defamation for
criticism of public officials or candidates for public office. Silencing
State Courts excavates that debate as it played out at the American
Law Institute’s 1937 annual meeting discussing a tentative draft of
the first torts Restatement.11 A Kansas judge, who had written the
leading opinion for the conditional privilege,12 squared off against
Learned Hand, who ultimately prevailed in having the conditional
privilege struck from the draft. But the Kansas approach carried the
day in Sullivan nearly three decades later. Justice Brennan fashioned
the federal rule out of materials supplied by state common law, citing
the Kansas opinion extensively.13 This remade the common law of
libel, but only by injecting a discrete federal element into the state
cause of action.
Snyder, by contrast, did not engage with Maryland common law.
The nature of IIED and the interests it protects were barely relevant
and mentioned only in passing. The intrusion upon seclusion claim
received even less attention. Instead, the Court framed the question
presented and its holding generally in terms of “tort liability” and im-
posed a blanket FirstAmendment “defense in state tort suits, including
10See, e.g., Kenneth S.Abraham&G. EdwardWhite, The Puzzle of the Dignitary
Torts, 104 C L. R . (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 53); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the
Common Law of Torts, 65 D P L. R . 433, 437–43 (2016); David S. Han,
Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 W . L. R . 1135, 1175; Nathan B.
Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 D
L. J. 1109, 1162–63 (2013); Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort, Speech, and the Dubious
Alchemy of State Action, 17 U. P . J. C . L. 1117, 1157 (2015).
11Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14A . L. I . P . 2, 135–57 (1937).
12Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
13New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (citing Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)).
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suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”14 In an analysis
of the five significant opinions applying Snyder,15 Silencing State
Courts shows that Snyder strong-arms state courts into preempting
all torts that apply to speech of public concern. These courts engage
in backwards avoidance: they routinely avoid a mine-run private
law issue by deciding a significant First Amendment question. Even
before discovery, state courts eliminate speech tort claims on First
Amendment grounds. Once the First Amendment shows up, these
lawsuits do not need developed factual records. Tort plaintiffs have
no opportunity to fully vindicate their claims. Nonviolent speech in
public view on a matter of public concern is immune to civil liability.
Silencing State Courts contends that Sullivan’s model is better
than Snyder’s because it promotes cooperative judicial federalism.
Equal dialogue between the federal and state judiciaries is valuable,
and flourishes when state rights of action embed discrete federal is-
sues (and vice versa). Sullivan precisely injected a limited federal
rule into the defamation cause of action, whereas in Snyder the First
Amendment overtook the entire litigation. Snyder shut down the
articulation of state law; silencing state courts on the common law
is a systemic ill. While Sullivan’s common law methodology inau-
gurated over fifty years of productive state-federal judicial dialogue,
in seven years Snyder suppressed every significant opportunity for
intersystemic judicial conversation.
A central pillar of Justice Thomas’s opinion inMcKee v. Cosby
exploited the rhetoric of preemption. He claimed that Sullivan “dis-
places vast swaths of state defamation law,” “abolish[es] the com-
mon law of libel,” and “scuttl[es] the libel laws of the States in [a]
wholesale fashion.”16 Silencing State Courts comprehensively re-
futes this argument. Sullivan, in fact, is state-regarding. It did not
colonize state libel law. Rather than holding the libel tort wholly
unconstitutional when wielded by public officials qua officials, as
14Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451, 451 n.2 (2011).
15Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013); Greene v. Tinker,
332 P.3d 21 (Ala. 2014); City of Keane v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015);
Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 356 P.3d 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015);
Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920 (Conn. 2015).
16McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari); id. at 678, 680 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
370, 381 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)).
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the concurrences urged,17 the Court required the official to prove the
critic’s malice. This allows damages for dishonest, vindictive and in-
tentionally harmful statements, and immunizes honest yet erroneous
critiques. Sullivan also preserved a role for the jury to determine
whether the conditional privilege had been abused.18 In truth, it is
Snyder, not Sullivan, that “displaces vast swaths” of state speech torts.
Snyder’s majority opinion (joined, oddly enough, by Justice Thomas)
encouraged state courts to ignore their own law and answer one over-
riding federal question: is the speech at issue of public concern? If
so, the defendant is “shield[ed] . . . from tort liability.”19
Speech in Breach: Silence for Sale
Silence for Sale moves on from torts (obligations imposed by law
ex post) to contracts (obligations voluntarily accepted by the par-
ties ex ante). The motivation is the profound collective realization
that NDAs promote disinformation and inequality. The #MeToo
movement shows that secret ordering can work deep injury to public
discourse. Silence for Sale attempts to reckon with the threat that
NDAs pose to free expression and argues that courts cannot ignore
that threat. This argument swims against the tide that prizes freedom
of contract and the voluntary trade of speech rights.
Any argument that the FirstAmendment applies directly to private
NDAs runs headlong into a state action fortress.20 Silence for Sale
therefore taps into the private law doctrine voiding contracts against
public policy. This doctrine is an excellent vehicle for the articulation
of a free speech limitation on private contracts. It is a rare example of
public interest trouncing private gain: contracts in restraint of trade, to
take what is considered the most ancient example, were consistently
voided in the eighteenth century.21 The free speech theories that
17Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring), 298–99 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
18See, e.g., Green v. Tinker, 332 P.3d at 30, 34 n.49, 36.
19Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. at 447, 461.
20Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
21William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U.
C . L. R . 357 (1954); Richard A. Epstein, Volume Introduction, in C
— F R xv, xvii (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000) (common law
held cartelization contracts unenforceable because they damaged social welfare).
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dominate today are also oriented toward the public interest. And yet,
currently the only NDAs that courts refuse to enforce are those that
conceal criminal or tortious conduct.22 Even then, courts will enforce
an NDA concealing wrongdoing if it is embedded in a settlement
agreement. In the battle between freedom of contract and freedom of
speech, contract almost always wins.
Silence for Sale first drives home the proliferation and perva-
siveness of NDAs in our lives. In almost every relationship with a
legal valence, NDAs play a significant role in moderating the flow of
information. They are, for example, among the first binding contracts
signed in commercial deals.23 This Article walks through the variety
of contexts in which NDAs are embedded: employment, dispute
resolution, commerce, journalism, intimacy, and consumption. From
this survey, the Article educes the values that NDAs serve: economy,
privacy, administration of justice, democracy, and national security.
Importantly, however, the relationship between NDAs and these val-
ues is not stable. For example, trade secrets might permit firms to
maximally exploit their intellectual property, but empirical evidence
suggests that trade secrets hurt innovation.24
Armed with an appreciation of the importance and value of NDAs,
Silence for Sale proceeds to argue that NDAs can destabilize each
member of the standard trilogy of free speech values (agency, democ-
racy, and truth). Consider agency. Speaker-focused accounts of
the argument from agency say that free speech is necessary for self-
expression and self-development. Audience-centric accounts say that
our agency increases with the availability of speech that might form
the basis of our rational decisionmaking. NDAs undermine speaker
agency by curbing a putative speaker’s ability to externalize her men-
tal contents; and they undermine a listener’s agency by depriving her
of information she would otherwise have. Similarly, some NDAs are
problematic for the argument from democracy. An NDA extracted
by a candidate for public office may prevent voters from accessing
information necessary for the intelligent exercise of the franchise.
22Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech,
83 C L. R . 261 (1998).
23Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. R . 376, 385, 385 n.26 (2018).
24Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade secrets and innovation: Evidence from the
“inevitable disclosure” doctrine, 39 S M J. 2921 (2018).
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And many NDAs are troubling for the argument from truth, because
every NDA removes speech from the public process of continual
disputation.
There are several obstacles that explain why it has not occurred
to courts to develop a public policy doctrine subjecting NDAs to free
speech scrutiny. The first, noted above, is freedom of contract. The
second, also already noted, is the state action doctrine. But these
two explanations point to broader pathologies. In the first place, why
does freedom of contract typically trump freedom of speech? It is
question-begging to answer that the speaker has waived or traded
away her free speech rights. The critical point is that the values and
interests in enforcing NDAs must actually be weighed against the
values and interests in free speech. Second, the state action doctrine
only explains why constitutional free speech scrutiny cannot reach
private contracts. It does not follow that courts are powerless to
identify and operationalize free expression as a public policy to void
or limit NDAs. Indeed, Silence for Sale diagnoses this pathology as
a monopoly: constitutions have wholly monopolized our free speech
discourse. It is time for the common law to wrest back some free
speech norms independently of constitutions and their rigid state-
action requirements.
In fact, the common law doctrine that voids contracts against
public policy is the perfect terrain for operationalizing the value con-
flict between contract and speech. Free of the rigid mandates of
constitutional provisions, state courts can implement their own local
conception of free speech public policy. And there is precedent for
operationalizing fundamental constitutional principles in this way.
For about a century, before statute intervened, state and federal courts
voided election wagers.25 Common law courts thought that these
contracts had the potential to fundamentally corrupt the franchise.
There is a clear parallel in free expression’s argument from democracy.
Silence for Sale analogously argues that courts should not enforce
NDAs that would make the judicial process complicit in delegitimiz-
ing an election. It concludes that courts should not enforce an NDA
between candidates for public office and their alleged extramarital
partners.
25See, e.g., Ball v. Gilbert, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 397 (1847).
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Returning to his opinion in McKee v. Cosby: Justice Thomas
could plausibly argue that erasing Sullivan empowers victims. After
all, the lower courts applied Sullivan to deny McKee’s defamation
claim against Cosby because she was classified as a limited-purpose
public figure who could not show actual malice.26 Now, there is no
evidence that an NDA was ever in place between McKee and Cosby.
But the argument that shredding Sullivan empowers victims has a
counterpart in the NDA context. A promise of confidentiality, this
argument goes, is often all the bargaining leverage that victims have.
As Jeannie Suk Gersen wrote: “Absent a legally enforceable promise
to keep the matter wholly out of the public eye, many powerful people
would prefer to take their chances at defending themselves in court
or in the press.”27
To my mind, these arguments miss the point. Justice Thomas’s
beef, really, is with the cases after Sullivan that expanded its federal
rule beyond government officials to public figures.28 There may very
well be a cogent argument that Sullivan has been stretched beyond
breaking point, but that is an argument for reinforcing Sullivan, and
not its doubtful extensions, as the North Star of our First Amendment
tradition. For the parallel NDA argument, let’s concede, arguendo,
that a promise of confidentiality is a victim’s only bargaining chip.
Some victims will be less well compensated if courts cease the mind-
less enforcement of NDAs concealing sexual misconduct. But that
does not settle the question. In its shocking and awesome scale, the
#MeToo movement demonstrates that these NDAs enable a culture
of impunity to fester unchecked. Victims who want to speak out are
censored by the threat of legal consequences: a breach of contract
judgment and vindictive liquidated damages. Courts should refuse to
be complicit in the collective harm laid bare by #MeToo.
26McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2017).
27Jeannie Suk Gersen, Trump’s Affairs and the Future of the Nondisclosure
Agreement, T N Y (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/trumps-affairs-and-the-future-of-the-nondisclosure-agreement.
28E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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Free Speech Federalism: Comparative Judicial Federalism
Comparative Judicial Federalism shows that the relative degree of
integration of central (federal) and local (state) courts affects the reach
of freedom of expression. It’s trite to observe that Australia’s implied
freedom of political communication is weak compared to the extraor-
dinary power of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
But in one context—the enforcement of federal free speech norms
against the common law—the implied freedom matches and might
even surpass the First Amendment. What explains, in the common
law context, the remarkable scope of Australia’s purportedly modest
implied freedom compared to the First Amendment? Comparative
Judicial Federalism argues that the answer lies in each country’s con-
ception of judicial federalism. In short, Australia’s judicial federalism
augments its implied freedom of political communication.
To make good on the comparative claim, this Article develops
a general theory of comparative judicial federalism (not compara-
tive judicial review, though they are related). Comparative judicial
federalism enables the comparison of the relationship and extent of
integration between central and local courts in different countries.
There is very little comparative judicial review scholarship, and that
which exists is undertheorized. To bring some rigor to the compara-
tive enterprise, this Article argues that there are three dimensions to
judicial federalism: institutional, jurisdictional, and jurisprudential.
The institutional dimension concerns the existence of separate sys-
tems of state and federal courts. The jurisdictional dimension refers
to the distribution of judicial power between the central and local
courts. The jurisprudential dimension centers on the sources of law
that bind each judiciary.
This framework enables a systematic comparison of the federal
judicial systems in the United States and Australia, which is key to
understanding the unexpected power of Australia’s implied freedom
in the common law context. First, the United States has maintained a
separate network of inferior federal courts since 1789. By contrast,
Australia embraced the Madisonian Compromise for the better part
of the twentieth century, lacking a broad network of inferior federal
courts until the creation of the Federal Court ofAustralia in 1976. Sec-
ond, the model of federal jurisdiction in the United States is atomized,
9
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exercisable only by Article III courts. Australia, however, adopted a
gestalt model of federal jurisdiction that closely integrates the state
and federal courts. Finally, the High Court of Australia administers a
national common law, binding on state and federal judges alike; but
in the United States there is no federal general common law, with
each state articulating its own.
Comparative Judicial Federalism concludes that the High Court
of Australia, as its federal supreme court is named, is a “Swift-plus”
tribunal. It resembles the U.S. Supreme Court during the era of Swift
v. Tyson,29 because it is a national appellate court deciding issues of
general law. But it is also a stronger national tribunal than the Swift-era
Supreme Court, because its decisions on general law are binding on
all state and federal courts in Australia. The High Court administers
a regime that is functionally equivalent to a binding version of Swift.
Applying this conclusion to the enforcement of federal free speech
norms yields a couple of interesting conclusions. It explains, first, why
the implied freedom looks very similar to the First Amendment when
deployed against common law speech torts. In Lange v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation,30 the case which conformed defamation
to the implied freedom, the High Court grounded its authority to
rewrite the common law in its status as a Swift-plus court. In Snyder,
by comparison, the Supreme Court sourced its authority to rewrite
Maryland’s common law in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Despite these different grounds, both courts’ reasons bear more than a
passing resemblance: they fashioned national common law defenses.
This suggests that the Supreme Court in Snyder acted as a Swift-plus
court. There is a strong resemblance between the methodology of
the High Court, which legitimately administers a national common
law, and the Supreme Court, which does not. This is not an argument
that Snyder was beyond the Supreme Court’s power; Snyder’s federal
defense is a legitimate example of “constitutional common law.”31
But it indicates that it can be difficult to distinguish between a consti-
tutional or federal common law, on the one hand, and a Swift-plus,
national general common law, on the other.
2941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
30(1997) 189 CLR 520 (Austl.).
31Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 H . L. R . 1 (1975).
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Second, Comparative Judicial Federalism shows that the implied
freedom can reach where the First Amendment cannot: private NDAs.
Australian courts, unlike those in the United States, are not hamstrung
by a quasi-jurisdictional state action doctrine. Moreover, American
and Australian courts have specified different sources of authority to
shape their interventions in the common law. In the United States, the
common law is primarily local. Justice Brennan in Sullivan therefore
looked to state courts for the doctrinal materials to fashion his federal
rule. But in Australia, the common law is a central institution which
predates the Constitution and in which the Constitution is embedded.
When developing the common law to conform to the implied free-
dom, Lange therefore relied on a judgment of Sir James Parke from
1834—written 66 years beforeAustralia’s Constitution was enacted.32
The High Court can imbue classic common law doctrines, like the
one that voids contracts against public policy, with constitutional
significance. In the absence of a state action requirement, there is no
obstacle to the High Court recognizing a public policy of free political
communication which could void some NDAs.
In McKee v. Cosby, Justice Thomas made a tantalizing aside that
has flown under the radar. He hinted that the Sullivan Court should
have decided the whole case on a much narrower ground. The alleged
libel in Sullivan generally criticized the local police without naming
the plaintiff. ButAlabama law required that a defamatory statement be
made “of and concerning” the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the lower court
thought it “common knowledge” that municipal police are “under the
direction and control of a single commissioner” and that criticism of
police “is usually attached to the official in complete control of the
body.”33 General governmental criticism was therefore imputed to
the official in charge. Justice Brennan rejected this reasoning: “such
a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an
otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel
of an official responsible for those operations.”34 The evidence was
32Toogood v. Spyring (1834) 149 Eng. Rep. 1044; 1 C. M. & R. 181 (Parke B)
(Exch).
33New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291 (1964) (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So.2d 25, 39 (Ala. 1962)).
34Id. at 292.
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constitutionally insufficient to support a finding that the statements
were of and concerning the public official.
Justice Thomas recited this facet of Sullivan and, in passing, said:
“This holding was sufficient to resolve the case.”35 Although garner-
ing far less attention than the view that Sullivan should be entirely
reexamined, his suggestion here is nearly equally consequential. It
amounts to a claim that the U.S. Supreme Court should act as a Swift-
plus tribunal when it reviews speech tort cases on First Amendment
grounds. On this view, in every speech tort case a federal court is
authorized by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to determine
whether the requirements of state law have been satisfied. In other
words, with the Free Speech Clause the “administration of justice
thus becomes essentially a federal function.”36
The cost of Justice Thomas’s suggestion is that it destroys an op-
portunity for cooperative judicial federalism. Silencing State Courts
argues that equal dialogue between the federal and state judiciaries is
valuable. Because it promoted cooperative judicial federalism, Sulli-
van’s mode of FirstAmendment enforcement is preferable to Snyder’s.
In Swift-plus jurisdictions like Australia, cooperative judicial federal-
ism does not make sense: lower courts follow the binding statements
of the central tribunal rather than engage in a cross-systemic con-
versation of equals. Of course, there are efficiency gains for a more
centralized judiciary. And a national Swift-plus court is perhaps more
suited to Australia’s small and relatively homogeneous population.
But adopting the Swift-plus model, as Justice Thomas recommends
for speech torts, sacrifices the ongoing and continually evolving for-
mation of American judicial opinion, and the diversity of viewpoints
which is its hallmark.
* * *
35McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 677 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).
36Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 C .
L. R . 489, 499 (1954) (“The Australian Constitution . . . gives the High Court of
the Commonwealth plenary authority to review state court decisions on questions of
state as well as federal law. The administration of justice thus becomes essentially
a federal function, though exercised largely through the subordinate tribunals of
the states.”).
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If I’m lucky, my future work will continue to feature the themes
that surfaced in Speech, Silence, and Structure. Writing Silence for
Sale, for example, supplied a privileged opportunity to reflect on
#MeToo, which is, along with Black Lives Matter, the most important
speech event of the twenty-first century. In a paper that is tentatively
titled Expression and Equality, I will argue that #MeToo reveals
equality as an independent and primary free speech value. It will
attempt to show that the basic content of #MeToo speech is experien-
tial or situational empathy. Embedded in this empathic expression
is a moral judgment that a predator denied the speaker’s status as an
equal, and the speaker’s reclamation of that equal status. This speech,
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INTRODUCTION
A strange thing is happening to common law speech torts. In state courts across
the Nation, they’re disappearing, preempted by the First Amendment. From a New
Hampshire city suing its libertarian residents for harassing city officers,1 to brothers suing
a TV station in Arizona for broadcasting their father’s suicide,2 to a Wisconsinite
school bus driver suing a journalist for publicizing her petty criminal history,3 to a
woman suing her ex-boyfriend’s mother for plastering missing-person posters outside
her home in Connecticut,4 the First Amendment is preempting intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED), intrusion upon seclusion, intentional interference with
contractual relations, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ignoring hornbook
constitutional avoidance doctrine, state courts routinely decide the First Amendment
question—whether the speech is protected—while consciously refusing to consider
the common law question—whether the speech is tortious in the first place—that is
logically (and legally) prior. This is backwards avoidance: state courts avoid a run-of-
the-mill private law issue by deciding a significant federal constitutional question.
Perhaps worse, state courts often dismiss these common law claims before dis-
covery. It turns out that once the First Amendment appears, these lawsuits do not need
developed factual records.5 That’s because there are only three facts that matter to
1 City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015).
2 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, L.L.C., 356 P.3d 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
3 Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
4 Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920 (Conn. 2015).
5 See infra Section II.B.3.
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the First Amendment: the violence, location, and content of the speech. Nonviolent
expressive conduct that is in public view and on a matter of public concern is immu-
nized. The most important question by far is whether the speech’s content falls within
a roomy conception of public concern. In these cases, the First Amendment doctrine
requiring appellate courts to independently and closely examine the factual record
is a mirage. The First Amendment denies plaintiffs not only a trial, but also the more
basic opportunity to present their case.6
The culprit is the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Snyder v. Phelps.7 In Snyder,
the father of a fallen Marine sued members of the fundamentalist Westboro Baptist
Church for emotional harm caused by their picketing of his son’s funeral.8 The Supreme
Court set aside the father’s $5 million jury verdict.9 “As a Nation,” wrote Chief Justice
Roberts for the majority of eight, “we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”10 Paying almost no
attention to Maryland law, Roberts announced that the First Amendment provides
a public concern defense in all state tort suits affixing liability to speech.11 Rather than
begin with state common law rules of liability, Roberts “beg[a]n[ ] in the opposite
corner with the First Amendment.”12 State courts picked up Snyder’s all-purpose
federal defense and have run with it. Speech on a matter of public concern (an
expansive category) is privileged.
This Article offers a sustained methodological critique of Snyder through the struc-
tural lens of judicial federalism (the relationship between the state and federal court
systems). To be clear, it does not argue that Snyder’s outcome was wrong or that Snyder
was an unconstitutional exercise of power. Regardless of your theory of incorporation,13
the reconstructed First Amendment applies in full force against the states. And it’s a First
Amendment truism that civil damages cannot be imposed for protected speech.14 If
6 This Article takes state courts seriously. See also Anna E. Carpenter et al., Studying
the New Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 250–52 (noting the “state court knowledge
deficit”); Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 4) (“[S]tate courts matter.”).
7 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
8 Id. at 449–50.
9 Id. at 450, 459.
10 Id. at 461.
11 Id. at 451–53.
12 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 292.
13 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 137–230 (1998) (tracing the history of the incorporation debate, criticizing the total and
selective incorporation models, and proposing the refined incorporation model); id. at
231–46 (discussing the incorporation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
14 Private figure plaintiffs can recover actual damages for defamation if they prove
negligence. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). See generally
David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (arguing for more
remedial flexibility in the application of the First Amendment to speech torts).
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we accept that Westboro’s speech was protected, then Snyder rightly set aside the
jury verdict.
But the existence of protected speech is not the only legal inquiry. State common
law speech torts can be legitimately constitutionalized in two broad ways. Snyder
represents the first model. On this view, the First Amendment is an external limit that
precludes a state from imposing liability for speech of public concern. Its vision of
the First Amendment is absolutist because it protects speech of public concern
regardless of context, form, factual record, and theory of liability. The first (and, most
of the time, only) question is whether the content of the defendant’s speech is of public
concern. If it is, then the plaintiff’s allegation—whether sounding in IIED, a privacy
tort, an economic tort, negligence, or some other theory of civil liability—is simply
irrelevant. This enables backwards avoidance, making it unnecessary for a court to
decide if the state tort actually covers the speech. Only the speech matters: if speech
is protected, the state is preempted. Snyder, then, contributed to the ongoing “rule-
ification” of the First Amendment and adopted a rule-conflict model for its
enforcement.15 The external limit of the First Amendment invalidates or strikes down
the tort. This model fits neatly into the emergent paradigm of thinking about the First
Amendment as an unstoppable force, a Lochner-esque preemption machine.16
There is another way. The second model views the First Amendment as an
internal limit on the state right of action. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,17 our
index case deploying the First Amendment to limit state common law torts, Justice
Brennan established the famous “federal rule,”18 also characterized as a “conditional
privilege,”19 that a public official is “prohibit[ed] . . . from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”20 On this view, the threshold
question is whether the application of state rules of law would impose liability for
expressive conduct. If yes, then there is state action, and only then is the First Amend-
ment inquiry taken up. This view considers crucially important not only the verdict,
but also the legal reasons—the rules and principles of state law—purporting to
legitimize the verdict. Rather than simply set aside the verdict because it punishes
speech, this model interrogates and refashions the state common law underwriting
the verdict, molding that law to ensure it conforms to the First Amendment.
15 Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103,
106 (2012).
16 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1199, 1207–09 (2015).
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18 Id. at 279–80.
19 Id. at 282 n.21. The Supreme Court took the characterization of the federal rule as a
privilege from a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas. Id. at 280 (citing Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)).
20 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
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The claim that Snyder and Sullivan represent different models of First Amendment
enforcement is contentious and needs justification. Indeed, the scholarly consensus is
that both Sullivan and Snyder operate as external, all-or-nothing limits on the states.21
On the contrary, this Article argues that scholars have been too quick to align Snyder
with Sullivan. This Article drives a wedge between their models of First Amendment
enforcement by arguing that Sullivan, unlike Snyder, is a common law decision.
Specifically, this Article argues that Brennan’s opinion adopted the internal point
of view vis-à-vis Alabama’s common law.22 As a threshold matter, Sullivan rested
its authority to rewrite state common law on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.23
It rightly accepted that the rules and principles of state common law, and not only
the ancillary orders enforcing state judgments, count as state action.24 By piercing
the libel verdict’s veil, Brennan subjected the legal reasons purporting to legitimize
that verdict to First Amendment scrutiny. Brennan did not throw out Alabama’s libel
tort; rather, he accepted Alabama’s common law of libel as far as constitutionally
permissible.25 This attitude—a practical attitude of accepting state common law—is
the internal point of view.
Drawing on a theory of common law adjudication,26 this Article argues that
adopting the internal point of view towards state common law explains why Sullivan
is a common law decision. The common law is a disciplined exercise of practical
reason that reflects and informs the complex texture of daily life and relationships
of members of the political community. State courts, which are the primary re-
positories of the common law, pride themselves on their status as common law courts.
Because they are closer to the people, state courts prefer to solve problems with local
rules. This, in turn, opens a dialogue on two fronts: first, with other state courts who
21 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts,
104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 53) (placing Snyder in “the Court’s
sequence of decisions” originating with Sullivan); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433,
437–43 (2016) (situating Snyder as an extension of Sullivan’s approach); Han, supra note
14, at 1175 (discussing “the Supreme Court’s general adherence to the all-or-nothing approach
in speech-tort cases ranging from Sullivan through Snyder.”); Nathan B. Oman & Jason M.
Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1162–63 (2013)
(situating Snyder as an extension of Sullivan’s approach); Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort,
Speech, and the Dubious Alchemy of State Action, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1157 (2015)
(“[I]n the line of cases from Sullivan and Snyder, the Court has attempted to establish a cate-
gorical, quasi-legislative scheme of dignitary tort.”).
22 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
23 Id. at 265–92.
24 See id. at 265.
25 Id. at 265–92.
26 See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155 (2002) [hereinafter Postema, Part I]; Gerald J. Postema, Classical
Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1 (2003) [herein-
after Postema, Part II].
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adopt or reject analogous common law rules, and second, with local legislatures who
prefer to comprehensively regulate.
Armed with the internal point of view to Alabama law, Sullivan adopted this
common law methodology, and resolved a long-standing common law debate. In the
early twentieth century, state courts debated the existence of a conditional privilege
in defamation for criticism of public officials or candidates for public office.27
Sullivan accepted a modified version of the so-called “liberal rule,” which permitted
the conditional privilege, quoting extensively from Rousseau Burch’s 1908 opinion
for the Kansas Supreme Court in Coleman v. MacLennan.28 Interestingly, the debate
played out at the American Law Institute’s [ALI] 1937 annual meeting. During dis-
cussion of a tentative draft of the First Torts Restatement, Burch, who had written
Coleman thirty years earlier, debated Learned Hand, who rejected the liberal rule.
Learned Hand convinced the ALI membership. The views of the author of Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten29 on the relationship between libel and free speech, artic-
ulated nearly thirty years before Sullivan, are of independent interest.
Finally, this Article argues that Sullivan’s methodology is preferable to Snyder’s
because Sullivan embraced, and Snyder eschewed, cooperative judicial federalism.30
Snyder shut down the articulation of state law. Because doctrine is a public good,
silencing state courts on state law—here, the unnecessary federal preemption of state
speech torts—is a systemic ill. Cooperative judicial federalism focuses on the value
of judicial dialogue between federal and state courts. It flourishes particularly when
a state right of action embeds a federal issue (and vice versa) because those cases
generate mixed questions of state and federal law. Exercising concurrent jurisdiction,
state and federal courts respond to each other’s opinions, shape the contours of their
own (and each other’s) law, and ensure state compliance with federal law. While
Sullivan’s common law methodology inaugurated over fifty years of productive state-
federal judicial dialogue, in just seven years Snyder’s absolutism has suppressed every
significant opportunity for intersystemic judicial conversation. One of Sullivan’s
unheralded virtues, then, is that it created the right conditions for a genuinely coop-
erative judicial federalism. That’s a compelling reason to prefer the Sullivan model.
There is a deep irony in Snyder’s model of First Amendment enforcement. Snyder’s
constitutional defense, in the words of one state court, “avoid[s] a ‘prolonged, costly,
27 See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
28 Id. at 285. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281–82 n.21.
29 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). See generally Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-
Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that in Masses, “Hand was the first judge to place heavy reliance
on democratic theory in seeking to understand the meaning of the first amendment,” and that
his premises and reasoning “have become the basic, though often unacknowledged, features
of modern first amendment analysis”).
30 “Judicial federalism” is used broadly to refer to the relationship between the state and
federal courts.
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and inevitably futile trial.’”31 But a trial isn’t futile for a losing plaintiff. Indeed, even
pretrial litigation isn’t futile if it permits plaintiffs to properly and completely
communicate their injury. Pretrial discovery and motion practice allow the tort
plaintiff to allege: that defendant wronged me.32 Snyder’s First Amendment, however,
silences this expressive function of tort law. Moreover, it’s ironic that Snyder’s First
Amendment smothers the articulation of state law. In an IIED suit, for example,
surely it is speech of public concern when a court expresses the local political com-
munity’s collective judgment that a defendant acted beyond all possible bounds of
civilized conduct. The First Amendment enforces the national community’s judgment
that the defendant shouldn’t pay damages for that conduct; it does not follow that
reasoned elaboration of the local community’s judgment is worthless.
The argument proceeds as follows. After Part I describes the reasoning and
significance of Sullivan and Snyder, Part II distinguishes between their models of
First Amendment enforcement. It defends the thesis that Sullivan is a common law
decision by arguing that Brennan adopted the internal point of view vis-à-vis
Alabama’s common law. But Snyder enforced an external, absolutist vision of the
First Amendment, which has shut down the articulation of state common law by state
courts. Finally, Part III argues that Sullivan’s methodology is superior to Snyder’s
because it embraced cooperative judicial federalism and generated decades of
productive state-federal judicial dialogue.
I. SULLIVAN AND SNYDER
This Part describes the reasoning and significance of the Article’s two focal
points, Sullivan and Snyder. In sum, Sullivan is necessary to the legitimacy of the
United States; Snyder is not so consequential. Latent in the following discussion is
that these two cases are symbols, representing not only choices about how the First
Amendment is enforced against the states, but also choices about how federal and
state law writ large interact. Lurking unarticulated in each is a vision of judicial
federalism. Parts II and III will draw out those different visions.
A. Sullivan
On November 3, 1960, Lester Bruce Sullivan, the elected Police Commissioner
of Montgomery, Alabama, was “very pleased.”33 Twelve “outstanding jurors”34 had
31 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, L.L.C., 356 P.3d 322, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)
(citation omitted).
32 Scott Hershovitz recently argued that tort law serves an expressive function. See Scott
Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10 J. Tort
L. 405, 406 (2017) (“What message does tort liability send? At the least, this: The defendant
wronged the plaintiff.”).
33 Jury Awards $500,000 In Alabama Libel Suit, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 4, 1960, at 29.
34 Id.
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just awarded him $500,000 for an alleged libel contained in a paid advertisement in
the New York Times describing police harassment and abuse. The largest libel award
in Alabama history,35 it was also the most damaging salvo in Sullivan’s campaign
against the northern press. Earlier that year, on his thirty-ninth birthday, Sullivan had
issued a statement excoriating the “prejudiced northern press” and its program of
“further[ing] . . . racial strife and exploitation for financial gain and spectacular dis-
torted news coverage.”36
Sullivan’s active prosecution of the media starkly contrasted with his passive (to
put it generously) policing of white brutality. On February 27, 1960, a white man
clubbed Christine Stovall, a twenty-two-year-old black woman, over the back of the
head.37 The press reported that nearby police made no arrests.38 Sullivan said, “[o]ur
hands were tied . . . because officers didn’t arrive on the scene until the disturbance
was over . . . and they couldn’t arrest anyone without a complaint.”39 The following
year, as Freedom Riders arrived in Montgomery on a Greyhound Bus, the city’s
police force was nowhere to be found.40 The Freedom Riders were mercilessly
beaten.41 Sullivan said, “we have no intention of standing police guard for a bunch
of trouble makers coming into our city and making trouble.”42
It was left to the federal courts to police Sullivan. His abnegation of duty earned
an injunction from District Judge Frank M. Johnson, who found “that the Montgom-
ery Police Department, under the direction of Sullivan . . . willfully and deliberately
failed to take measures to ensure the safety of the students and to prevent unlawful
acts of violence upon their persons,” which “continued even after the arrival of the
bus.”43 Sullivan’s attempt to weaponize libel was thwarted by the Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.44 Justice Brennan reversed Sullivan’s damages award
by establishing the famous “federal rule,”45 also characterized as a “‘conditional’
35 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
35 (1991). In 1964, as now, libel in Alabama is a common law cause of action subject to some
statutory regulation.
36 Statement by L. B. Sullivan, March 5, 1960, available at http://archives-alabama-primo
.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/01ALABAMA:default_scope:01ALABAMA_ALMA2161389700
02743 [https://perma.cc/TNG8-CSD4].
37 Montgomery Woman Beaten, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1960, at 51.
38 Id.
39 Sitdown Campaigns Are Pushed, ANNISTON STAR, Feb. 29, 1960, at 1.
40 LEWIS, supra note 35, at 10–11.
41 Don Martin, U.S. Official Is Knocked Unconscious: Montgomery Police Break Up
Scuffles With Tear Gas, WASH. POST, May 21, 1961, at A1.
42 Id. at A6. Sullivan tried to leverage all the attention into a gubernatorial candidacy, “if
public reaction continue[d] to be favorable.” Alabama Cop May Seek Post, CHI. DAILY
DEFENDER, July 17, 1961, at 11.
43 United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 901
(M.D. Ala. 1961).
44 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45 Id. at 279.
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privilege,”46 that a public official is “prohibit[ed] . . . from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”47
The Court in Sullivan also claimed power to “‘make an independent examination
of the whole record’ . . . to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”48 Brennan disposed of a Seventh
Amendment objection on two distinct grounds. First, he observed that the Seventh
Amendment “does not preclude us from determining whether governing rules of
federal law have been properly applied to the facts.”49 Second, Brennan pointed out
that the Supreme Court is empowered to review a state court’s findings of fact
“‘where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so inter-
mingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze
the facts.’”50 In Sullivan, the first ground did all the work: the facts, as found, showed
that the advertisement was not of and concerning Sullivan, and its publication did
not amount to actual malice.51
The Sullivan case was “an occasion for dancing in the streets”52 and the most
important First Amendment decision of the twentieth century.53 It held that a state’s
law of libel “can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and
“must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”54 The Court staked
out the “central meaning of the First Amendment” as the abolition of seditious libel.55
And it concluded that the federal rule protected the good-faith publication of criticism
of public officials who enforced discriminatory laws and policies in the south.56
Sullivan, then, stood at a nexus of the private law of torts, the First Amendment, and
federalism. First, aided by sympathetic state courts, Sullivan had obtained a private
law tort remedy against the publisher of a paid advertisement criticizing official con-
duct. According to M. Roland Nachman, Jr., Sullivan’s lawyer, an award of damages
for the advertisement was “within the normal, usual rubric and framework of libel.”57
46 Id. at 282 n.21.
47 Id. at 279–80.
48 Id. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
49 Id. at 285 n.26.
50 Id. (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385–86 (1927)).
51 Id. at 285–92.
52 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting a personal conversation with
Alexander Meiklejohn).
53 Henry Paul Monaghan, In Memoriam—Herbert Wechsler, A Legal Giant Is Dead, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1370, 1375 (2000).
54 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
55 Id. at 273.
56 See id. at 292.
57 Oral Argument at 01:23:59, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No.
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Second, at the time conventional doctrine held that the First Amendment did not
protect libel. Professor Herbert Wechsler, representing the New York Times, agitated
against that ingrained view, and announced that the Alabama judgment “poses . . .
hazards to the freedom of the press of a dimension not confronted since the early days
[of] the Republic.”58 Third, Nachman not only argued that libel fell outside the First
Amendment as a doctrinal matter.59 He also argued that “[t]he Court has left the
characterization of publications as libelous or not libelous to the States.”60 In other
words, there can be no federal common law of libel.
It is worth pausing to emphasize Sullivan’s stakes. Its enforcement of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments against state common law was part of an epic constitu-
tional struggle. Sullivan and its plaintiff cannot be disentangled from the Jim Crow
south, as Anthony Lewis chronicled in elegant detail.61 The menace of racism infected
the trial: the Times found it difficult to retain local counsel; to avoid violence, its New
York attorneys stayed in Alabama motels under assumed names; Sullivan’s lawyers
struck two African Americans from the list of thirty-six potential jurors; and the trial
judge was a Confederate zealot.62 Nor was Sullivan the only libel action afoot against
the Times. A cluster of lawsuits threatened the paper’s financial viability.63 Indeed, a
loss for the Times may have silenced national coverage of the civil rights movement.64
There are, moreover, strong reasons to think that Sullivan is necessary for a free
society. It is closely aligned with the eradication of seditious libel—the central thrust
of, or one of the core policies underlying, the First Amendment.65 The Madison and
Meiklejohn arguments about self-government establish that the minimal conception
of free expression protects criticism of government.66 And Rawls argued that the
absence of the crime of seditious libel is a necessary condition of a free society:
So long as this crime exists the public press and free discussion
cannot play their role in informing the electorate. And, plainly,
39), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/warren11/oral_argument_audio/14501 [https://perma.cc
/A8Y6-YGSF].
58 Id. at 00:00:27.
59 See id. at 01:23:21.
60 Id.
61 See generally LEWIS, supra note 35, at 15–22 (describing racial segregation and
discrimination in the United States in the mid-twentieth century, especially in Alabama and
the south, where it “was . . . far more virulent, because it had force of law,” and was a defining
characteristic of “the atmosphere in Alabama as The New York Times prepared to defend
itself in court in Montgomery against the first libel action, brought by Commissioner Sullivan”).
62 Id. at 24–27.
63 See id. at 42.
64 See id. at 34–45 (noting that the suit by Sullivan was designed “to choke off a process
that was educating the country about the nature of racism and was affecting public attitudes
on that issue”).
65 Monaghan, supra note 53, at 1376 n.34.
66 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275, 297 (1964).
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to allow the crime of seditious libel would undermine the wider
possibilities of self-government and the several liberties required
for its protection. Thus the great importance of New York Times
v. Sullivan.67
For Rawls, the freedom of political speech is essential “to any fully adequate scheme
of basic liberties.”68
B. Snyder
On March 10, 2006, Albert Snyder rode with his ex-wife and their two daughters
to St. John’s Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland.69 They were attending the
funeral of Snyder’s son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who had died in Iraq
in the line of duty a week earlier.70 As the funeral procession pulled into the church
grounds, Snyder saw the tops of some signs held by picketers between 200 and 300
feet away.71 He did not learn what was written on the signs until later that day, when
someone switched on the news at a private wake in his parents’ home.72
The picketers were seven members of the Westboro Baptist Church. Westboro
deploys confrontational tactics to preach its Calvinist theology, which Randall
Balmer, Westboro’s expert witness and a respected historian of American religion,
described as “fire-and-brimstone,” “fundamentalist militancy,” and “‘prophetic’ and
condemnatory.”73 Westboro preaches that the United States “is full of sin, and proud
of her sin.”74 “This proud sin,” Westboro members said in sworn affidavits, “does not
just include homosexuality, though that is a major one.”75 Adultery, divorce, remarriage,
and idolatry are also among the “institutionalize[d] sin[s].”76 The United States, they
say, “has become a nation of idolaters, and their main idols are the military uniform,
the American flag, and patriotism.”77 Coupled with the view that the United States
67 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 343 (2005).
68 Id. (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44).
69 See Michael Smerconish, He Looked Hate in the Eye, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2014), http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/al-snyder-westboro-baptist-church-104353
[https://perma.cc/93JC-X3UX]; Mike Argento, Time of Solace, Signs of Hate, YORK DAILY
RECORD, Mar. 11, 2006, at 01.
70 Argento, supra note 69.
71 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 449 (2011).
72 Id.
73 Statement of Randall Balmer, Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008)
(No. RDB-06-1389), 2007 WL 3118533, at 3–6.
74 Affidavit of Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis at ¶ 17, Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567
(D. Md. 2008) (No. 06-CV-1389).
75 Id. ¶ 63.
76 Id. ¶¶ 17, 63.
77 Id. ¶ 18.
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“is de facto Babylon” are beliefs that Westboro members are prophets, that scriptural
“discussions about the fall of Babylon . . . are in fact for America,” that tragedies are
punishments from God, and that the Iraq war was “a precursor to the destruction of
this nation and this world.”78 It follows that “we have a duty to publish to this nation,
and the world, a message that God is punishing them for their proud sins.”79
So, on March 10, 2006, Fred Phelps, two of his adult daughters, and four of his
minor grandchildren picketed Matthew Snyder’s funeral.80 After about forty-five
minutes of picketing, they packed up just as the funeral service was beginning.81
Westboro had given law enforcement notice.82 The picketing was peaceful, unamplified,
and confined to a small police-designated area on public land sandwiched between
a public street and church property.83 It was neither seen nor heard during the funeral
service.84 Phelps’s daughters held signs saying: “God Hates You,” “God Hates
America,” “America is Doomed,” “Semper Fi Fags” (with a graphic of stick figures
having sex), “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” and “God’s View” (with a graphic of Uncle
Sam in cross-hairs).85 Phelps’s grandchildren held signs saying: “You’re Going to
Hell,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “Fag Troops,” “Don’t Pray for the
USA,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Maryland Taliban,”
“Fags Doom Nations,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “Pope in Hell.” All seven wore T-
shirts emblazoned with “God Hates Fags.”86
Snyder commenced a diversity action against Phelps and Westboro,87 and later
added Phelps’s daughters as defendants.88 Three of the state law tort claims—IIED,
intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy—survived to a jury trial.89 The jury
returned a verdict for Snyder on all three, awarding $2.9 million in compensatory
damages and $8 million in punitive damages.90 The District Judge reduced punitive
damages to $2.1 million.91 The Fourth Circuit reversed, accepting Westboro’s
argument that the judgment contravened the First Amendment.92
78 Id. ¶¶ 25, 34, 36.
79 Id. ¶ 35.
80 See Isaac Baker & Ari Natter, Group Pickets Across Country, CARROLL CTY. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2006, at 01.
81 See id.
82 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
83 Id. at 448–49.
84 Id. at 460.
85 Id. at 448, 454; Affidavit of Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis at ¶ 126, Snyder v. Phelps, 533
F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008) (No. 06-CV-1389); Argento, supra note 69, at 01.
86 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448, 454; Argento, supra note 69, at 01.
87 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008).
88 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 210–11 (4th Cir. 2009).
89 See id. at 211.
90 Id.
91 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008).
92 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
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The Supreme Court rejected Snyder’s appeal in an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by all except Justice Alito.93 Proceeding on “the unexamined premise
that [Westboro’s] speech was tortious,” Roberts noted that “[t]he Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”94 Making out the defense “turns
largely on whether [Westboro’s] speech is of public or private concern, as determined
by all the circumstances of the case.”95 Speech is of public concern “when it can ‘be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of
general interest and of value and concern to the public.’”96 The Court must examine
the “content, form, and context” of the speech as disclosed by an independent review
of the whole record.97 Roberts gave two examples of speech of purely private concern:
information about a particular individual’s credit report made solely in the personal
interest of the speaker to a small number of subscribers who were bound not to
disseminate; and videos of a government employee engaged in sexual activity.98
Turning to the speech at issue, Roberts held that “[t]he ‘content’ of Westboro’s
signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large.”99 This conclusion
is stated rather than justified. Westboro’s signs, although “fall[ing] short of refined
social or political commentary,” nevertheless highlighted “matters of public import,”
namely, “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate
of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic
clergy.”100 It did not matter that some of the signs could be fairly considered as related
to the Snyders specifically, because “the overall thrust and dominant theme of
Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”101 On form, Roberts held
that the signs conveyed Westboro’s position “in a manner designed . . . to reach as
broad a public audience as possible.”102 And on context, Roberts held that the funeral
setting “cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”103 Roberts
rejected Snyder’s arguments on content, form, and context—for example, that
Westboro’s picketing was simply a pretext for a private, personal attack on Snyder
93 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 446, 461, 463 (2011).
94 Id. at 451, 451 n.2.
95 Id. at 451.
96 Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); City of San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
97 Id. at 453–54 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
761 (1985)).
98 Id. at 453 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 and City of San Diego, 543
U.S. at 84).
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and his family, and that the signs deserved minimal First Amendment protection
because Westboro exploited the funeral as a platform to publicize its message—by
reiterating that Westboro peacefully communicated its sincerely held beliefs on mat-
ters of public concern while lawfully present on public land.104 Westboro’s speech
was therefore “entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment.”105
The remainder of the opinion argued three seemingly unrelated points. First, IIED
is not a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on speech.106 Rather, “[i]t
was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages,” and “any distress occasioned
by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message con-
veyed.”107 Second, the IIED element of outrageousness is “highly malleable” with
“an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on
the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression.”108 This creates an unacceptable risk that the jury would be
turned into a censor; an outraged jury cannot overcome the First Amendment’s special
protection. Finally, in the only substantive argument dealing with the intrusion upon
seclusion claim, Roberts rejected Snyder’s assertion that he was a member of a captive
audience at his son’s funeral.109 The captive audience doctrine, Roberts explained,
is applied only sparingly. Snyder did not meet his burden of “‘showing that substantial
privacy interests [were] invaded in an essentially intolerable manner,’”110 because
Westboro stayed well away from, and did not interfere with, the memorial service
itself, and Snyder saw no more than the tops of the signs while driving there.111
Justice Breyer’s prudential concurrence emphasized that the Court’s opinion was
narrowly limited to Westboro’s picketing. Although he “agree[d] with the Court’s
conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of public concern,” Breyer thought
that more was required.112 After all, a physical assault committed as a means to
broadcast a matter of public concern to a wide audience is not immunized by the First
Amendment, and “in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would
be similarly unprotected.”113 The judicial task, when “First Amendment values and
state-protected (say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict,” is to “review[ ] the
underlying facts in detail.”114 And—just like the Court—Breyer reiterated that
Westboro’s peaceful picketing communicated its sincerely held beliefs on matters
104 Id. at 453–54.
105 Id. at 458.
106 Id. at 457–58.
107 Id. at 457.
108 Id. at 458 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 459–60 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
111 Id. at 460.
112 Id. at 461 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 462.
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of public concern while lawfully present on public land, that the picketing did not
impact the funeral service, and that Snyder only saw the tops of the signs as he drove
there.115 The application of state law would “punish Westboro for seeking to com-
municate its views on matters of public concern without proportionately advancing
the State’s interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.”116
Justice Alito penned a lonesome dissent. He disagreed “that the First Amendment
protected [Westboro’s] right to brutalize Mr. Snyder.”117 Alito was obviously affected
by Snyder’s “incalculable loss,” and worried that the First Amendment insulated
Westboro from liability for a “vicious verbal assault” that had deprived Snyder the
elementary right of every parent to bury a dead child in peace.118 Alito denied that
the First Amendment is a license to “intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on
private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal
attacks that make no contribution to public debate.”119 Because IIED is “a very narrow
tort”120 that can be satisfied by speech, “[w]hen grave injury is intentionally inflicted
by means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not
interfere with recovery.”121 Alito carefully reviewed Westboro’s speech and concluded
that it “specifically attacked Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2)
he was a member of the United States military,”122 and that “this attack, which was
almost certain to inflict injury, was central to [Westboro’s] well-practiced strategy
for attracting public attention.”123 On the one hand, Alito said, “commentary on the
Catholic Church or the United States military constitutes speech on matters of public
concern,” but, on the other, “speech regarding Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct
does not.”124 Alito thought Breyer’s analogy—that a physical assault committed as
a means to broadcast a matter of public concern to a wide audience is not immunized
by the First Amendment—captured the nature of Westboro’s verbal assault here.125
Alito directly engaged the Court’s opinion on three fronts. He argued, first, that
the Court was wrong to conclude that “the overall thrust and dominant theme of
Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broad[ ] public issues.”126 Rather, Westboro’s
specific attack on Matthew was of “central importance.”127 “[I]n any event,” Alito
argued, “I fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because
115 Id.
116 Id. at 462–63.
117 Id. at 463 (Alito, J., dissenting).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 464.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 466.
122 Id. at 470.
123 Id. at 466.
124 Id. at 470.
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it is interspersed with speech that is protected.”128 Second, Alito rejected what he
called the Court’s “suggest[ion] that [Westboro’s] personal attack on Matthew Snyder
is entitled to First Amendment protection because it was not motivated by a private
grudge.”129 Westboro executed a “cold and calculated strategy to slash a stranger as
a means of attracting public attention,” and its desire to achieve maximum publicity
did not turn a personal attack into a contribution to public debate.130 Third, Alito
contended that the location of the picketing—on public land adjacent to a public
street—should not be dispositive: if otherwise actionable speech grounds IIED
liability, then a public street near a funeral is not “a free-fire zone.”131
II. SULLIVAN V. SNYDER
Sullivan and Snyder are usually placed in the same category of First Amendment
enforcement, because Snyder takes up Sullivan’s mantle to limit state common law
torts according to the constitutional free speech guarantee.132 Since Sullivan, no
tenable First Amendment theory can deny that the First Amendment protects some
speech which would otherwise be actionable under a state’s common law. For ex-
ample, a state’s IIED tort: compensates for injury to state of mind, and is not a “generally
applicable law”; does not involve the injured party’s waiver of First Amendment
rights; can punish for speech of public concern; and can be balanced away when it
restricts speech.133 In a choice between “two radically different ways that the First
Amendment addresses civil liability involving speech—either full First Amendment
protection or virtually none at all”134—Sullivan and Snyder are of the same ilk.
But their modes of First Amendment enforcement are categorically different. This
Part aims to drive a wedge between them. Sullivan is a common law decision. It
started with the Alabama law of libel because that is what the state courts purported
to enforce.135 And, as this Part shows, Sullivan’s primary holding settled a long-
standing common law debate that raged in state courts over the existence of a
128 Id.
129 Id. at 471–72.
130 Id. at 472.
131 Id.
132 See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1658–60 (2009) (explaining that Sullivan’s application
of the First Amendment to state common law had “profound implications” and that the
Supreme Court “expanded the Sullivan rule in defamation law” and “also applied the First
Amendment beyond defamation to a variety of speech torts”).
133 See generally id. at 1672–85 (detailing various theories of First Amendment applica-
bility, including the nature of the injury approach, the generally applicable law approach, the
consensual waiver approach, the public concern approach, and the First Amendment bal-
ancing approach).
134 Id. at 1652.
135 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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conditional privilege in a defamation action for criticism of public officials or candidates
for public office. Brennan quoted extensively from, and modeled his federal rule on,
the leading state court decision supporting the so-called “liberal rule,” which immunized
criticism of public officials and candidates for office.136 Sullivan is a common law
decision because it adopted the internal point of view towards state common law.
Snyder started not with Maryland’s common law, but with the First Amendment.
Roberts announced that the First Amendment provides a public concern defense in
all state tort suits affixing liability to speech.137 Consequently, speech on matters of
public concern (an expansive and elastic category) is not actionable. This Part
demonstrates that since it was decided, state courts have applied Snyder to a wide
range of factual circumstances and to torts beyond IIED. Snyder is absolutist because
its immunization of speech that is arguably of public concern has effectively pre-
empted state common law speech torts. Although courts are required to analyze the
content, form, and context of speech in determining the extent of First Amendment
protection, in reality, content is almost always dispositive.
A. Sullivan: Start with the Common Law
Methodologically, Sullivan is a common law decision. This claim, though simple-
sounding, needs unpacking. Sullivan is a common law decision because Brennan’s
opinion adopted the internal point of view vis-à-vis Alabama’s common law. Brennan
first held that a state common law rule grounding a jury verdict counts as state action.138
He then adopted the point of view of a state common law court to supply a rule of de-
cision that conformed to the First Amendment.139
1. Looking Behind the Libel Label
The state action point did not receive much airtime in briefing, oral argument,
or Brennan’s final opinion. Wechsler’s brief urged the Court to look behind the libel
label. The brief emphasized that not only the judgment but also the “rule of law” (or
“rule of liability” or “principle of liability”) was state action that is offensive to the
First Amendment.140 In Wechsler’s telling, the Times “challenged a State rule of law
applied by a State court to render judgment carrying the full coercive power of the
State, claiming full faith and credit through the Union solely on that ground.”141 It
136 Id. at 282.
137 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011).
138 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264–65.
139 See id.
140 Brief for Petitioner at 29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 42, 49, 58, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39). The pincites refer to expressions like “rule of law” in the
petitioner’s brief.
141 Id. at 39–40.
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was “obvious[ ]” to Wechsler that both “[t]he rule and judgment” were “of course”
state action.142 In a phrase picked up by Brennan, Wechsler said that “libel does not
enjoy a talismanic insulation from the limitations of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.”143 Wechsler’s “first proposition” during oral argument was “that this action
was judged in Alabama by an unconstitutional rule of law . . . offensive on its face
to the First Amendment.”144
Brennan accepted this argument almost glibly. He held that the common law rule
was constitutionally deficient due to inconsistency with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.145 Like Wechsler’s brief, Brennan’s opinion referred to the “rule of
law” or “rule of liability”146 as state action to be “measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.”147 “It matters not,” said Brennan, that the “law has been ap-
plied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute.”148
What matters is whether state “power has in fact been exercised.”149 The common
law fashioned and applied by the Alabama courts counted as state action that must
yield to the First Amendment.
Having subjected the legal reasons purportedly legitimizing the jury verdict to
First Amendment scrutiny, there were a few options available to Brennan. One was
to throw out the libel tort when wielded by officials as officials, as Wechsler and the
concurrences urged.150 Another was to require the official to prove special damages
(that is, actual or material economic harm).151 A third option was to require the official
to prove the critic’s malice.152 The requirement of malice distinguished between dishonest
statements designed to harm the official and honest yet factually incorrect criticisms.153
Brennan’s famous adoption of an actual malice requirement was characterized
by a striking and unusual engagement with state common law. Thanks to Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins,154 the Supreme Court rarely bothers with the intricacies of state
common law, on which state courts are authoritative. A similar tendency is apparent
142 Id. (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 29. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“[l]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations.”).
144 Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 00:40:55.
145 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
146 Id. at 268.
147 Id. at 264–65, 268–69, 278.
148 Id. at 265.
149 Id.
150 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring), 297–98 (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Brief for Petitioner at 51–52, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No.
39); Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 00:41:08.
151 See Brief for Petitioner at 53, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(No. 39).
152 See id. at 53–54.
153 See id. at 54.
154 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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when state statutes present federal constitutional questions. Federal courts are often
reluctant to narrow state statutes to avoid those questions.155 Although arguably erro-
neous, federal courts avoid avoidance in state statutory cases. This approach is driven
by a concern that federal courts lack power to rewrite state statutes if the Constitution
does not affirmatively require it. Rather than decide the question for themselves, the
federal courts often punt to state legislatures or state courts. In Sullivan, the Alabama
law of libel was a mix: a creature of the common law regulated by statute.156 Unusually
in a post-Erie world, Brennan held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments af-
firmatively required that the Alabama law of libel be changed.
2. The Internal Point of View
Put differently, Brennan adopted an internal point of view vis-à-vis Alabama
common law. Ordinarily, the Constitution either upholds or invalidates state law. Rather
than narrow, federal courts prefer to veto state statutes. Wechsler and the concurrences
similarly preferred to view the application of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
as a binary operator: before, state officials could bring defamation claims; after, they
could not.157 On this view, the Constitution operates externally to state common law.
But Brennan took a different view. The First and Fourteenth Amendments justified
Brennan adopting an internal point of view vis-à-vis Alabama law and modifying
that law to remove the constitutional infirmity.
The distinction between the internal and external points of view of a social group
equipped with rules of conduct was first made by Herbert Hart in 1961. The external
point of view is an attitude towards the rules of the group “as an observer who does
not himself accept them.”158 The internal point of view towards the rules is the attitude
of “a member of the group [who] accepts and uses them as guides to conduct.”159 Hart
illustrated this concept by way of a traffic light on a busy street. The external point
of view, he said, is limited to the view of an observer who says that “when the light
turns red there is a high probability that the traffic will stop.”160 But this “will miss
out a whole dimension of the social life” of the drivers, who adopt the internal point
of view by treating the red light “not merely [as] a sign that others will stop,” but “as
a signal for them to stop, and so a reason for stopping in conformity to rules which
make stopping when the light is red a standard of behaviour and an obligation.”161
The debate over the correct understanding of the distinction between the internal
and the external points of view is alive and well. This is not the place to rehash that
155 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretations: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1948–58 (2011).
156 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
157 See id. at 293, 297–99 (Black, J., concurring).
158 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 90.
161 Id.
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debate. The distinction has been widely adopted (a version of it was deployed by both
Hart and Ronald Dworkin) but no one seems to agree precisely on what it is. Hart
distinguished between the observer and the group member;162 Dworkin between the
sociologist or historian and the participant;163 Shapiro (reconstructing Hart) between
the theoretical and the practical.164 In a skeptical intellectual history, Barzun dis-
tinguished between substantive and methodological varieties of the distinction.165
I’ll focus on the substantive internal point of view, which, as articulated by Shapiro,
is “the practical attitude of rule acceptance,”166 or, according to Barzun, is “the
attitude of someone who accepts a given rule as a guide for his or her conduct.”167
A person “takes the internal point of view towards a rule when one intends to conform
to the rule, criticizes others for failing to conform, does not criticize others for
criticizing, and expresses one’s criticism using evaluative language.”168
Under the Rules of Decision Act,169 federal courts regard relevant state law as
rules of decision, unless federal law requires otherwise. This means that federal judges
take the substantive internal point of view towards state law. They display a practical
attitude of accepting state law: they intend to conform to state law (except where it
is preempted by federal law), criticize other judges if they fail to apply state law cor-
rectly, view the fact of criticism as legitimate, and use evaluative language. But there
are, nevertheless, crucial differences in the expression of the practical attitude of state
law acceptance in federal and state courts. State courts have a legal claim to the status
of ultimate sovereign authority over state law. They make and develop state law. As
a species of the substantive internal point of view, I’ll call this the authorial attitude:
state courts author state law.
Federal courts adopt another species of the substantive internal point of view,
which I’ll call scribal. Thanks to Erie, in the absence of applicable federal law, federal
courts have no authoritative say over the content of state law. When federal courts
162 See id. at 89–90.
163 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13–14 (1986).
164 See Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157
(2006) (distinguishing between two points of view: the practical, which “is that of the insider
who must decide how he or she will respond to the law”; and the theoretical, which “is that
of the observer, who is often, but not necessarily, an outsider, who studies the social behavior
of a group living under law”).
165 Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal
Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015) (summarizing three different internal points of view,
one substantive and two methodological, and arguing that the distinction between the internal
and external perspectives has “proliferated throughout legal theory,” “allowed novel, inter-
disciplinary approaches to studying legal phenomena,” and “offered a sophisticated intellectual
justification for engaging in more traditional, doctrinal forms of scholarship,” but has also
“dodged as many questions as it has answered”).
166 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 1157, 1159, 1161.
167 Barzun, supra note 165, at 1218.
168 Shapiro, supra note 164, at 1163.
169 Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
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apply state law in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and state law has run out, the
federal court can either hazard an Erie guess or, in some instances, certify the ques-
tion to the state supreme court. In a run-of-the-mill case, the federal court ascertains
state law as best it can, seeking to capture and apply state law as it exists, point-in-
time. This scribal attitude thus takes a substantive internal point of view by seeking
a current but static snapshot of state law. And while federal court judges need no
longer “be a ventriloquist’s dummy,”170 it was not until 1991 that the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted de novo rather than deferential review of lower federal court determi-
nations of state law.171 Federal courts are not authors, but scribes of state law.
3. The “Discoursive” Method of the Common Law
Reconstructing a modest and historically minded conception of the common law,
Gerald Postema sensitively theorized some of our platitudinous aphorisms about the
common law: incrementalism, case-by-case adjudication, bottom-up reasoning, and
so on.172 The common law, he argued, “is rooted in a disciplined practice of public
practical reasoning, maintaining a substantial congruence (but not identity) with the
texture of daily life and affairs of members of the political community.”173 For our pur-
poses, there are three aspects of this so-called “artificial reason” that merit highlighting.
The first is that the classical conception of the common law focused on what
Matthew Hale dubbed the “texture of human affairs” and the “conversation between
man and man.”174 In Postema’s reconstruction, “Hale’s use of these two terms ‘texture’
and ‘conversation’ is rich and telling,” because they capture the complexity of “all
the forms of daily social interaction, commerce, and communication that give shape
to human affairs.”175 The aim of the common law judge was “to make concrete
judgments from a comprehensive grasp of the concrete relations and arrangements
woven into the fabric of common life.”176 Judges acquire “the social capacity to make
judgments that even in novel cases one can be confident will elicit recognition and
acceptance as appropriate in one’s community.”177 When interpreting a covenant, for
example, Hale’s judge “sets the words into the context of his understanding of the
concrete commerce of the parties,” and deploys relevant cases and “his understanding
170 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 396 (6th ed.
2002).
171 Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 236 (1991) (“The obligation of respon-
sible appellate review and the principles of a cooperative judicial federalism underlying Erie
require that courts of appeals review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo.”).
172 Postema, Part I, supra note 26; Postema, Part II, supra note 26.
173 Postema, Part II, supra note 26, at 27.
174 Id. at 4.
175 Id. at 4 n.17.
176 Id. at 5.
177 Id. at 9–10.
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of the practice of making sense out of such agreements.”178 The common law crafted
solutions molded to the tangible social relationships between parties, and its credibility
depended on a sensitive, textured understanding of those complex relationships.
Second, the artificial reason of the common law is “discoursive,” because it
constitutes “deliberative reasoning and argument in an interlocutory, indeed forensic,
context.”179 Sound law is “tried and sifted upon disputation and argument” in open
court.180 Hale thought that common law judging “was a distinctively deliberative,
discoursive capacity,” that is, “an ability to articulate and defend judgments publicly.”181
And, on this view, the authority of a common law opinion derives from its surviving
continual contestation in a public forum. A judicial decision claims authority as “the
product of a process of discoursive reasoning and contextually-situated reflective
judgment.”182 According to Hale, a judgment counts as law if it is integrated or in-
corporated into the practice of common law reasoning183: as Postema put it, “[o]nly
through continual use, exposition, interpretation, and extension—through being taken
up and appropriated by practitioners of the common law—was a novel rule or doctrine
made part of the common law.”184 And, through its incorporation into the common law,
a doctrine influences the activities of members of the political community, strengthening
the link between the common law and the complex texture of human experience.
Finally, the common law resisted the canonical formulation of its doctrines. Com-
mon law rules and norms can be reduced to text, argued Postema, “but no such formu-
lation is conclusively authoritative; each is in principle vulnerable to challenge and
revision in the course of reasoned argument and dispute in the public forensic context.”185
Bacon thought that the common law “is not to be sought from the words of the rule,
as if it were the text of the law,”186 and Coke thought that “[t]he reporting of particular
cases . . . is the most perspicuous course of tracing the right rule and reason of the
law.”187 Postema labeled these statements “orthodox common law jurisprudence.”188
We see the threads of this discoursive account of common law jurisprudence at work
today, especially in state courts. State courts view themselves, and distinguish them-
selves from federal courts, as common law courts. Ellen Ash Peters, former Chief
Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, wrote that “[u]nlike the federal courts,
Connecticut courts still function, most of the time, as common law courts, where the
178 Id. at 9.
179 Id. at 7.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 16.
182 Id. at 17.
183 See id. at 13.
184 Id. at 20.
185 Id. at 14.
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operative principles are more often derived from fact-bound precedents than from
authoritative texts.”189 Similarly, Margaret H. Marshall, former Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, contended, “[t]o an extent virtually unknown
in the federal courts, state court judges are common law judges.”190 “Because we are
deeply rooted in the common law,” argued Marshall, “we are fluent in its cardinal
principle of law’s plasticity,” and the ability of the common law to “adapt[] to changing
realities with a disciplined incrementalism.”191
State courts, because they are common law courts, reflect and influence the day-
to-day activities of, and relationships among, their residents.192 State courts are local
courts, less centralized than their federal counterparts, and in that sense are “closer”
to the people.193 The doctrinal basins of the common law (torts, contracts, property,
and restitution) are located in the states. State common law courts often prefer to solve
problems possessing a constitutional dimension by fashioning a common law rule
that avoids the constitutional difficulty. Their “focus . . . is to fashion workable rules
for a narrower, more specific range of people and situations.”194 “The state courts’
long tradition as common law generalists,” argued Helen Hershkoff, “affords legiti-
macy to this nonconstitutional elaboration of public issues.”195 The absence of a
federal general common law means that the general common law is state law; and
that common law is co-constitutive of the complex texture of human affairs.
In its ideal form, the common law practice of state courts is classically dis-
coursive. For one thing, of course, state courts “regularly borrow from each other,
using good ideas and forms of analysis that lawyers cite in appellate proceedings.”196
State courts are wary of a U.S. Supreme Court that prematurely silences interstate
judicial dialogue when federalizing the common law.197 Moreover, a preference for
189 Ellen Ash Peters, What Are the Locals Up To? A Connecticut Snapshot, in WHY THE
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 129, 130
(Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2010).
190 Margaret H. Marshall, State Courts in the Global Marketplace of Ideas, in WHY THE
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 153, supra
note 189, at 160.
191 Id.
192 See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (1995).
193 Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 459, 465 (1996); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2067 (2010).
194 Judith S. Kaye, A Double Blessing: Our State and Federal Constitutions, 30 PACE L.
REV. 844, 848 (2010).
195 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (1999).
196 Randall T. Shepard, State Supreme Courts as Places for Litigating New Questions, in
WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 137,
supra note 189, at 150.
197 Marshall, supra note 190, at 162–63.
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crafting common law solutions to avoid constitutional difficulties opens a dialogue
with the state legislature. Judith Kaye, former Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals, noted that common law decisions “leave it open for legislatures to fix
comprehensive standards.”198 Molding common law rules against the backdrop of
constitutional norms “afford[s] the legislature an explicit opportunity to develop
programmatic content.”199 The integrated discourse among a state’s lawmaking insti-
tutions is deep. Ellen Ash Peters observed that “state supreme courts see the creation
of an integrated state jurisprudence, without sharp lines of demarcation between consti-
tutional law, statutory law, and judge made law, as part of our judicial responsibility.”200
And, because state courts are closer to the people and to state legislatures, unac-
ceptable common law is “more readily redressable.”201 Developing common law rules
consistently with constitutional norms increases the likelihood that those rules survive
continual public contestation and are taken up by legislatures and other courts.
4. Sullivan’s Discourse
Armed with the internal point of view to Alabama law, Sullivan adopted the dis-
coursive method of the common law. In the first half of the twentieth century, a debate
raged in state courts over the existence of a conditional privilege to a defamation suit.202
In the mid-1930s, state courts were about evenly split on whether a member of the
public was conditionally privileged to make false and defamatory statements of fact
about public officers and candidates for office.203 To establish a privileged occasion,
the defendant had to show that the speech related to the qualifications of a public officer
or a candidate for office. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the privi-
lege had been abused, that is, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant did not
believe the truth of the statement or did not have reasonable grounds for believing in
its truth. The states recognizing this conditional privilege were said to adhere to the “lib-
eral rule,” because it permitted more public discussion and loosened defamatory restric-
tions; the states rejecting the conditional privilege adhered to the “narrow rule.”204
Kansas, for example, affirmed the liberal rule in a 1908 case, Coleman v.
MacLennan.205 The plaintiff, the state’s attorney-general seeking re-election, sued
198 Judith S. Kaye, Foreword: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full
Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 745 (1992).
199 Hershkoff, supra note 195, at 1164.
200 Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State
Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1070–71 (1998).
201 Kaye, supra note 194, at 848–49.
202 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1041 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936) (Note
to Annual Meeting).
203 Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 135 (1937) (“The au-
thority is just about evenly divided.”).
204 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1041 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936).
205 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
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the owner and publisher of a newspaper for an allegedly defamatory article purporting
to state facts about the plaintiff’s official conduct relating to a school fund trans-
action.206 The trial judge instructed the jury on the conditional privilege, and the jury
found for the defendant.207 Rousseau Burch, for the Kansas Supreme Court, affirmed
the lower court in an interesting and wide-ranging opinion.208 Burch held that anyone
claiming to be defamed by a communication on “matters of public concern, public
men, and candidates for office,” “must show actual malice, or go remediless.”209
Burch noted that “[u]nder a form of government like our own there must be freedom
to canvass in good faith the worth of character and qualifications of candidates for
office.”210 Analogizing from English cases on parliamentary and courtroom privilege,
Burch argued, in a passage made famous by Sullivan, that the importance of the
discussion of the character and qualifications of candidates for office “is so vast and
the advantages derived are so great that they more than counterbalance” any potential
injury to individuals.211
Nearly twenty years after Coleman, the debate over the liberal and the narrow
rules played out at the American Law Institute’s 1937 annual meeting, attended by
Burch and also by Learned Hand.212 The thirteenth tentative draft of the first torts
Restatement adopted the liberal rule, citing Coleman as a leading case.213 This proved
contentious. Fowler V. Harper, the Associate Reporter and a noted torts expert, said
that the state of authority was about evenly divided or “a little bit on the side of the
strict rule.”214 Augustus N. Hand, Learned Hand’s first cousin and, like Learned Hand,
a judge on the Second Circuit, moved to strike the conditional privilege from the
Restatement.215 William Draper Lewis, ALI’s founding director, called it “the most
important question you have in relation to this volume.”216
Burch spoke in favor of the liberal rule. He defended Coleman but was
“extremely reluctant to be in the attitude of the fireman rescuing his own child.”217
Nevertheless, he responded to criticism that the conditional privilege was contrary
to English law, saying, “I have never thought it necessary to roll up the bottoms of
my trousers when it was raining in London.”218 He suggested that the Restatement’s
broad and unchallenged conditional privilege rule—permitting “any one of several
206 See id. at 281.
207 See id. at 281–82.
208 Id. at 293.
209 Id. at 285.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 286.
212 Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 2 (1937).
213 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1041 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936).
214 Proceedings of 1937 Annual Meeting, 14 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 148 (1937).
215 Id. at 137 (Judge Augustus Hand).
216 Id. (Director William Draper Lewis).
217 Id. at 142–43 (Hon. Rosseau A. Burch).
218 Id. at 143.
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persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter” to claim a con-
ditional privilege—would support the liberal rule, just as it supported a conditional
privilege to members of non-profit associations for communications concerning the
qualifications of officers and members.219 The requirement of good faith, “a matter
that is tried every day in all the courts of the country,” ensured that newspapers were
not given a license to defame.220 And he argued that the predicted dangers flowing
from the liberal rule—that it would deter people from running for office and en-
courage outrageous and scandalous press reporting—had not eventuated in Kansas,
where the liberal rule had prevailed for sixty years.221 Burch’s final point was funda-
mental. If an investigation leads to an honest and reasonably founded belief in facts
which turn out to be wrong, Burch asked, “just because somebody is running for
office, that must be suppressed?”222
Burch’s support of the liberal rule pitted him against Learned Hand. Hand started
from the premise that “[t]he elector is not helped by learning false things about a man
who is running for office or who is in office.”223 He embraced the view that there is
no public interest in the discussion of falsehood. For Hand, the problem was one of
burden of proof. If the liberal rule privileged newspapers to publish facts about a
public officer or candidate that turned out to be untrue, then Hand would have no
objection.224 But the burden of showing good faith and that the privilege had not been
abused rests with the injured party. A newspaper “has not got to justify itself” because
“[i]t is enough for it to say this man was running for public office or he was in public
office and then the burden moves to the other side.”225 This burden, Hand argued,
is impossible to discharge. Take, for example, “a great metropolitan paper.”226 How
is an injured party “to burrow into the structure and the management of a great paper
to find out what inquiry they make; whether the editor was moved by a personal
feeling of spite; whether he was sore against the party[?]”227
Hand then suggested that libel is not a very effective control on newspapers. He
drew a distinction between preventing a newspaper from making statements (which
no one could countenance) and making the newspaper liable for its statements. “At
least,” said Hand, libel “gives [the injured person] some money. That is not much.”228
If newspapers are not liable for damages, then “they have a free hand for anything
that they want to say in the heat of a campaign or perhaps when guided by the meanest
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 146.
222 Id. at 147.
223 Id. at 150.
224 See id.
225 Id. at 151–52.
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of motives.”229 Hand thought that “a most unjust deprivation of remedies to the parties
who are injured.”230 Hand thus supported rejecting the conditional privilege.
Burch briefly responded, arguing that the problems with the burden of proof were
more apparent than real. Relating an anecdote of a libel trial, Burch said that a jury
deciding the question of good faith would find against a defendant who “displayed
a tendency to conceal,” even if the evidence ultimately showed that the defendant was
testifying truthfully.231 A jury would not be satisfied that an untrustworthy defendant
honestly believed facts after making a reasonable investigation. Burch thought that
burden-of-proof difficulties “all wash[ ] out when the parties face the jury and good
faith will appear which will warrant the jury finding one way or the other without
difficulty.”232 This rejoinder was apparently unconvincing. After a little more discussion,
the ALI sided with Hand and rejected the conditional privilege, 98 votes to 22.233
In Sullivan, Brennan held that the First Amendment required the liberal rule—in
other words, the First Amendment resolved the common law question as Burch had
suggested in 1937. Brennan quoted extensively from Coleman, noting that it rep-
resented “[a]n oft-cited . . . like rule, which has been adopted by a number of state
courts,”234 and that “[t]he consensus of scholarly opinion apparently favors the rule
that is here adopted.”235 The “privilege for the citizen-critic of government” was
“required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”236 It is true, of course, that the
privilege established in Sullivan is not precisely coterminous with the liberal rule.
But Brennan went out of his way to draw from state common law. His first draft of
the Sullivan opinion stated that “[s]afeguards have already been devised by state
courts to guard against the risk that the civil action for libel might be a vehicle for
the suppression of protected comment.”237 The liberal rule articulated by Coleman,
Brennan’s first draft continued, “satisf[ies] the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”238 Sullivan, in other words, was sensitive to the states as authorities over their
own common law. Alabama common law was inconsistent with the First Amendment;
looking to sister states for a constitutional answer is, at the very least, state-regarding
and sensitive to the legitimate interests of the states to develop and direct the course
of their own common law.
The course of authority after Sullivan is well known and, after a shaky start, de-
veloped into a stable doctrinal regime.239 In 1977, John Wade said that the developments
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 154 (Hon. Rosseau A. Burch).
232 Id.
233 Id. at 156–57.
234 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
235 Id. at 280 n.20.
236 Id. at 282–83.
237 LEWIS, supra note 35, at 265–66.
238 Id.
239 This is not necessarily a consensus view. In 1990, when Sullivan was 25 years old, a
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in the law of defamation after Sullivan were “coming about through the traditional
common law technique,” that the Supreme Court was “working out the problems on a
case-by-case basis,” and that “[t]here have been some wrong turns, but they have been
corrected.”240 The Supreme Court’s reform of defamation, said Wade, produced “a much
better system, simplified and workable administratively—and with a better total bal-
ance of interests.”241 The Supreme Court’s extensive reformation of the law of defamation
was “sound and solid,” and “all the signs point to a very fine completed product.”242
B. Snyder: Start with the First Amendment
While Sullivan started with the state’s legal reasons underpinning the jury verdict,
Snyder started with the bare social fact that a verdict is attached to speech. The initial
focus on naked speech in Snyder, rather than state common law, is a methodological
difference that apparently tees up a prodigious value conflict. The modern First
Amendment is defined by its hostility to discretion. But the discoursive method of
the common law plainly embraces discretion in its incremental attempt to reflect and
contribute to the complex texture of daily human interaction. This section shows,
by reference to IIED, that this value conflict is more apparent than real. Then, by
focusing on how state courts have applied Snyder, this section demonstrates that
Snyder is absolutist because it protects speech that is arguably of public concern,
regardless of form, context, factual record, or theory of liability. In sum, Snyder’s
rule is that arguably public speech is always immune.
1. First Amendment Hostility to Discretion
The unstoppable march of the First Amendment is old news. The literature is
awash with First Amendmentisms (expansionism, Lochnerism, consequentialism)
characterizing its uncontrollable spread. One of the engines of this growth is the First
Amendment’s historic and epic hostility to discretion. The intellectual traditions
embodied by the First Amendment view discretion very skeptically. The Supreme
number of critiques appeared in legal scholarship. One criticized Sullivan as leaving “little
opportunity for common-law growth or innovation,” and arguing that “[t]he fifty laboratories
are gone; there is just the United States Supreme Court groping for a rational scheme.” Elaine
W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of Constitutionalizing State
Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 182–83. Some scholars continue to argue that
Sullivan created doctrinal confusion. See, e.g., Tilley, supra note 21, at 1155–60 (arguing that
the Court, in the post-Sullivan dignitary tort cases, “has elegantly articulated the need to balance
speech and dignity,” but “the rules it has promulgated are inconsistent and imprecise”).
240 John W. Wade, The Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 MISS. L.J. 671,
710 (1977).
241 Id. at 711.
242 Id.
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Court zealously embraced this skepticism. It is no exaggeration to say that First
Amendment doctrine views discretion as free speech’s blood enemy.
When used to evaluate speech, words like malice and, especially, offensive and
outrageous give us a bout of First Amendment jitters. “Malice,” said Black in his
Sullivan concurrence, “is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to
disprove.”243 It is “at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss
public affairs.”244 IIED’s outrageousness element fares even worse. Quoting Hustler,
Roberts’s opinion in Snyder stated that outrageousness “is a highly malleable standard
with ‘an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of
a particular expression.’”245 Eugene Volokh thought that “[m]any statements might
be labeled ‘outrageous’ by some judge, jury, university administrator, or other
government actor.”246 If a tort attaches liability to outrageous (whatever that means)
speech, then the First Amendment should step in.
The argument that a word like “outrageous” in a legal standard is malleable and
vague strikes me as obvious and unhelpful. It is obvious because clearly there are
borderline cases of outrageous conduct (following Timothy Endicott and others, let’s
say that a legal standard is vague if there are borderline cases for its application).247
Vagueness in law is very common,248 perhaps even pervasive,249 and officials and
juries impose liability on the basis of vague standards every day (reasonableness is
a prime example). And it’s unhelpful because it proves too much. If the First
Amendment destroyed all vague standards attaching liability to speech, then it would
invalidate all content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations too: there are
borderline cases of content neutrality.
The argument must be that outrageous is so vague a concept that there are no
clear cases of IIED. It is a borderline case every time a court finds that a defendant’s
243 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
244 Id.
245 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
246 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 300.
247 See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 31 (2000) (“An expression is vague
if there are borderline cases for its application.”); id. at 32 (noting that tall is a vague word
and that “a borderline case is one in which, even if we do know how tall someone is, we do not
know whether to say that they are tall or not tall”). Without any more context, Endicott might
say that “outrageous” is a “dummy standard,” that is, a requirement that decisionmakers set
a standard. But “if there is a doctrine of precedent, judicial decisions may give a particular
content to a dummy standard.” Id. at 49, 49 n.35.
248 Id. at 1.
249 See Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher, Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Per-
spectives, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 9 (Geert
Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016).
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expressive conduct is outrageous. And because outrageousness is all border and no
center, decisionmakers have complete discretion to decide whether expressive conduct
is outrageous. Therefore, IIED is a license to censor. But, as Zipursky argued, this
is “exactly backwards.”250 The outrageousness element of IIED functions not as an
open-ended conferral of arbitrary discretion, but as a significant limitation on liability.
The legal reality is that “IIED is among the most heavily guarded torts.”251 Courts rou-
tinely accept defendants’ arguments that their conduct, “while admittedly inappropri-
ate and hurtful, does not rise to the extraordinary level expected for the tort.”252
It’s wrong to think of IIED as a tort with only an outrageous element. “The tort
is not,” argued Zipursky, “acting outrageously and thereby causing severe emotional
distress.”253 More accurately, “[o]ver decades and even centuries, courts recognized
clusters of cases in the following areas: striking effrontery in dealing with passengers
or guests, vicious practical jokes, gross sexual misconduct and/or stalking, and mis-
handling of the deaths, funerals, or corpses of family members.”254 These classes of
cases are the core or center of IIED, and the tort expands in the usual common law,
incremental way. In determining whether the tort applies to new facts, courts are guided
by the stinginess of the outrageous element, and judges have a large gatekeeping role
to ensure that juries do not run amok. IIED, and its outrageousness element, are not com-
prehensively vague. There are core instances and—like many other legal standards—
there are borderline applications.
Not that any of this is apparent from Snyder, which was indifferent to Maryland’s
common law of torts. It is a remarkable feature of Snyder—a case originating in the
district court’s diversity jurisdiction—that Maryland law is mentioned in passing only
twice.255 The first is a sentence stating the elements of IIED, citing a Maryland Court
of Appeals case from 1977.256 The second is a paragraph on why the outrageousness
element is insufficiently protective.257 The opinion betrayed no effort to decide
whether the outrageousness element actually threatened the First Amendment; instead,
it simply relied on Hustler’s wrong-headed assertion that outrageousness is too
vague.258 Even though IIED had been recognized as a viable tort in Maryland for more
than thirty years,259 Snyder made no effort to find out what “outrageous” means under
Maryland law.
250 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps: Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of
Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 500 (2011).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 503.
254 Id. at 502–03.
255 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451, 458 (2011).
256 Id. at 451 (citing Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977)).
257 Id. at 458.
258 See id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
259 Maryland first recognized the IIED tort in Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977).
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Snyder’s failure to interrogate Maryland’s IIED tort suggests that it adopted an
external point of view vis-à-vis state law. Without inquiring into the tort-related legal
reasons grounding the jury verdict, or the attitudes or beliefs of the Marylanders who
accept IIED as a practical standard of conduct, the Supreme Court viewed the jury
verdict as a bare social fact offensive to the First Amendment. And this posited a
conflict-of-laws relationship between state common law and federal law. This model
of rule-conflict says that a state common law tort is either consistent or inconsistent
with the First Amendment, and if it is inconsistent it is invalid and superseded by
the Free Speech Clause.260 The state tort, then, must be abandoned in favor of the rule
of decision supplied by the First Amendment. Thus Volokh accurately described Snyder
as holding that “the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort is presumptively
unconstitutional when applied to speech on matters of public concern.”261
Forgive me for thinking it odd to describe a state common law tort as “invalid”
or “unconstitutional,” or as being “struck down.” That is, of course, the appropriate
vocabulary for judicial review of state (and federal) legislation. As a species of law,
legislation is amenable to the valid/invalid binary. But one of the fundamental
differences between judicial and legislative lawmaking is what Joseph Raz called
the “special revisability of judge-made law.”262 The common law may be incre-
mentally revised each time it is litigated. The judicial power to distinguish precedent,
and to modestly amend or develop the common law, means that legislation is more
static than judge-made law. These are general observations of course; nevertheless,
“[i]t is typical of common law rules to be moulded and remoulded in the hands of
successive courts using explicitly or unconsciously their powers of reformulating and
modifying the rules concerned.”263
Snyder, however, equated Maryland’s common law right of action to legislation.
As noted above, the common law since Hale and Coke resists the reduction of its rules
and principles to a canonical text because they are “vulnerable to challenge and
revision in the course of reasoned argument and dispute in the public forensic
context.”264 Treating IIED as reduced to a fixed, canonical text, the Supreme Court
adopted a plain-meaning interpretation of “outrageous,” ignored state common law,
and effectively preempted IIED when applied to speech of public concern. By taking
an external point of view to Maryland’s IIED tort, as though it were statute-like and
invulnerable to change, the Court denied the capacity of a judge to act as an author
of the common law and develop the tort in a way that removes the inconsistency with
the First Amendment.
260 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 27 (1977).
261 Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916 (2015).
262 JOSEPH RAZ, Law and Value In Adjudication, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 195 (2d ed. 2009).
263 Id.
264 Postema, Part II, supra note 26, at 14.
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2. Seven Years On: Snyder in State Court
The First Amendment’s hostility to discretion is borne out by the important state
court cases that have considered Snyder.265 These cases have not been collected or
analyzed elsewhere, and they are critically important to an appreciation of how state
courts have understood and applied Snyder.266 Snyder framed the question presented
and its holding in terms of “tort liability.”267 It imposed a blanket First Amendment “de-
fense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”268
The Court also included suits for intrusion upon seclusion, although that tort received
even less attention than IIED in the Snyder opinion. Snyder’s reasoning is, therefore,
freely generalizable. Indeed, state courts have adopted the broad, trans-substantive
First Amendment defense. Only the tort of defamation, to which Sullivan and its
progeny directly apply, is resistant to Snyder’s broad sweep.
a. Robin Hooders in New Hampshire
The clearest example of Snyder’s broad sweep comes from New Hampshire,269
where the official state motto is “Live Free or Die.” The City of Keene in south-
western New Hampshire employed three Parking Enforcement Officers (PEOs) to
monitor its downtown parking meters and issue tickets.270 Six of the City’s residents,
who were relatively new Granite Staters and part of a movement called “Free Keene,”
conducted what they called “Robin Hooding”: regularly and closely following and
videotaping the PEOs, identifying expired meters, and refilling them before a ticket
could issue.271 A card would be left on the vehicle’s windshield: “Your meter expired!
However, we saved you from the king’s tariff!”272 They characterized their activity
265 A Westlaw search for “Snyder/5 Phelps” across all state courts produces 89 cases and
24 trial court orders. The cases analyzed here are all the noncriminal opinions that relied on
Snyder’s methodology.
266 Clay Calvert, in an earlier analysis focusing on IIED and media defendants, argued that
lower courts were not limiting Snyder to its facts. See Clay Calvert, Public Concern and
Outrageous Speech: Testing the Inconstant Boundaries of IIED and the First Amendment
Three Years After Snyder v. Phelps, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 437 (2014). Calvert’s article was
published before any of the opinions analyzed here were issued.
267 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447 (2011) (“The question presented is whether the
First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case.”);
id. at 461 (“As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues
to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro
from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”).
268 Id. at 451.
269 City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015).
270 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, Nos.213-2013-cv-00098, 213-2013-cv-0241, 2013
WL 8691664, at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013).
271 See Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 255.
272 Id.; Dan Barry, Libertarians Trail Meter Readers, Telling Town: Live Free or Else,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, at A1.
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as political protest with an ultimate goal of abolishing parking enforcement because
parking is not a criminal act, the City should not be charging citizens to park, and
parking tickets are a threat against the people.273
On an almost daily basis, the Robin Hooders videotaped and trailed the PEOs,
sometimes about a foot away or so close that if the PEO turned around they would
bump into each other.274 They followed the PEOs on breaks and on their days off.275
They called various PEOs a “fucking thief,” “liar,” “racist,” “bitch,” and “coward.”276
They accused the PEOs of stealing from citizens and of vandalism when the PEOs
chalked tires.277 They suggested that a PEO who was a veteran would “drone brown
babies.”278 This PEO resigned.279 Another PEO contemplated quitting.280 She found
it difficult to focus on her job, she refused to work Saturdays because she felt unsafe,
and she contacted the police on three occasions.281 The third PEO felt intimidated,
and would tense up and become distracted when she heard approaching footsteps.282
Apart from the reduction of staffing hours and loss of ticket revenue, the City also
incurred costs by hiring a private investigator and a therapist.283
The City sued the six Free Keeners in state court for tortious interference with
contractual relations and civil conspiracy, and sought preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief.284 Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the pleadings failed
to state a claim on tortious interference, and that all causes of action violated the free
speech clause of the First Amendment, and Articles 8 (government accountability)
and 22 (free speech) of Part I of the New Hampshire Constitution.285 The City then
filed a separate civil complaint against the same defendants based on the same alleged
facts, which requested a jury trial and sought money damages for tortious interference
and negligence.286
In the Superior Court of New Hampshire, Judge Kissinger, after a three-day
evidentiary hearing, granted the motion to dismiss all claims because they violated
the First Amendment.287 Although “skeptical” that tortious interference could be made
out when private citizens protest government employees, Kissinger nevertheless did
273 See Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 256.
274 See id. at 257.
275 See id. at 256–57. See also Cleaveland, Nos.213-2013-cv-00098, 213-2013-cv-0241,
2013 WL 8691664, at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013).
276 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 256; Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *2.
277 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *4.
278 Id. at *4.
279 Id. at *4; Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 257.
280 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *3.
281 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 257; Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *2–3.
282 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 257; Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *5.
283 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *5.
284 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 255.
285 Id. at 256.
286 Id.
287 Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691664, at *9.
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not reach the issue because “the enforcement of such a tort is an infringement on the
Respondents’ right to free speech and expression under the First Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.”288 In an opinion littered with citations to Snyder, Kissinger
described defendants’ conduct as “speech and expressive protest of the City’s parking
regulation through filling meters, placing cards on windshields, telling the PEOs they
should quit, calling the PEOs ‘thieves,’ ‘fucking thieves,’ and ‘liars,’ and attacking
[a] PEO . . . for his military service.”289 This speech implicates “the political authority
of the City as a sovereign and its regulation of the citizens, as well as the United
States’ military actions abroad,” which “are clearly matters of public concern.”290
The speech “is given special protection because it is at a public place on a matter of
public concern.”291
The tortious interference claim, said Kissinger, could not be characterized as a
“reasonable time, place, or manner restriction” on speech.292 He explained that tortious
interference with contractual relations requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant
intentionally and improperly interfered with an economic relationship between the
plaintiff and a third party.293 Like IIED’s outrageousness requirement, Kissinger thought
that the requirement of improper interference was so subjective as to “create[ ] an
unreasonable risk that the jury will find liability ‘on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.’”294 With
this, Kissinger dismissed the tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims, denied
injunctive relief, and dismissed the negligence claim.
In the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Justice Bassett affirmed the trial court’s
ruling on tortious interference, but reversed and remanded the denial of injunctive
relief.295 Bassett noted that “we normally address constitutional questions first under
the State Constitution and rely on federal law only to aid in our analysis.”296 Because
the trial court did not address the state constitutional arguments, however, Bassett first
considered the arguments under the federal Constitution.297 Although echoing the trial
288 Id. at *10.
289 Id. at *12.
290 Id.
291 Id. at *13.
292 Id. at *14.
293 Id. at *9–10.
294 Id. at *14 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988))).
295 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed and remanded the denial of injunctive
relief because the trial court had not considered all the factual circumstances of the case. The
Supreme Court “express[ed] no opinion as to whether the City’s allegations, if proven, [we]re
sufficient to warrant the trial court’s exercise of its equitable power, or as to whether the par-
ticular injunctive relief requested by the City would violate the Federal or State Constitutions.”
Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 264.
296 Id. at 258.
297 Id. at 258–59.
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court’s skepticism that a tortious interference claim can exist when private citizens
protest the government, Bassett agreed that it was not necessary to reach the issue be-
cause enforcing the City’s tortious interference claim “would infringe upon the re-
spondents’ right to free speech under the First Amendment.”298 His First Amendment
analysis basically tracked the lower court’s, with a similarly large dose of Snyder:
in sum, the First Amendment bars state tort liability attaching to speech of public
concern.
The City did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the content of de-
fendants’ speech was of public concern.299 It did, however, contend that the First
Amendment does not protect specific conduct such as “following closely, chasing,
running after, approaching quickly from behind, lurking outside bathrooms, yelling
loudly, and filming from close proximity.”300 Bassett disagreed. He observed that
a boycott of businesses which causes economic harm and is realized by expressive
conduct (“speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism”) cannot ground an
award of damages.301 Physical violence “is beyond the pale of constitutional protection,”
but peaceful expression on matters of public concern “need not meet standards of
acceptability.”302 The specific conduct targeted by the City was nonviolent and
“intended to draw attention to the City’s parking enforcement operations and to
persuade the PEOs to leave their positions.”303 “[T]he mere threat of tort liability,”
explained Bassett, would have an intolerable chilling effect.304
b. A Police Chase and a Suicide in Arizona
On September 28, 2012, armed with a Glock pistol, JoDon Romero carjacked
a maroon Dodge Caliber in the parking lot of a Phoenix Denny’s.305 He led police
on an hour-long, high-speed chase.306 At first driving east along Interstate 10 for five
miles, Romero made a U-turn, fired his pistol at a police car, and sped west on I-10
for an hour.307 He exited at Tonopah, a “census-designated place” in the Tonopah
Desert near Salome, and eventually turned onto a dirt path before stopping.308 Romero
got out, ran a short distance, fell down, got up, walked through some brush, and
298 Id. at 259.
299 Id. at 260. See also Cleaveland, 2013 WL 8691644, at *12.
300 Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 260.
301 Id. at 261.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 260.
305 Jessica Testa, Why Did Jodon Romero Kill Himself On Live Television?, BUZZFEED
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stopped at a small dirt clearing.309 As police officers approached, Romero put the
pistol to his head, fired, and crumpled to the ground.310
Two helicopters buzzing overhead captured footage of Romero’s suicide. One
belonged to the Phoenix Police Air Support Unit and the other to KSAZ-TV, the Fox
News affiliate in Phoenix.311 The Fox footage aired live during a nationally broadcast
breaking-news program; the ordinary five-second delay for live feeds was not
functioning.312 So, despite the program anchor’s on-air commands to technicians to
“get off” the feed, Romero’s suicide was broadcast live.313
At school, two of Romero’s teenage sons heard that a suicide had been broadcast
on live TV.314 When they got home, they located a clip of the Fox newscast on
YouTube.315 As they watched, they realized that it was their father who had taken
the Dodge at gunpoint and led police on a high-speed chase.316 The boys then saw
footage of their father shooting himself.317
The boys’ mother, Angela Rodriguez, sued Fox on their behalf for intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.318 On First Amendment grounds, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuit.319
Applying Snyder, Judge Johnsen held that “the Fox broadcast clearly addressed a
matter of public concern.”320 She rejected plaintiff’s argument that although the police
chase was newsworthy, Romero’s suicide was a purely private matter. “Without doubt,”
Johnsen said, “‘the overall thrust and dominant theme’ of the coverage addressed
important matters of public concern.”321 On content, Johnsen explained that “[t]he
public has a strong interest in monitoring the manner in which law enforcement re-
sponds to criminal behavior,” and that Romero “posed an immediate and ongoing
threat to public safety.”322 On form and context, Johnsen noted that the chase and
suicide were broadcast during a news program.323 The footage was not private speech
disguised as a public broadcast.324 The Supreme Court of Arizona denied a petition
for review and the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.325
309 See id.
310 Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 356 P.3d 322, 324 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
311 Testa, supra note 305.
312 Id.
313 Rodriguez, 356 P.3d at 324; Testa, supra note 305.
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49
2018] SILENCING STATE COURTS 37
c. A Public School Bus Driver in Wisconsin
Sometime in April 2012, Robert Koebel, a TV reporter employed by Journal Com-
munications, Inc., approached Melissa Dumas in a parking lot, with a camera operator
in tow.326 Through public record requests, Koebel had identified Dumas as a Milwaukee
Public School bus driver who, eight years earlier, had been convicted of misdemeanor
prostitution.327 Koebel was investigating a news story for Milwaukee’s NBC affiliate
about school bus drivers with criminal histories.328 The final story aired footage of
Koebel confronting a visibly shocked Dumas with her mug shot and police report.329
Koebel described “salacious details” from the police report.330 “Koebel also reported
that Dumas had been arrested for ‘drugs and driving on a suspended license,’ and that
Dumas had been in a school bus accident in 2009 when she worked for a different bus
company.”331 The story also showed footage of Koebel interviewing Dumas’s manager
at the bus company.332 The manager said that he had no knowledge of the conviction.333
The broadcast concluded with Koebel noting that Dumas had been dismissed.334
Dumas sued Koebel and his employer, Journal Communications, for invasion
of privacy, IIED, and intentional interference with a contractual relationship.335
Defendants moved to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim because the information
broadcast was a matter of public record.336 The other two claims, they argued, were
barred by the First Amendment.337 Exhibited to defendants’ motion to dismiss was
a video of the broadcast, a transcript of the video published on the internet, and
records relating to Dumas’s arrest and driving history.338 The trial court converted
the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, which it granted on all
claims.339 Judge Curley affirmed for the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.340
Curley first affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, relying on
a Wisconsin statute providing that it is not an invasion of privacy to communicate
any information “available to the public as a matter of public record.”341 There was
no dispute that Dumas’s misdemeanor conviction is a matter of public record. And
326 Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319, 321–22 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
327 Id.
328 Id. at 321.









338 Id. at 322–23.
339 Id. at 323.
340 Id. at 319–20.
341 Id. at 325 (applying WIS. STAT. § 995.50(2)(c) (2011–12)).
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Curley rejected Dumas’s contention that her name is not a matter of public record,
relying on precedent holding that “the public has a right to know the names of the
individuals who are driving their children to and from school.”342
Relying almost exclusively on Snyder, Curley noted that “[t]he Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits,”343 and
held that “[i]f we determine that the allegedly tortious speech is a matter of public
concern, we must grant summary judgment on the tort claims alleged.”344 Curley
concluded that although defendants’ broadcast was “undoubtedly embarrassing” to
Dumas, it was nevertheless a matter of public concern entitled to full First Amendment
protection.345 On content, Curley observed that although parts of the story publishing
Dumas’s history were “salacious,” “it did highlight a matter of public import: whether
such a history should have prohibited an individual from working as a school bus
driver.”346 On context, Curley said that “Koebel confronted Dumas in public and asked
her questions about public information, and Dumas did not allege any facts showing that
she had a preexisting relationship with either Koebel or Journal Communications that
would suggest a veiled attempt at a private attack.”347 And on form, Curley dismissed
Dumas’s challenge to “the way in which Koebel confronted her,” simply saying that it
was “clear . . . that any surprise, embarrassment, and indignation arose from the content
of Koebel’s speech.”348 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied a petition for review.349
d. A Disappearance in Connecticut
Nearly fifteen years ago, Billy Smolinski, Jr., disappeared from his home in
Waterbury, Connecticut.350 Nobody can say what happened to him. Billy had asked his
next-door neighbor to walk his German shepherd “because he was travelling north to
look at some cars.”351 But when his parents went to his house the next day, Billy’s truck
was parked in the driveway with his wallet and keys inside.352 Theories swirled. Billy’s
mother and sister, convinced that his ex-girlfriend Gleason knew more than she would
say, applied pressure.353 They disparaged Gleason to her friends.354 They posted many
342 Id. at 325–26 (quoting Atlas Transit, Inc. v. Korte, 638 N.W.2d 625, 633 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001)).
343 Id. at 326 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011)).
344 Id. at 327.
345 Id.
346 Id. at 328.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Dumas v. Koebel, 848 N.W.2d 859 (Table) (2014).
350 Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 927 (Conn. 2015).
351 Alexander Nazaryan, Billy Smolinski, Gone Since 2004, Is Part of a ‘Silent Mass Dis-
aster,’ NEWSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:05 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/15/billy
-smolinski-gone-2004-part-silent-mass-disaster-263142.html [https://perma.cc/DE3V-WF29].
352 Id.
353 See Gleason, 125 A.3d at 927.
354 Id.
51
2018] SILENCING STATE COURTS 39
missing person flyers depicting Billy along Gleason’s school bus route (Gleason
worked as a school bus driver) and near Gleason’s home.355 After noticing that Gleason
and a friend were tearing down some posters, Billy’s mother and sister followed Gleason
and videotaped her activities.356 Eventually Gleason went to the police station, where
Billy’s mother and sister followed, and a confrontation occurred.357
Gleason sued Billy’s mother and sister for defamation and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.358 The trial court awarded damages on both counts, as well as
punitive damages, but no First Amendment argument was preserved at trial.359 On
appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court rejected defendants’ contention, based on
Snyder, that a First Amendment violation had deprived them of a fair trial.360 The
Appellate Court credited the trial court’s finding that defendants’ placement of posters
was targeted specifically at plaintiff, intended to “break” her into providing defendants
with information.361 The Appellate Court held that, although the posters did not name
the plaintiff, “the context and placement of the posters was designed to ‘hound’ the plain-
tiff into providing . . . information . . . rather than to raise a matter of public concern.”362
The Connecticut Supreme Court, on defendants’ appeal, reversed the Appellate Court
and held that defendants’ conduct was protected by the First Amendment.363 Justice
Robinson first reviewed Snyder at length,364 and then turned to “an examination of
the objective nature of the speech at issue . . . namely, the defendants’ extensive cam-
paign of missing person posters.”365 On content, Robinson held that “matters pertaining
355 Id.
356 Id. at 929.
357 Id. The Connecticut Superior Court, the Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court all
discussed: the origins and nature of Billy’s relationship with Gleason; an alleged love triangle;
the demise of the relationship between Billy and Gleason two days before Billy’s disappear-
ance; Billy’s reaction; and the foundations for Billy’s family’s suspicion of Gleason. The trial
judge summed it up: “The facts of this case are distressing. Two sets of basically decent
people found themselves in conflict and involved in a series of mutually antagonistic events
because of a tragic event—the disappearance and apparent death of a young man with his
whole life ahead of him.” Gleason v. Smolinski, No. NNH-CV-06-5005107-S, 2012 WL
3871999, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012).
358 Gleason also sued Billy’s mother and sister for invasion of privacy and tortious inter-
ference with business relationships and expectancies. The invasion of privacy claim wasn’t
successful at trial and Gleason didn’t appeal. The tortious interference claim didn’t make it
to trial. Id. at *1.
359 Id. at *17.
360 Gleason v. Smolinski, 88 A.3d 589, 597–99 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). The standard under
Connecticut law for prevailing on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial in-
cludes a requirement that “the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.” Gleason, 125 A.3d at 930 n.10.
361 Gleason, 88 A.3d at 599.
362 Id.
363 Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 960 (Conn. 2015).
364 Id. at 938.
365 Id.
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to missing persons” are of public concern.366 Because the flyers solely sought in-
formation about Billy and did not name the plaintiff, their content related to a matter
of public concern.367
Robinson agreed, at least in principle, with the Alaska Supreme Court in Greene
v. Tinker368 that Snyder is “not an all-purpose tort shield,” and he rejected the “sweeping”
argument that “speech involving a matter of public concern is inactionable.”369 He
explained, however, that “the existence of preexisting animus . . . does not necessarily
render the messages conveyed . . . matters of purely private rather than public con-
cern.”370 Defendants’ intention to “hound” plaintiff until she “broke” did not remove
First Amendment protection because “the targeted content and location” of the flyers
“was consistent with the overarching public concern of gaining information about
Bill’s disappearance.”371 Robinson distinguished the flyers here from the picketing
signs in Snyder because the signs “referred, at least obliquely, to Snyder.”372 He also
pointed out that the flyers “were placed on or adjacent to public roadways,” and
therefore entitled to heightened First Amendment protection.373
Interestingly, Robinson said that he was “[g]uided heavily” by Cleaveland because
it “considered similarly targeted and harassing conduct.”374 The New Hampshire Supreme
Court, explained Robinson, thought it relevant that the challenged conduct was non-
violent, took place on public streets and sidewalks, and was intended, at least in part,
to persuade the PEOs to quit their jobs.375 Similarly, defendants’ conduct here was “in-
tended to persuade [plaintiff] with regard to a matter of public concern as in Cleaveland,”
and it was not intended to “merely torture her gratuitously with regard to a purely private
matter.”376 The defendants’ “ill-motivated flyer campaign,” therefore, was protected by
the First Amendment.377 Rather than direct judgment as a matter of law, Robinson
ordered a new trial, because the lower courts ignored defendants’ other harassing
conduct—calling the plaintiff offensive names, following her, and videotaping her—
which “might well be held to furnish an independent basis” for plaintiff’s IIED claim.378
Defendants also appealed the trial court’s defamation verdict. The trial court
found three statements by defendants to be defamatory, which together conveyed the
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 332 P.3d 21 (Ala. 2014).
369 Gleason, 125 A.3d at 939 (quoting Greene, 332 P.3d at 34–35).
370 Id. at 939 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
371 Id. at 940.
372 Id. at 942.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 944.
375 Id. at 942–44 (citing City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253 (N.H. 2015)).
376 Id. at 944.
377 Id. at 945.
378 Id. at 944–45.
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imputation that plaintiff or someone in her family murdered Billy, and that plaintiff
knew where Billy was buried.379 Robinson acknowledged that, beyond the common law,
“there are numerous federal constitutional restrictions that govern the proof of the tort
of defamation,” which depend on the status of the plaintiff (public or private figure) and
the subject of the speech (public or private concern).380 The parties did not dispute that
the statements were of public concern and that plaintiff was a private figure. Robinson,
therefore, viewed the inquiry as a question of “the law governing the proof of defamation
claims . . . made by private figure plaintiffs, but relating to matters of public concern.”381
Relying on a straightforward application of Gertz,382 Robinson rejected de-
fendants’ argument that a private figure plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant acted with actual malice in making an allegedly defamatory
statement on a matter of public concern.383 Rather, Robinson held that in such a case
the “defamatory statements must be provably false, and the plaintiff must bear the burden
of proving falsity.”384 But “neither the trial court nor the Appellate Court ever expressly
considered whether the plaintiff proved the falsity of the defamatory statements,”
giving rise to a First Amendment violation.385 Also to no avail was plaintiff’s reliance
on the trial court’s finding of actual malice; Robinson held that the record did not
support such a finding.386
Justice Eveleigh’s dissent, joined by one other justice, denied that the First
Amendment protected defendants’ conduct.387 Eveleigh agreed that the flyers’ content,
“without more, ostensibly relates to a matter of public concern.”388 But he argued that
the flyers’ context and form showed otherwise. Eveleigh centered on what he called
the trial judge’s “crucial” and “critical” factual finding: defendants’ targeted place-
ment of posters served no purpose beyond harassing the plaintiff and expressed no
protected message.389 The majority, argued Eveleigh, overturned this factual finding
sub silentio, without locating clear error as Connecticut law required.390 Instead, the
majority substituted its own factual finding—that “the targeted content and location
was consistent with the overarching public concern of gaining information about
Bill’s disappearance”391—absent a prerequisite ruling that the trial judge had clearly
379 See id. at 946.
380 Id. at 947–48.
381 Id. at 954.
382 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
383 Gleason, 125 A.3d at 954–55.
384 Id. at 956 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
385 Id. at 957.
386 Id. at 957–58.
387 Id. at 960 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting).
388 Id. at 963.
389 Id. at 961–62.
390 Id. at 961.
391 Id.
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erred. This was all the more troubling, according to Eveleigh, because the majority
disregarded the trial judge’s credibility determinations.392
Bound by the trial judge’s factual findings, Eveleigh emphasized three features
of the speech at issue. First, the speech was “uttered in a context that consists of the
sole and exclusive desire to harm the plaintiff and, concomitantly, no intent to convey
a protected idea or message to the public.”393 Second, the speech “is inextricably linked
to intimidating conduct that borders on harassment of a private party on a purely
private matter.”394 And third, holding defendants liable would “not chill protected
speech or pose a risk of self-censorship.”395 No case, argued Eveleigh, has conferred
First Amendment protection on speech meeting these three criteria, even if the speech
contained “facially acceptable content expressed in a traditional public forum.”396
Eveleigh distinguished both Cleaveland and Snyder. Cleaveland was distinguish-
able on two grounds. The first “critical difference” was that Cleaveland involved
“harassing activity that, as a matter of fact, was inextricably linked to, and intended
to advance, [a] protected message to the public—a message protesting the govern-
ment.”397 But here, defendants’ conduct “was not a bona fide expression to the public
of a message that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects.”398 In other contexts, defendants’
message would be protected. But defendants’ admission that their only purpose was
to harass the plaintiff “formed the basis of the trial court’s credibility determination
that this conduct was merely and solely tortious conduct directed at a private party
in an antagonistic, private dispute.”399 Second, a judgment for money damages would
not chill protected speech here. Defendants in Cleaveland “would be penalized for
expressing [their] message,” and others “would think twice and potentially self-
censor.”400 But a judgment against defendants here would “not penalize the defendants
for searching for Bill or bringing their grievances about the authorities’ lack of diligence
to public light.”401 Instead, it would prevent people “from targeting, intimidating,
harassing, and intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon any person they believe
to have previously engaged in the commission of a crime.”402
As for Snyder, according to Eveleigh, “it was the content of the speech—the honestly
believed, protected message that the defendants in Snyder wished to communicate to
the public—that caused the distress, not the context in which the speech occurred.”403
392 Id. at 965–66.
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Here, however, plaintiff’s distress “resulted solely from the context in which the
speech occurred—the relentless hounding of the plaintiff where she lived and
worked—not the content of the posters.”404 Moreover, a judgment here would “not
pose any risk of having resulted from differing tastes or views on what the posters
conveyed or the ideas they espoused, nor does it pose a risk of suppressing unpleasant
expression.”405 Rather, it would impose liability for defendants’ continued and
aggravated conduct which hounded the plaintiff for the sole purpose of intimidation
and harassment.
e. A History of Animosity in Alaska
Only one state court case considering the application of Snyder in detail has
resisted its broad sweep. But its primary reason for refusing to apply Snyder was that
the cause of action was defamation; only as an afterthought did it repeat the false
slogan that Snyder is limited to its particular factual record.406
Distantly related, and hailing from the Alaskan community of Pilot Station, Beverly
Tinker and Karen Greene (and their respective families) had “a history of animosity.”407
In 2007, Tinker, who worked at the Pilot Station Health Clinic, “improperly accessed
Greene’s medical file.”408 After Greene filed a complaint about the incident with the
clinic operator, Tinker was reprimanded and directed to participate in a confidentiality
education program or lose her job.409 The clinic operator also directed Tinker never
to access Greene’s file again.410
It got messier in 2011. In February, when Greene was in the early stages of
pregnancy, she visited the health clinic.411 Greene asked a staff member to ensure
that Tinker would not learn of the pregnancy and due date.412 In addition to her concerns
about Tinker’s prior misconduct, Greene wanted to keep the pregnancy private be-
cause of an earlier miscarriage.413 Soon enough, Tinker told the staff member of
Greene’s pregnancy and the due date.414 The staff member duly informed Greene,
who confronted Tinker at the clinic and filed a second complaint with the clinic
operator.415 It turned out, however, that Tinker was informed of Greene’s pregnancy
“through a gossip chain that began with Greene herself.”416
404 Id. at 973.
405 Id.
406 See Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 35 (Alaska 2014).
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Receiving no response to her second complaint, Greene took the matter to the
Pilot Station Traditional Council.417 Greene “attended several meetings of the tribal
council, which according to Tinker was dominated by members of Greene’s extended
family.”418 At one meeting Greene read a letter accusing Tinker of violating confi-
dentiality.419 An investigation by the clinic operator eventually revealed that Greene’s
second complaint was unsubstantiated.420
Tinker sued Greene for defamation.421 Greene counterclaimed.422 Both parties
“sought damages, including punitive damages,” and attorney’s fees.423 During pretrial
motion practice, the trial court rejected Greene’s argument that the alleged disclosures
by Tinker were a matter of public concern, so that Greene had an absolute privilege
to complain about them.424 The trial court explained that “three instances of discussion
in an arguably public forum such as the Pilot Station [Traditional] Council do not
transmute one’s complaints about a specific individual’s actions into a public concern.”425
Instead of an absolute privilege, the trial court held that Greene “had a conditional
privilege to make defamatory statements about Tinker.”426 The question for the jury
was whether Greene had abused her conditional privilege, and the trial court instructed
the jury accordingly. The jury awarded Tinker one dollar in nominal damages.427
Greene appealed the trial judge’s legal rulings on conditional privilege and the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.428 Chief Justice Fabe thought that Sullivan repre-
sented a “major departure” from the common law of defamation.429 Fabe then discussed
the extension of Sullivan to public figures and explained, relying on Gertz, that “the
First Amendment imposes only the most minimal restrictions on state-law liability
in defamation actions brought by private individuals.”430 For private figure defamation
actions, Alaska precedents had not yet determined whether actual malice was required




420 Id. at 27.
421 Tinker also sued Greene for intentional interference with contractual relations, but
abandoned that claim. Id.
422 Greene’s counterclaims were for invasion of privacy and abuse of process. Id. The trial
court entered a directed verdict on abuse of process, and the jury found Tinker not liable for
invasion of privacy. Id. at 30.
423 Id. at 27.
424 Id. at 28.
425 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
426 Id.
427 Id. at 24.
428 Id. at 36.
429 Id. at 33.
430 Id. at 34.
431 Id. at 34. See also id. at 34 n.43.
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been overprotective, because it instructed the jury as though Tinker were a public
figure who was required to show actual malice.432
Greene argued at length that, after Snyder, “speech involving a matter of public
concern is inactionable.”433 Fabe was having none of it: “the First Amendment is not
an all-purpose tort shield, and Snyder did not change this.”434 She thought that “it
requires some hard squinting to read Snyder as creating such a sweeping rule.”435
Snyder, Fabe announced, “contains no indication that the Court intended to depart
at all—much less depart dramatically—from its carefully drawn defamation prece-
dents.”436 And, of course, “the Court explicitly limited its holding in Snyder to the
facts before it.”437 The major factual difference was that Snyder involved a demonstration
on public land adjacent to a public street,438 whereas “Tinker’s defamation claim was
based entirely on Greene’s complaint to Tinker’s supervisor.”439
3. Snyder Is Absolutist
These cases leave little doubt that, certainly outside defamation, state courts have
wholeheartedly embraced Snyder even at the expense of their own common law. It
is easy to see why: Snyder’s reasoning is freely generalizable. Rather than limiting
its reasons to the Maryland IIED tort, Snyder is expressed in terms of “tort lia-
bility.”440 The major premise of the Court’s opinion is that the “Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment . . . can serve as a defense in state tort suits,” and its minor
premise is merely that IIED is one of those torts.441 The only court to have denied
a broadly stated First Amendment defense to a state tort is the Alaska Supreme Court,
but in that case the cause of action was defamation, to which Sullivan and its progeny
directly applied.
The similarities between Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Snyder and Black’s
absolutist concurrence in Sullivan are instructive and striking. Black would have held
that the First Amendment does not merely limit state libel laws but completely
432 See id.
433 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
434 Id. at 35.
435 Id. at 34.
436 Id.
437 Id. at 35.
438 See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
439 Greene, 332 P.3d at 35. Fabe also dealt with analogous arguments under the Alaska
Constitution’s free speech guarantee. See id. at 35–36.
440 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 447 (“The question presented is whether the First Amendment
shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case.”). Id. at 461 (“As
a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability
for its picketing in this case.”).
441 Id. at 451.
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prohibits a state’s power to award damages to public officials against critics of their
official conduct. Black’s thoughts on Brennan’s actual malice requirement parallel
Roberts’s on outrageousness. “Malice,” argued Black, “is an elusive, abstract concept,
hard to prove and hard to disprove.”442 It is “at best an evanescent protection for the
right critically to discuss public affairs.”443 Just as Roberts observed that “[a]s a
Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate,”444 so Black thought that “[t]his Nation” cannot
“live in freedom where its people can be made to suffer physically or financially for
criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials.”445 Black could have been
summarizing the Snyder holding when he concluded that “[a]n unconditional right
to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum
guarantee of the First Amendment.”446
Snyder is absolutist.447 Its conception of the First Amendment precludes state
common-law tort liability attaching to speech whose content is of public concern,
irrespective of context, form, factual record, and basis of liability. To sum up the state
court use of Snyder—despite judicial protestations to the contrary—speech whose
content is of public concern is not actionable. Defamation is a significant exception.
But the important state court cases applying Snyder demonstrate its absolutism. They
show that Snyder’s two purported limitations are not real: first, the content-form-
context trilogy is dominated by content alone, and second, Snyder’s avowed factual
narrowness is a tepid limitation.
First, despite judicial assurances that no one element of the content-form-context
trilogy is dispositive,448 it turns out that content is dispositive and a circumstantial
analysis generally changes nothing. Consider the two state cases where context and
form mattered most: Cleaveland and Gleason. In Cleaveland, the targeted harassment
of the PEOs, which included personal insults, was insufficient to deny First Amend-
ment protection to speech whose content was of public concern.449 And in Gleason,
defendants covered telephone poles at plaintiff’s home and work with flyers relating
442 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
443 Id.
444 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 461.
445 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring).
446 Id.
447 First Amendment “absolutism” is associated with Justice Hugo Black’s insistence that
the First Amendment “says ‘no law,’ and that is what I believe it means,” Edmond Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 554
(1962), “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or ‘whereases,’” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
448 “In considering content, form, and context,” Roberts said in Snyder, “no factor is
dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech.” Snyder, 562
U.S. at 454.
449 See City of Keane v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 260 (N.H. 2015).
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to her former lover’s unexplained disappearance—concededly for the sole purpose
of hounding and breaking the plaintiff.450 As the Cleaveland court acknowledged,
prompted by Snyder, absent actual physical violence, the context and form of the
speech is irrelevant.451 And the Gleason court held that so long as targeted, public
harassment is “consistent with the overarching public concern”452 of the speech, then
the First Amendment insulates the speaker from tort liability.453
In the result, an expansive conception of public concern shields a speaker from
tort liability that would otherwise attach.454 True, there are some qualifications: if
there is physical violence, for example, or if the speech constitutes personal har-
assment out of public view. But sustained personal vilification in a public place is
protected by the First Amendment, so long as there is a connection between the content
of the speech and a matter of public concern. As Daniel Solove and Neil Richards
anticipated in their important work on free speech and civil liability, this approach
“provides too broad a scope of First Amendment protection.”455
Second, Snyder’s promise that its “holding . . . is narrow,” and that its “reach . . .
is limited by the particular facts,”456 has been honored only in the breach. In light of
the dominance of content in the content-form-context trilogy, the factual record is rela-
tively unimportant. Identifying the content of speech is a rarely contested issue of fact;
but whether that content is of public concern is an oft-contested question of law. Simi-
larly, the location of speech is a question of fact, but it is not a nuanced factual inquiry;
and it suffices for First Amendment protection if the speech is in public view (or even
better, located on or adjacent to a public street). And the location of speech when broad-
casting images is not the same as the location of events depicted by those images.
Rodriguez shows that the public broadcast of events not in public view (for example,
a suicide in the remote Arizonan desert) nevertheless counts as speech in public view.457
In sum, peaceful speech in public view whose content is of public concern is protected.
This factual inquiry—identifying the content, location, and violence of the speech
at issue—does not ordinarily require a developed record. Indeed the irrelevance of
450 See Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 940, 940 n.20 (Conn. 2015).
451 See Cleaveland, 118 A.3d at 260.
452 Gleason, 125 A.3d at 940.
453 See id.
454 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974), Justice Powell argued
that the public concern test, which Snyder embraced, would overly restrict a state’s legitimate
interest in enforcing a legal remedy for defamation of a private individual. “And,” Powell
argued, “it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’
and which do not—to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, ‘what information is
relevant to self-government.’” Id. at 346 (citation omitted). Powell “doubt[ed] the wisdom
of committing this task to the conscience of judges.” Id.
455 Solove & Richards, supra note 132, at 1683.
456 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
457 See Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, 356 P.3d 322, 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
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the factual record is confirmed by the procedural posture of the state cases applying
Snyder. Rodriguez was determined on a motion to dismiss—that is, on the pleadings
prior to fact discovery.458 The Court consciously decided to “address Fox’s consti-
tutional defense” to “avoid a ‘prolonged, costly, and inevitably futile trial.’”459 Similarly,
in Dumas, a motion to dismiss filed prior to discovery (converted to a motion for
summary judgment because it exhibited a video and transcript of the broadcast and
records relating to Dumas’s arrest and driving history) terminated the litigation.460
The tort claims in Gleason went to trial, but the First Amendment was only raised
on appeal.461 Only in Cleaveland—terminated on a motion to dismiss but after a three-
day evidentiary hearing—did the trial court decide the First Amendment issue on a
relatively developed factual record.462 The clear tendency is that in cases applying
Snyder, much of the factual record is simply irrelevant to the First Amendment inquiry.
The incapacitation of the jury is an obvious corollary of the irrelevance of the
factual record. Snyder went out of its way to justify jury distrust: a jury may not, said
Roberts, “impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or . . . on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression.”463 Scholars have supported the distrust
of the jury to properly enforce the First Amendment. In 1970, Henry Monaghan con-
tended that, “[i]n general, any expansive conception of the jury’s role is inconsistent
with a vigorous application of the First Amendment.”464 Even though Sullivan preserved
a role for the jury in principle, Monaghan noted that Brennan refused to remand the
case against the New York Times back to the hostile state courts and juries.465 More
recently, Eugene Volokh argued that “[m]any statements might be labeled ‘outrageous’
by some judge, jury, university administrator, or other government actor.”466
There is, of course, real reason to worry that juries might fail to vigorously enforce
the First Amendment. But why can’t this distrust be averted in the usual way, by proper
jury instructions? Snyder does not explain. And Snyder ignored the possibility that the
First Amendment could be enforced by requiring the bench to decide the “outrageous”
element. Neither juries nor judges, apparently, can be trusted to decide whether speech
is “outrageous” (Snyder)467 or “improper” (the trial judge in Cleaveland).468 Guided
by the judicial articulation of innumerable other “highly malleable” and “inherent[ly]
458 See id. at 324.
459 Id. at 325 (citation omitted).
460 See Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
461 See Gleason v. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 928 (Conn. 2015).
462 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 256, 258 (N.H. 2015).
463 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
464 Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 527
(1970).
465 See id. at 527 n.37, 528.
466 Volokh, supra note 246, at 300.
467 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.
468 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 258 (N.H. 2015).
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subjective[]” legal standards,469 juries have been deciding such questions for centuries.
Whether conduct is reasonable or reckless—that is the bread and butter of the modern
jury. But whether speech is outrageous—nope. At the risk of repetition, it is true that
the role of the jury has been justifiably limited in many contexts. It is true, too, that
the First Amendment evolved long ago from a guarantee of “protection of the people
collectively from unrepresentative government” to the “protection of currently un-
popular ideas from a current majority.”470 Snyder, however, did not adequately explain
its scope, and ignored open alternatives (proper instructions or judicial determination
of the problematic element). Notice also that Greene v. Tinker, the Alaskan defamation
case applying Sullivan, preserved a role for the jury consistently with the First Amend-
ment (the question for the jury was whether the conditional privilege had been abused).471
The net result is that Snyder enforced an absolutist First Amendment, notwith-
standing the solemn curial pledges that Snyder is a narrow decision. The application
of the First Amendment to state speech torts fixes on a small number of discrete and
rarely contested facts. In reality, one factual finding—the content of the speech—is
a simple predicate that swings open the wide First Amendment door.
III. SULLIVAN, NOT SNYDER
This Part argues that Sullivan’s methodology should be preferred over Snyder’s,
because Sullivan embraced cooperative judicial federalism. Sullivan’s model of First
Amendment enforcement has underwritten fifty years of productive state-federal judicial
dialogue. In just seven years, Snyder has suppressed every significant opportunity
for intersystemic conversation. One of Sullivan’s unheralded virtues, then, is that it
created the right conditions for a genuinely cooperative judicial federalism.
A. Cooperative Judicial Federalism
Cooperative judicial federalism goes by various names in the scholarship: dialec-
tical,472 interactive,473 polyphonic474 or relational federalism,475 or intersystemic476 or
469 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.
470 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 242
(1998). See also Monaghan, supra note 464, at 527–29.
471 Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 21, 28, 30 (Alaska 2014).
472 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1046–47 (1977).
473 Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study
in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 864 (1985).
474 ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS 7 (2009).
475 Charleton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a
Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 511, 512 (2011).
476 Gluck, supra note 155, at 1906.
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interjurisdictional477 adjudication. The broad thrust of this literature is that federal-
state judicial dialogue is valuable, and that Erie did not foreclose that dialogue.
Concurrent jurisdiction creates opportunities for cooperative judicial federalism,
because both state and federal courts are authorized to decide the same legal ques-
tions. A court of one system often decides a question arising under the laws of the other.
Although federal courts are not authoritative on questions of state law, there is
nevertheless real room for intersystemic conversation when they interpret state
statutes and constitutions.478
The scholarship says that dialogue between federal and state courts is valuable.
In a seminal work on dialectical federalism, Cover and Aleinikoff argued that the
development of criminal procedure doctrine is “a conversation among equals,” which
“demonstrate[s] a remarkable breadth of views and concerns,” has “a profound impact
on the development of constitutional law,” and “may be justified because it articulates
a basic tension in our society’s view of the criminal process.”479 Similarly, Gluck
invites us to “imagine the possibilities” were statutory interpretation methodology
to be given stare decisis effect.480 Courts would be encouraged to experiment with
their statutory interpretation methodology, creating “a realistic possibility for cross-
systemic pollination of interpretive theory.”481 Of course, federal-state judicial dialogue
was commonplace before Erie, because general common law was a legitimate source
that both state and federal judges could interpret and develop.482
Cooperative judicial federalism should flourish particularly when state rights of
action embed federal issues, or federal rights of action embed state issues. Because
these cases generate questions of state and federal law, they present real opportunities
for state and federal courts to engage in productive dialogue, to respond to each
other’s opinions, and to shape the contours of their own (and each other’s) law,
ensuring state law compliance with federal commands. As Martin Redish argued,
“both state and federal systems have much to gain from institution of a dialogue
between the courts of both systems,” especially when state and federal law can’t be
easily separated.483
Enforcing the First Amendment against state torts therefore presents an oppor-
tunity for cooperative judicial federalism. Sullivan and Snyder both deployed the First
Amendment to set aside a jury verdict underwritten by state law. They both required
that a state’s common law speech tort embed a mandatory First Amendment issue.
477 Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World,
in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 103
(James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2011).
478 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 474, at 102; Gluck, supra note 155.
479 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 472, at 1055, 1065–66.
480 Gluck, supra note 155, at 1992.
481 Id.
482 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 472, at 1048 n.66.
483 Redish, supra note 473, at 901.
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But the similarities stop there. Sullivan seized the opportunity for cooperative judicial
federalism; Snyder spurned it. In the following decade, state courts absorbed Sullivan
and its progeny into the specifics of their common law.484 This process epitomizes
cooperative judicial federalism because the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement
made “much room for federal-state dialogue.”485 But Snyder paid almost no attention
to state law, leaving no breathing space for federal-state dialogue. Snyder’s absolutism,
part and parcel of the First Amendment’s unstoppable march, shut down the articu-
lation of state law and with it the possibility of federal-state judicial dialogue.
B. The Common Law and Cooperative Judicial Federalism
Why did the Sullivan paradigm for enforcing the First Amendment against state
common law torts generate a cooperative judicial federalism? Sullivan’s inauguration
of cooperative judicial federalism is partly (and inseparably) about the role and status
of the common law in the United States. In “Our Federalism,”486 the common law
is primarily located in the states. This is a consequence of two facts: first, Henry
Hart’s celebrated axiom that federal law is “interstitial in its nature,” designed to achieve
a specialized or targeted purpose;487 and second, Brandeis’s famous declaration in
Erie that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”488 These are not absolutes, but
they resonate when the First Amendment limits state common law torts. In effect,
Sullivan imposed an affirmative duty on state and federal judicial officers in some
common law cases. Snyder imposed a congruent affirmative duty too; that duty,
however, ignores and preempts state common law, straining the systemic fact that
the primary location of the common law is in the states.
Sullivan generated cooperative judicial federalism because it took an internal
point of view with respect to Alabama’s common law of libel. By taking a practical
attitude of rule acceptance to state common law, the Court in Sullivan pictured federal
and state courts engaged in the same enterprise: molding or revising state common
law to comply with the First Amendment. Sullivan was an interstitial decision: it
identified a “gap” in state law (namely, the rule permitting an official to recover libel
damages for a publication criticizing official conduct), and filled the gap using the
First Amendment.489 And Brennan did not create a federal general common law of
484 Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving
Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 317, 344 (2009) (describing the doctrinal landscape defined by Sullivan as “relatively
settled and stable”).
485 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 472, at 1049.
486 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
487 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 435 (1953).
488 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
489 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 261, 283–85 (1964).
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libel. It’s fashionable to say that Sullivan “federalized” or “constitutionalized” defama-
tion; sometimes Sullivan is described very differently as “h[o]ld[ing] Alabama’s
defamation tort unconstitutional.”490 These are exaggerations, and the truth lies
somewhere in the middle. Brennan introduced a federal element for public officials
alleging that criticism of their official conduct was defamatory. That federal rule did
not colonize state common law wholesale.
Sullivan created the right conditions for cooperative judicial federalism by
ensuring that the First Amendment operated against the background of the state
common law. On this view, the First Amendment functions by altering or supplanting
legal relationships established by the states. It is therefore necessary first to look at
the substantive operation of state common law by reference to the rights, duties,
privileges, powers, and immunities that it creates, changes, or abolishes. Once the
substantive operation of the state common law is discerned, the First Amendment
modifies that substantive operation if necessary. This methodology encourages
cooperative judicial federalism because it does not pit federal law against state law.
The federal question is reached only if, from the perspective of a judicial officer who
accepts state common law as a practical guide for action, the substantive operation
of the state’s common law infringes the First Amendment. This generates varied
questions of state and federal law in which both state and federal courts are competent,
creating opportunities for intersystemic dialogue.
A sampling of recent defamation cases in state courts vividly illustrates that
Sullivan embraced cooperative judicial federalism. In D Magazine Partners, L.P. v.
Rosenthal,491 for example, the Texas Supreme Court amply demonstrated that its
common law had assimilated the federal constitutional requirements while leaving
room for an analysis of defamation elements under state law (including defamatory
“gist,” requirements of a prima facie case, and various defenses). In Elliott v.
Murdock,492 the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a statement was not defamatory
490 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1395 (2017). See
also John C.P. Goldberg, Benjamin Cardozo and the Death of the Common Law, 34 TOURO
L. REV. 147, 151 (2018) (“[S]tarting with New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
has shown itself prepared to deem entire swaths of state tort law null and void, often in the
name of protecting business interests.”).
491 529 S.W. 3d 429, 433 (Tex. 2017) (noting “the longstanding yet delicate balance”
between the First Amendment’s “need for a vigorous and uninhibited press” and the state’s
“legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury”); id. at 440 (applying, consistently with
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), “a negligence standard in cases involving
a private plaintiff seeking defamation damages from a media defendant”). 
492 385 P.3d 459, 465–66 (Idaho 2016) (“This Court, in reliance on the United States Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Gertz, has held that an individual can become a public figure on
a limited range of issues through voluntary public engagement on those issues.”); id. at 466
(observing that “[e]ven if, for the purposes of argument, the statements are accepted as
defamatory, [plaintiffs] fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [they] are
public figures” to whom Sullivan’s actual malice standard applies). 
65
2018] SILENCING STATE COURTS 53
under state law before deciding that, in any event, plaintiff was a public figure. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Edwards v. Commonwealth,493 assessed
the adequacy of a defamation complaint according to federal standards as incor-
porated into Massachusetts law. And the Court observed that an independent basis
existed under state law to impose the actual malice standard. In SIRQ, Inc. v. The
Layton Companies, Inc.,494 the Utah Supreme Court applied state law as guided by
Sullivan and reversed the trial judge’s failure to properly conduct an initial inquiry
to ensure that only statements capable of defamatory meaning made it to the jury in
a false light claim. The Maryland Court of Appeals has incorporated Sullivan as a
“First Amendment conditional privilege.”495 “Although defamation jurisprudence
traces its origins to a number of seminal First Amendment cases of the United States
Supreme Court,” the Court insisted that “the resolution of defamation claims brought
by private individuals has largely been left to the province of state courts.”496
Snyder operated very differently. It sidestepped Maryland law altogether: IIED
was mentioned in passing and intrusion upon seclusion was silently preempted.497
The First Amendment inquiry was acontextual, divorced from the substantive
operation of state common law. The First Amendment, in other words, did not operate
interstitially “against the background of the total corpus juris of the states”;498 rather,
the federal question overtook the whole litigation. And its application to a whole
swathe of torts—IIED, intrusion upon seclusion, intentional interference with con-
tractual relations, and negligent infliction of emotional distress—strongly suggests
that Snyder created a federal general common law, which largely preempts state
speech torts. Nor has Snyder developed in the usual common law way. It has not
sparked an incremental reform of IIED law; rather, it has sparked an absolutist
application of the First Amendment, underwritten by an expansive public concern
test.499 A natural consequence of this absolutism is the hyperstability and predictabil-
ity of the doctrinal regime thus generated. A federal law, severed from an underlying
state right of action, has preempted a static, external vision of state common law.
State courts applying Snyder engage in backwards avoidance. They decide a
momentous federal constitutional question to avoid ordinary issues of state private
493 76 N.E.3d 248, 256–59 (Mass. 2017) (citing Massachusetts cases incorporating Sullivan’s
actual malice requirement into state law).
494 379 P.3d 1237, 1245 (Utah 2016) (quoting state court opinions for the proposition that
false light claims are “predicated on publication of a defamatory statement” and “reside in
the shadow of the First Amendment”) (quoting Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 842
P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1992) and Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005)); id. at 1246
(“[F]alse light claims that arise from defamatory speech raise the same First Amendment
concerns as are implicated by defamation claims.”).
495 Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane, 149 A.3d 573, 576, 581 (Md. 2016).
496 Id. at 575.
497 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–60 (2011).
498 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 487, at 435.
499 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451–53.
66
54 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1
law. We have seen, for example, that state courts applying Snyder to economic torts
like intentional interference do not consider whether those torts actually contravene
the First Amendment. In Cleaveland, the trial judge was “skeptical that a claim for
tortious interference with contractual relations exists in circumstances such as those
presented here,” but held that the Court “need not reach this issue as the enforcement
of such a tort is an infringement on the Respondents’ right to free speech and ex-
pression under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”500 The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire mirrored this reasoning.501 The Court consciously refused
to follow its usual practice of “normally address[ing] constitutional questions first under
the State Constitution and rely[ing] on federal law only to aid in [its] analysis.”502
Instead, although the Court “share[d] the trial court’s skepticism” concerning the
intentional interference tort, it agreed that “[it] need not decide whether a viable
tortious interference claim can exist under the circumstances present in this case,”
because Snyder precluded recovery.503
Although it ignored Maryland law, Snyder nevertheless held that there was only
one way that Maryland law could be reconciled with the First Amendment, namely,
the creation of an all-purpose federal defense.504 It is one thing to say, as Snyder does,
that the First Amendment incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment limits state com-
mon law.505 No one disputes that, and it is consistent with the scribal attitude of the
federal courts towards state law (I argued above that federal courts take a scribal atti-
tude to state law, and state courts take an authorial attitude to state law). It is entirely
500 City of Keene v. Cleaveland, Nos. 213-2013-cv-00098, 213-2013-cv-0241, 2013 WL
8691664, at *10 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013).
501 See City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 260–61 (N.H. 2015).
502 Id. at 258.
503 Id. at 259. In Rodriguez, the Arizona court noted that starting with the First Amend-
ment rather than state law would “avoid a ‘prolonged, costly, and inevitably futile trial.’”
Rodriguez v. Fox News Network L.L.C., 356 P.3d 322, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (internal
citation omitted). The flip side of this concern, however, is that an incorrect First Amendment
determination in state court will truncate the application of state law, resulting in a costly
appeal and remand process. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991)
(“The Minnesota Supreme Court’s incorrect conclusion that the First Amendment barred
Cohen’s claim may well have truncated its consideration of whether a promissory estoppel
claim had otherwise been established under Minnesota law and whether Cohen’s jury verdict
could be upheld on a promissory estoppel basis. Or perhaps the State Constitution may be
construed to shield the press from a promissory estoppel cause of action such as this one.
These are matters for the Minnesota Supreme Court to address and resolve in the first instance
on remand.”). Henry Monaghan observed that in Snyder the Court exercised its power to
select the precise issues for determination. Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance,
Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 696–97 (2012).
504 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451.
505 See id. at 460 (“As we have noted, ‘the sensitivity and significance of the interests pre-
sented in clashes between First Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.’”).
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another to say, also as Snyder does, that there is only one way to enforce that limit. That
is a separate and stronger claim that the First and Fourteenth Amendments completely
determine the application of the limit across a whole class of state torts (common law
and statutory).
The difficulty associated with the stronger claim—that state tort law can be
reconciled with the First Amendment only by creating an all-purpose federal defense—
is that it robs state courts of their authorial attitude, that is, their capacity to develop
their own law by taking a critical reflective attitude towards it. As we have seen, the
state courts applying Snyder ignore their own tort law and their own constitutions,
and do not decide how to square their own law with the First Amendment.506 Instead,
they are required to unthinkingly obey Snyder’s command. And this command trans-
lates to directives to state courts: do not bother fussing over your local law; do not
worry about the possibility of a different division of authority between judge and jury;
do not fret about pointless jury instructions.
Snyder makes state courts mere scribes of their own law. The federal structure
contemplates that a state-created right of action is governed by state law, unless
federal law applies. The starting point is state law, followed by the enforcement of
an interstitial national law to achieve its special and targeted objective. Snyder’s
absolutism flips the starting point.507 As it has been applied in state courts, the starting
point is not the state law purporting to legitimize the jury verdict, but instead whether
the speech is protected.508 And this requires state courts to take a brief static snapshot
of state tort law to predict the likelihood of liability attaching to speech. Rather than
ask whether the state common law in fact impinges on the First Amendment and, if
so, how it could be modified to remove the inconsistency, Snyder simply invalidates
the state law in its predicted application.
Snyder therefore raises the question: if the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
and Erie, embody judicially developed federal commands, and the IIED tort is a
judicially developed state right of action, why not allow state courts to do the heavy
lifting? Why deny state courts the capacity to develop their own common law, over
which they are ordinarily sovereign (in the absence of applicable federal law), consis-
tently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than require them to obey
a defense effectively legislated by the Supreme Court?
Had he looked a little harder, Roberts might have embraced cooperative judicial
federalism and the internal perspective towards state common law. Snyder, in its
rejection of the authorial perspective, failed to notice the true nature of IIED’s
outrageousness requirement. It failed to realize, moreover, that IIED targets conduct
that is not just outrageous, but both extreme and outrageous; a “double limitation”
which “requires both that the character of the conduct be outrageous and that the
506 See supra notes 500–05.
507 Cf. Kalven, supra note 52, at 191–92.
508 See supra notes 500–05.
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conduct be sufficiently unusual to be extreme.”509 And Snyder refused to consider the
different roles of judge and jury in an IIED claim—discussed in Harris v. Jones510 and
described in the Third Restatement as the “court play[ing] a more substantial screening
role on the questions of extreme and outrageous conduct and the severity of the
harm”511—as a potential cure for the constitutional defect. The judge “first makes
a judgment . . . as to whether the conduct alleged could be found extreme and out-
rageous and the harm sufficiently severe such that liability is permissible,” and, if
so, “submits the case for the jury to determine whether the defendant engaged in ex-
treme and outrageous conduct and whether the plaintiff suffered severe emotional
harm.”512 Snyder simply did not explain why these common law rules ran afoul of
the First Amendment.
Put differently, Snyder is functionally equivalent to a First Amendment collateral
attack. This external, collateral attack simply fixes on a verdict enforcing a state right
of action against a speaker. The state law basis underwriting the verdict—for example,
the tort or theory of liability, the legal source (common law, legislation, or both)—is
entirely ignored. The effect of Snyder’s methodology is to change the right of action
completely. The state courts practicing backwards avoidance transform the plaintiff’s
state tort allegation into a First Amendment claim of the defendant. Snyder thus
contributed to the “epidemic pathology” that state courts parrot U.S. Supreme Court
reasoning on constitutional issues.513 In the result, neither federal nor state courts
answer questions of state law that cry out for resolution, silencing state-federal
judicial dialogue and denying intellectual and decisional resources—the “guidance,
509 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 2012).
510 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). Harris v. Jones, the case Roberts cited to establish that
Maryland recognized IIED, was sensitive to the “particularly troublesome question” of
“[w]hether the conduct of a defendant has been ‘extreme and outrageous.’” Id. at 614. Citing
other state courts, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in Harris v. Jones that “[i]t is for the
court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be
regarded as extreme and outrageous,” and, where reasonable minds may differ, “it is for the
jury to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme
and outrageous to result in liability.” Id. at 615.
511 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 2012).
512 Id.
513 Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 726
(2016). For defamation actions, where one might think that the gravitational force of Sullivan’s
“federal rule” would be overwhelming, it is noteworthy that state courts claim a significant
degree of decisional independence. See, e.g., Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane, 149 A.3d 573, 575
(Md. 2016) (“[T]he resolution of defamation claims brought by private individuals has largely
been left to the province of State courts.”); Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza, 294 S.E.2d 70, 73
(W.Va. 1981) (critical of the state of defamation law after Sullivan, but noting that “Sullivan and
its progeny . . . placed a first amendment, free speech gloss upon all prior law of defamation”
and “permitted the states to adopt their own standards of liability in defamation actions”).
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perspective, inspiration, reassurance, or cautionary tales”514—offered by the discoursive
method of the common law.
C. Making Snyder Cooperative
How, then, should Snyder have been written to embrace cooperative judicial
federalism? One approach is to mimic Hustler for private-figure IIED lawsuits, which
would require a plaintiff to show Sullivan-brand actual malice.515 Falwell failed to
make out his IIED claim because the advertising parody of which he complained did
not contain a false statement of fact made with knowledge, or in reckless disregard,
of its falsity.516 But actual malice is custom-made for public figures, who attain that
status by position alone or by “thrusting their personality into the vortex of an
important public controversy.”517 Another reason that actual malice is inapt stems
from its commitment to a conception of truth and falsity. Truth or falsity is part of
the defamation cause of action (and, for that matter, a false-light invasion of privacy
cause of action); but in an IIED suit, extreme and outrageous speech that is not readily
characterizable as true or false can nevertheless cause severe emotional harm.
A second option is to take up the Restatement’s suggestion and imbue certain
aspects of the IIED cause of action with constitutional significance. This could
require, for example, a judge to make an initial assessment of whether the defendant’s
extreme and outrageous conduct reaches a necessary First Amendment threshold,
before submitting the case to the jury. A third option is to adopt the newsworthiness
privilege that exists in various state law privacy torts. To be sure, the newsworthiness
privilege may have its own problems and may closely resemble Snyder’s public
concern test. But it would place responsibility on state courts, as primary authors,
to ensure that their common law conforms to the First Amendment.
The point isn’t to advocate one view over another, but to show that the problem
confronted in Snyder could have been solved in many ways, and that the solution
chosen by Snyder sacrificed state common law and cooperative judicial federalism
on the altar of an absolutist First Amendment. The second and third options outlined
very briefly here are akin to Sullivan. They pick up state common law trends, showing
at least some comity and respect to the states as sovereign authorities backing state
common law, and to the state courts writing that common law. Within the confines of
the First Amendment, these alternatives allow states to author their own common law.
514 Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children”:
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633,
1642 (2004).
515 See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
516 See id. at 56–57.
517 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
The application of the First Amendment to state common law torts is a continual,
sometimes urgent, problem. In 1967, the Supreme Court of Texas decided Fisher v.
Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,518 the well-known “plate grabbing” case. Emmit E. Fisher,
a black NASA mathematician, had been invited to attend a conference in Houston.519
After the morning session, attendees adjourned for a buffet lunch at a whites-only
private club.520 As Fisher stood in line, an employee approached him, snatched the
plate from his hand, and shouted that he could not be served in the club.521 There was
no direct physical contact and Fisher did not apprehend any physical injury.522 He was
highly embarrassed and hurt by the hotel employee’s conduct in the presence of
colleagues.523 The Texas Supreme Court held “that the forceful dispossession of . . .
Fisher’s plate in an offensive manner was sufficient to constitute a battery.”524
After Snyder, there is a real question as to whether Fisher—“a landmark racial
discrimination case”525—remains good law. In 2014, when considering a discussion
draft of the Third Restatement of intentional torts to persons, two ALI members
doubted Fisher on First Amendment grounds.526 This Article has endeavored to explain
that the danger is not only that cases like Fisher come out differently after Snyder.
The danger is also systemic: that Snyder forecloses plaintiffs and courts from alleging,
reasoning, and judging that certain conduct is right or wrong under the local standards
of state tort law.
Sullivan, as we have seen, does not pose the same systemic risk,527 because it took
state common law seriously. Its methodology recognizes not only that state common
518 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
519 Id. at 628.
520 Id.
521 Id. at 628–29.
522 Id. at 629.
523 Id.
524 Id. at 630.
525 Richard Delgado, One Man’s Dignity: An Interview with Emmit E. Fisher, in THE
PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY
23 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
526 See Proceedings of 2014 Annual Meeting, 91 AM. LAW. INST. PROC. 129–30 (2014).
Peter F. Langrock argued Fisher “raise[d] . . . certain First Amendment questions, which are
not dealt with,” and “[n]o matter how offensive the language may be, there is still the First
Amendment, and we’ve got to protect that.” Id. at 130. Professor George C. Christie also
acknowledged Fisher’s “First Amendment issues.” Id. at 135.
527 Consider, for example, Iowa, where “[t]he judicial heavy lifting necessitated by” Sullivan
“has abated” but where “[t]he dialectal heat generated by the competing interests of [common
law] reputation and freedom of speech continues to simmer.” Patrick J. McNulty & Adam
D. Zenor, Iowa Defamation Law Redux: Sixteen Years After, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 365. 368
(2012) (“Most of the cases decided by the Iowa Supreme Court in the last sixteen years are
private disputes involving application of common law principles,” including significant cases
“in which the principles of the common law and the First Amendment intersect.”).
71
2018] SILENCING STATE COURTS 59
law counts as law under Erie, but also that a state common law judgment represents
the local political community’s collective opinion that the defendant wronged the
plaintiff. At the same time, it recognizes that the defendant should not pay for the
wrong. Importantly, moreover, Sullivan’s approach recognizes that local standards—
the rules and principles of state common law—can themselves be offensive to the
First Amendment and, if so, should be changed accordingly. Sullivan says that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments changed the Alabama law that purported to hold
the Times and the four ministers liable for criticizing an elected public official.528
Because Sullivan adopted the internal point of view vis-à-vis state common law, it
permitted state common law to be revised.
Snyder’s methodology is broad; Sullivan’s is deep. Snyder applies across all state
torts; Sullivan responds to the special contours of the right of action. Snyder fixes
only on a verdict; Sullivan reaches into state common law. Neither Sullivan nor
Snyder is an unconstitutional judicial overreach. The better approach is determined,
then, by asking: what is lost or gained in choosing one over the other? What we gain
in choosing Sullivan is the best vision of our judicial federalism. Choosing the internal
point of view towards state common law creates opportunities for cooperative judicial
federalism. Sullivan’s classical common law approach does not silence but encourages
discourse and state-federal judicial dialogue.
528 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–85, 292 (1964).
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In the battle between freedom of contract and freedom of speech, 
contract almost always wins. Just why that is so, however, has never 
been adequately addressed. Recently, nondisclosure agreements 
(NDAs)—contracts that censor speech—have come under intense 
scrutiny for their central role in ensuring that moneyed wrongdoers 
can act with impunity. Yet none of the criticism deals with an ele-
mental injury wrought by NDAs: the harm that contractually 
enforced silence unleashes on free expression. Prompted by the 
#MeToo movement, and especially the devastating success of NDAs 
that prohibited victims of sexual harassment and assault from 
speaking out, this Article argues that freedom of contract should not 
always trump freedom of speech. It starts by demonstrating that 
NDAs are ubiquitous in our lives, and that they can serve important 
individual and social interests. But, this Article goes on to show, 
some NDAs also conflict with cardinal free speech values. For ex-
ample, an NDA where a private individual sells her silence to a 
candidate for public office may prevent voters from meaningfully 
exercising their sovereignty at the ballot box, violating the “in-
formed voter” conception of free speech. After articulating the 
significant threats that NDAs present to the dominant free speech 
values (truth, democracy, and agency), this Article contends that 
courts should tap into the common law doctrine voiding contracts 
against public policy. NDAs against the public policy of free expres-
sion should not be enforced. By recovering a line of cases from the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in which the common 
law refused to enforce contracts that contradicted fundamental con-
stitutional principles, this Article returns some free speech norms to 
the common law. It busts the monopoly that the First Amendment 
has claimed over free speech discourse. 
∗ Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A few months before he died of a sudden heart attack in October 
1946, Leroy Gardner, director of the prestigious Saranac Labora-
tory, received a visitor. The visitor, trailblazing industrial 
toxicologist Harriet Hardy, found Gardner distressed. The manufac-
turers who funded his research forbade him from publishing his 
animal studies, in which mice and cats exposed to asbestos devel-
oped cancer. The asbestos industry enforced its contractual veto 
over publication, “one of many instances where asbestos corpora-
tions manipulated and influenced the scientific literature to protect 
their vested interests.”1 Fifty years later, the disgraced movie pro-
ducer Harvey Weinstein built a “complicity machine” to quiet 
allegations of years of abuse. Victims of Weinstein’s predation were 
contractually bound to stay mum.2 Bill O’Reilly, the former Fox 
News host, silenced his own accusers by paying $45 million in con-
fidential settlements. Some of these bargains required not just 
silence but, if the information ever became public, denial.3 In the 
final months of his life, Ian Gibbons, a brilliant scientist who had 
the tragic misfortune to be hired by Theranos, could not confide in 
his wife because of the strict agreement he had signed.4 And who 
could forget Donald Trump, whose lackey in 2016 paid two women 
to remain silent over alleged affairs.5  
1 David S. Egilman & Harriet L. Hardy, Manipulation of Early Animal Re-
search on Asbestos Cancer, 24 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 787, 789 (1993). See also 
Harriet Hardy & David Egilman, Corruption of Occupational Medical Literature: 
The Asbestos Example, 20 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 127, 128 (1991); Bill Richards, 
New Data on Asbestos Indicate Cover-Up of Effects on Workers, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 12, 1978, at A1; Lawrence K. Altman, Dr. Harriet Hardy, Harvard Profes-
sor, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at B10; HARRIET L. HARDY,
CHALLENGING MAN-MADE DISEASE 42–43 (1983). 
2 Megan Twohey et al., Feeding the Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2017, at A1, A20. 
3 Emily Steel, Settlement Agreements Reveal How O’Reilly Silenced His Ac-
cusers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2018, at B3. 
4 JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY
STARTUP 146 (2018). 
5 Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Paid Porn Star, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 13, 2018, at A1. 
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There is a common thread here: nondisclosure agreements 
(NDAs). The NDA is the legal mechanism enabling silence to be 
sold, and a crucial pillar of many schemes to conceal information of 
vital public import. And NDAs are everywhere. That’s because the 
need for confidentiality arises in “infinite and consequential circum-
stances.”6 Trump himself helpfully tweeted that NDAs are “very 
common among celebrities and people of wealth.”7 In fact, they are 
very common, period. In the S&P1500, 87% of CEO employment 
contracts contain an NDA.8 For everyone else, an NDA is a condi-
tion of employment “offered by employers on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.”9 Employment, dispute resolution, deals, the gig economy, 
journalism, intimacy—name a relational context, and some lawyer 
somewhere has regulated its information flow with an NDA. Indeed, 
NDAs are so common that companies automate their production. In 
2017, the General Counsel of Adobe Systems explained that 70% of 
the 2,000 NDAs executed annually do not require a lawyer. Some-
times an NDA only needs “one click to generate”; otherwise, “a 
dynamic agreement … is built on questions and answers.”10 
The unrelenting parade of abusive NDAs marching across the 
news may lead us to jump to the conclusion that all NDAs are bad. 
But make no mistake: confidentiality agreements are valuable. They 
protect privacy. A victim often seeks contractual assurance that de-
tails of wrongdoing are hushed. And, because the wrongdoer 
6 RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE: WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY AND
WHEN TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 156 (2009). 
7 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 3, 2018, 3:54 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/991994433750142976 
8 Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses 
and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015). 
9 Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements 
and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 379, 384–85 (2006).
10 Mike Dillon, How We Stripped Down NDAs: Adobe’s GC wanted a non-
disclosure agreement template that could be used without Calling a Lawyer, 
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invariably wants confidentiality too, the victim gets more compen-
sation.11 NDAs also protect commercially valuable information. 
Google’s algorithms and Coca-Cola’s formulae are closely guarded 
trade secrets. NDAs assure companies that such valuable secrets will 
not be freely passed along to competitors. Without NDAs, moreo-
ver, many negotiated deals would (and many settlements could) fall 
through. Major news stories might not materialize if confidentiality 
of sources could not be guaranteed. And so on. 
Perhaps it’s precisely because NDAs are so valuable that the as-
sault on their enforceability has been so tepid and piecemeal. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have focused on President Trump, who, as far as 
NDAs go, is an easy target: the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
prevents governments from censoring unclassified information by 
contract.12 Or, they have focused on content-neutral doctrines that 
police all contracts, like unconscionability and duress.13 There are 
also avenues for attacking specific types of NDAs, including the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act14 and state legislation prohibiting NDAs 
when settling sexual assault claims.15 The scholarship, while 
thoughtful, has also failed to supply sufficiently robust conceptual 
resources to confront the entirety of the NDA problem. One scholar 
proposed regulations that targeted repeat offenders.16 Another ar-
gued that NDAs should be subject to scrutiny on public policy 
grounds, but that argument was limited by its framing: NDAs anal-
ogous to those that protect trade secrets are valid, and NDAs 
11 Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, 
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311 (2018). 
12 United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972); McGehee 
v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
13 See, e.g., Emma J. Roth, Is a Nondisclosure Agreement Silencing You From 
Sharing Your ‘Me Too’ Story? 4 Reasons It Might Be Illegal, ACLU: BLOG (Jan. 
24, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-
workplace/nondisclosure-agreement-silencing-you-sharing-your-me-too.  
14 See, e.g., Quicken Loans, Inc. v. NLRB, 830 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(denying petition to review NLRB’s determination that an employment contract 
forbidding employees to use or disclose a broad range of personnel information, 
or to criticize the employer publicly, violated the NLRA). 
15 E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1002 (West 2018). 
16 Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76,  
79 (2018). 
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analogous to those that conceal crime are not.17 Still others argue 
that NDAs are unenforceable when they amount to restraints of 
trade,18 or when they harm third parties.19 
One of the profound social insights of the past two years is that 
all this private (more accurately, secret) ordering shapes and deter-
mines public discourse. And yet, after this collective realization 
dawned, and in all the critical acid poured over NDAs, one question 
remains: where is free speech? The First Amendment, we are told, 
is absent for two good reasons. One is the state action doctrine. The 
Free Speech Clause and corresponding state guarantees apply only 
to governments, not to private parties. As a federal district court re-
cently observed, there is no state action when a court “merely” 
enforces a private contract.20 “To hold otherwise,” said the judge, 
“would mean that courts could never enforce non-disclosure agree-
ments.”21 
The second is freedom of contract. In 1991, the Supreme Court 
said that a law that “simply requires those making promises to keep 
them” escapes First Amendment scrutiny, because any speech re-
strictions are “self-imposed.”22 Speech rights are voluntarily 
traded.23 “Constitutional rights are waived every day,” said Frank 
Easterbrook nearly forty years ago, and “[t]here is nothing special 
about the First Amendment.”24 Eugene Volokh argued that “it’s 
proper to let speakers contract away their rights.”25 For Daniel 
Solove and Neil Richards, speech rights are “alienable” and the First 
17 Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of 
Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998). 
18 Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure Agree-
ments to Silence Whistleblowers, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1207 (1999). 
19 David A. Hoffmann & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3328569.
20 Bronner v. Duggan, 249 F.Supp.3d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2017).
21 Id. 
22 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991). 
23 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 433, 479–80 (1993). 
24 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privi-
leges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 346. 
25 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Trou-
bling Implications of a Right to Stop People Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1057 (2000). 
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Amendment should apply to a private law restriction on speech only 
if “the speaker cannot avoid accepting the duty.”26 Timothy Zick is 
partial to what he calls an “autonomy approach.”27 Erica Goldberg 
thinks that NDAs get a free speech pass because “individuals volun-
tarily exchanged their ability to speak for compensation.”28 
These two responses are red herrings. The state action doctrine 
might explain the absence of the First Amendment, but it does not 
explain the absence of free speech. And reciting freedom of contract 
just begs the question: why does freedom of contract always trump 
freedom of speech? The answer cannot simply be waiver, promise, 
alienation, or some other synonym for contract. The values and in-
terests in enforcing NDAs must actually be weighed against the 
values and interests in free speech. Sometimes our silence should 
not be sold. 
The hour is nigh for a wholesale reckoning with the threat that 
NDAs pose to free expression. This Article embraces the oppor-
tunity presented by the NDA crisis to shake our instinctive, closely 
held faith that selling silence does not implicate free speech. It ar-
gues that NDAs present significant threats to the dominant free 
speech values (truth, democracy, and agency), and that courts should 
refuse to enforce some NDAs for violating the public policy of free 
expression. In establishing these claims, this Article makes three pri-
mary contributions. The first is an extensive account of the 
prevalence and value of NDAs. This Article shows that confidenti-
ality agreements are crucial components of our social and legal 
lives. From arms-length commercial parties to close intimates, 
NDAs temper the information flow and assure us that our confi-
dences will be kept. This Article highlights some important interests 
that NDAs serve: economy, privacy, administration of justice, de-
mocracy, and national security.  
26 Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil 
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1677, 1692 (2009).  
27 Timothy Zick, “Duty-Defining Power” and the First Amendment’s Civil 
Domain, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 116, 119 (2009), https://columbialawre-
view.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Zick.pdf  
28 Erica Goldberg, Thoughts on Enforcing Non-Disclosure Agreements, IN A 
CROWDED THEATER (March 21, 2018), https://inacrowdedthea-
ter.com/2018/03/21/thoughts-on-enforcing-non-disclosure-agreements/. 
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Second, this Article articulates how NDAs threaten all the dom-
inant free speech values. Consider, for example, agency. Even for 
speaker-centric agency accounts, NDAs are problematic. On these 
theories, free speech is crucial for self-expression or self-develop-
ment.29 NDAs destabilize these interests by curbing a confidant’s 
ability to externalize her mental contents.30 This is not a hypothet-
ical concern: recall Ian Gibbons, the late Theranos scientist who felt 
he could not confide in his wife.31 And at least one of the NDAs 
wielded by Harvey Weinstein prohibited the victim from talking to 
her therapist.32 For audience-focused accounts of agency, NDAs are 
equally problematic. NDAs limit audience autonomy if they deprive 
listeners of information they would otherwise have. Our agency de-
creases when information decreases. The secret ordering ordained 
by NDAs, therefore, undermines agency.33 
The third contribution of this Article is to identify and break the 
First Amendment’s monopoly over free speech. Since waking from 
its hibernation in the early twentieth century,34 the Free Speech 
Clause has grown to mediate all our free speech discourse. It’s now 
29 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) 
30 SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, 
AND THE LAW (2014). 
31 CARREYROU, supra note 4, at 146. 
32 Twohey et al., supra note 2, at A20. 
33 A subsidiary contribution of this Article is that it establishes First Amend-
ment pluralism. In other words, the First Amendment does not prioritize or 
privilege one free speech value over others. First Amendment monists—like Rob-
ert Post, who thought that the First Amendment accords lexical priority to 
participatory democracy—value doctrinal certainty and stability. Robert Post, 
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011). But this 
Article argues that First Amendment monism is itself inconsistent with our con-
stitutional practice. Drawing on Philip Bobbitt’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation, this Article notices a similarity between Bobbitt’s modalities of 
constitutional argument (textual, historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and 
ethical) and our accepted modes of First Amendment argument (truth, democracy, 
and agency). PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1982). In short, the First Amendment consists in the practice of arguing 
that free speech serves these important values. First Amendment monism denies 
or depreciates the legitimacy of multiple First Amendment values. That, however, 
is just not our constitutional practice. 
34 Vincent A. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule at the Birth of the 
Modern First Amendment, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 13, 28 (Lee C. Bol-
linger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019) 
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impossible to talk about free speech without also talking about the 
First Amendment. This is not the familiar complaint that the Free 
Speech Clause embodies a “first class” right,35 or has been weapon-
ized36 or Lochnerized.37 The point, rather, is that the Free Speech 
Clause has colonized every site of free speech discourse. Even state 
free speech guarantees, some expressed very differently to the First 
Amendment, often simply mimic the federal right.38 
This Article busts the First Amendment’s free speech monopoly 
at the altar of the common law doctrine voiding contracts against 
public policy. The public policy doctrine, as a branch of the state’s 
common law of contracts, is one of the few areas of the law resistant 
to the First Amendment’s claim to be the privileged source of free 
speech norms. This Article recovers a forgotten line of cases in 
which common law courts refused to enforce contracts because they 
were, in Lord Mansfield’s phrase, “against the fundamental princi-
ples of the constitution.”39 The doctrine was embraced 
wholeheartedly in the fledgling United States. Election wagers were 
voided because they so corrupted the franchise that it “could not be 
regarded as the expressed will of an intelligent constituency.”40 
It turns out, then, that the doctrine that contracts against public 
policy are void is no stranger to public law principles. This Article 
cashes out the rediscovered doctrine to invalidate two recent and 
controversial NDAs. First, the NDA between candidate Trump and 
an adult film actress should not be enforced by a court of law. By 
suppressing information of public concern about a presidential can-
didate, the contract keeps the electorate in the dark. Courts should 
not be complicit in the frustration of an informed voting public. Sec-
ond, the NDA between Harvey Weinstein and one of his victims is 
35 Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 950–52 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
36 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
37 The academic characterization du jour. E.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Loch-
nerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political 
Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 179, 179 n.2 (2018). 
38 E.g., City of West Des Moines v. Engler, 641 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 
2002). See generally Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Consti-
tutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005). 
39 Allen v. Hearn (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 969; 1 T.R. 56 (K.B.). 
40 Ball v. Gilbert, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 397 (1847). 
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void. Just as election wagers were invariably nixed because of their 
“tendency” to violate fundamental principles, each NDA that con-
ceals sexual harassment and abuse tends to damage to free 
expression. Courts should recognize that enforcing sexual miscon-
duct NDAs makes the judicial process complicit in this collective 
harm. 
The argument develops as follows. Part I first discusses exactly 
what an NDA is. It then proceeds to contextualize NDAs to illustrate 
their prevalence and the important values they serve. Part II argues 
for First Amendment pluralism, and then articulates the significant 
free speech concerns posed by NDAs. Finally, Part III justifies the 
doctrine that contracts against the public policy of free expression 
are unenforceable. It analyzes a Trump NDA and a Weinstein NDA, 
arguing that free speech public policy voids both. 
I. THE DNA OF NDAS
NDAs are important. This Part examines precisely what NDAs 
are: the legal rights and duties that they generate; their prevalence in 
our commercial, social, and legal lives; and the values and interests 
that they serve. Studying NDAs in their own right illustrates the 
need to be cautious, in Parts II and III, when considering whether 
free speech renders some of them unenforceable.  
A. The Acontextual NDA
In an NDA, one person, the confidant, promises to refrain from 
speaking about a matter or from disclosing information, in exchange 
for money or other consideration from the confider. NDAs are con-
textual, that is, they are always embedded in the context of some 
legal or normative relationship between the parties. Utter strangers 
do not execute NDAs. It’s true, sometimes parties to an NDA have 
not met, but some prior relationship must exist (or be contemplated) 
for which an NDA makes sense. An NDA may be part of, or may 
partly constitute, a discrete transaction, say, or a long-term associa-
tional agreement.41 That said, this section will analyze an NDA as 
41 This is a general property of all contracts. Contracts, “like other forms of 
human association … are … embedded in conventions, norms, mutual assump-
tions and unarticulated expectations.” Hugh Collins, Introduction: The Research 
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though it were executed between complete strangers: a “bare” prom-
ise by one stranger not to speak about some information in exchange 
for consideration from another stranger. Although artificial, the ac-
ontextual NDA serves as an analytical ideal. It permits us to analyze 
the obligations imposed and rights conferred by an NDA qua NDA. 
The next section will contextualize promises of silence and ask how 
an NDA’s context affects its strength. 
1. Structure of an NDA
Suppose that Donald and Stephanie, two strangers, sign an 
NDA: Donald pays Stephanie money for her to remain silent about 
certain information. Assuming no other relevant circumstances like 
duress, Stephanie voluntarily created a binding legal obligation by 
her promise. That promise, like contract law generally, serves the 
value of individual autonomy, namely Stephanie’s enhanced control 
over her life.42 Her capacity to promise that she will waive her 
speech right expanded the range of available options open to her. It 
enabled her monetary gain. It’s good that Stephanie can decide to 
legally undertake to not speak. 
Stephanie’s promise confers a legal right on Donald that the 
promise be kept.43 The NDA provides Donald with legal assurance 
that Stephanie will keep her silence, since Stephanie voluntarily 
Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of Contracts, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CON-
TRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 1, 2 (David Campbell 
et al. eds., 2003). 
42 Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 58, 61–62, 67  (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014); 
see also Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 19 (2013). 
43 This and subsequent claims in this paragraph rely on Raz, supra note 42. 
Raz’s account of the normativity of promises is illuminating for the institution of 
contract law, which supports the social practice of promising. Normatively, Steph-
anie’s bare promise to Donald (without payment) confers on Donald a right that 
the promise be kept, and a right and power to waive his right, releasing Stephanie 
from her undertaking, at any time and at Donald’s complete discretion. Id. at 72. 
As Raz notes, Donald has a normative assurance that Stephanie will keep her si-
lence: Stephanie voluntarily undertook to not speak (assuming, of course, no other 
relevant circumstances); Donald has power to terminate Stephanie’s obligation to 
remain silent; Stephanie cannot terminate her obligation on the ground that it is 
no longer in Donald’s interest. Id. at 72–74. 
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promised not to speak (assuming, again, no other relevant circum-
stances like duress) and Donald can enforce that obligation by 
arbitration or an action for damages. Depending on the terms of the 
NDA, it is also quite likely that Donald has a legal power to release 
Stephanie from her promise at his discretion. Stephanie, of course, 
cannot terminate her legal duty because, in her view, it is no longer 
in Donald’s interests. In most NDAs, the confidant voluntarily 
agrees to a continuing duty not to speak about relevant matters. Even 
if the information becomes public, Donald might wish that Stepha-
nie herself not verify it. 
There is a legal difference between waiving the right to speak 
and contracting with another to waive the right to speak. Suppose 
that Stephanie, prior to signing an NDA, has no intention to disclose 
the information that Donald wants to protect. Stephanie’s reasons 
for waiving her right to speak could be multifarious and personal: 
because she thinks the information is not important, or because dis-
closure would harm Donald, or because disclosure is too much 
effort. Before signing an NDA, Stephanie can waive her right to 
speak and, equally importantly, she can unwaive it at any time. 
Waiver of the right to speak is not like waiving due process rights, 
which completely depend on legal institutions for their exercise. 
Once a defendant waives a jury trial, or a party waives an argument 
or a privilege, those rights are forever surrendered. The old saying 
is that a privilege waived is a privilege lost. But Stephanie’s waiver 
of her right to speak, in the absence of any contract, is at her discre-
tion. The duration of that waiver is up to Stephanie. 
As soon as Stephanie enters into an NDA, she is legally bound 
by her promise unless and until Donald releases her from the obli-
gation. The contract confers on Donald a right that Stephanie keep 
her promise to waive her free speech rights. As soon as Stephanie 
entered into the NDA with Donald, the duration and scope of Steph-
anie’s waiver is no longer up to her. There may be other 
circumstances that override the NDA (for example, unconscionabil-
ity). But in the absence of such circumstances, the NDA secures 
Stephanie’s promise to waive her right to speak about certain mat-
ters, the duration and scope of which is subject to Donald’s say-so. 
To summarize, the acontextual NDA between Donald and 
Stephanie consists in the following: 
(a) Donald’s payment of money to Stephanie (or
some other consideration);
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(b) Stephanie’s promise to waive her right to speak
about certain information;
(c) Stephanie’s creation of a voluntary and binding
legal (contractual) obligation to waive her right
to speak;
(d) Stephanie’s loss of her power to unwaive at her
discretion;
(e) Donald’s right that Stephanie keep the promise to
waive; and
(f) Donald’s right to release Stephanie from the
promise to waive.
2. Waiver, Not Alienation
There are a couple of related corollaries that follow from the 
conclusion that the essence of the NDA confidant’s promise is a 
waiver of her speech rights. First, an NDA does not transfer the con-
fidant’s speech right. Regrettably, the literature is replete with talk 
of transfer and alienation. An NDA is said to transfer the confidant’s 
right to speak on the specified matter to the confider. Kathleen Sul-
livan, in her work on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
adopts these metaphors.44 So does Frank Easterbrook.45 But the met-
aphors are unhelpful. An NDA does not transfer the confidant’s free 
speech right; it secures the confidant’s promise to waive that right. 
Consider Frank Snepp. In 1977, after serving in the CIA for 
eight years, Snepp wrote a memoir criticizing the American evacu-
ation of Saigon. He did not submit the account for prepublication 
review by the CIA, as was expressly required by his 1968 employ-
ment contract. The federal government successfully sued to enforce 
the contract, and the Supreme Court spent most of its time on the 
appropriate remedy.46 But in a footnote, the Court suggested that for 
many government employees, a similar prepublication requirement 
would not withstand First Amendment scrutiny.47 For employees 
44 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1476–89 (1989). 
45 Easterbrook, supra note 24. 
46 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
47 Id at 509 n.3. 
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like Snepp, however, the agreement was a reasonable means of pro-
tecting vital national security interests.48 
Sullivan agreed with the Court, characterizing the result as hold-
ing that Snepp’s speech right was alienable: he was permitted to 
transfer his speech right to the federal government in exchange for 
employment. For Sullivan, the problem with viewing Snepp’s right 
to speak as inalienable is that it suggests that Snepp must speak, be-
cause “making decisions inalienable creates duties.”49 Sullivan 
asked rhetorically: “If the right to divulge the secrets of government 
employment is deemed inalienable — for example, in order to pre-
vent government from insulating itself from public criticism — is 
Snepp then obliged to speak?”50 
Of course not. This is a non sequitur and the mischief of the met-
aphor lies in the very fact that it permits Sullivan’s line of argument. 
There is no confusion once we discard talk of transfer and alienabil-
ity. Snepp did not transfer his free speech right; rather, he promised 
to waive an aspect of it. Plainly it is nonsensical to even suggest that 
Snepp acquired a duty to speak as a consequence of promising to 
waive his right to speak. Snepp’s promise to waive his speech right 
can be outweighed or defeated by other reasons. So the question is 
not whether free speech prohibits Snepp from alienating his speech 
right; rather, the question is whether free speech generates reasons 
that weaken or perhaps defeat Snepp’s promise to waive his speech 
right.51 
3. Waiver, Not Exercise
The second corollary is that an NDA does not exercise the con-
fidant’s speech rights. This is important because it scuttles a popular 
argument that immunizes an NDA from free speech scrutiny. By 
entering into an NDA, the argument goes, the confidant exercises 
her right to not speak. It follows that the NDA exercises her free 
48 Id. 
49 Sullivan, supra note 44, at 1486. 
50 Id. at 1487.  
51 The transfer/alienation metaphor invites other troubling conclusions. Sup-
pose, for example, that B breaks a valid promise of confidentiality by disclosing 
information to the press. If B’s promise had transferred a right, then does B’s 
subsequent disclosure of that information amount to conversion or theft? 
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speech right, because the right to free speech includes the right not 
to speak at all. And there is nothing objectionable about paying a 
confidant to exercise her free speech rights. “One aspect of the value 
of a right,” argued Easterbrook, “is that it can be sold and both par-
ties to the bargain made better off.”52 On this view, selling a right 
exercises the right. If we believe that constitutional rights are valu-
able, then we “should endorse their exercise by sale as well as their 
exercise by other action.”53 This argument—an NDA cannot 
threaten free speech because it counts as an exercise of the free 
speech right itself—purports to justify the absence of free speech 
scrutiny of NDAs. 
Undoubtedly the free speech right includes a right to not speak. 
Raz observed that free expression includes the freedom not to com-
municate.54 Blocher characterized the free speech right embodied by 
the First Amendment as a “choice right,” that is, a right to do some-
thing and to not do something.55 Doctrinally, the First Amendment 
right to not speak developed in the mid-twentieth century.56 By 
1977, Chief Justice Burger held for the Court in Wooley v. Maynard 
that the First Amendment protects “the right to refrain from speak-
ing at all.”57 Blocher argued that “the value of speech would be 
degraded if people could be compelled to engage in it,” because, for 
52 Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 347. 
53 Id. 
54 Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 n.3 (1991). 
55 Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 775–76 
(2012). 
56 Id. at 762–63. Interestingly, Blasi observed that “the seventeenth-century 
notion that speech is special precisely because it is not a matter of conscious 
choice.” Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. 
BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521, 544–45 (1977). He explained that “[s]everal 
early advocates of toleration—most significantly John Locke and the Leveller 
William Walwyn—argued that people have no real control over their beliefs and 
hence should not be held legally accountable for them,” and quoted Spinoza: “Not 
even the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep 
silence.” Id. 
57 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see also Janus v. Am. Fed’n 
of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) (“We 
have held time and again that freedom of speech ‘includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.’”). 
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example, coerced speech undermines credibility and sincerity.58 The 
absence of a right to not speak would undermine free speech values. 
Problems arise when we examine the claim that an NDA exer-
cises the confidant’s free speech rights. An NDA waives the 
confidant’s right to speak but does not exercise the right to not 
speak. As Blocher argues, it is wrong to equate waiving the right to 
speak with an exercise of the right to not speak. Waiving the right 
to speak, he says, gives up freedom from restraint; a right to not 
speak gains freedom from coercion.59 The basic distinction is that 
the right to speak operates against censorship; the right to not speak 
operates against compelled speech. Because free speech is a choice 
right, there is a distinction between exercising the right to not speak 
and waiving the right to speak.60 
Exercising the right to not speak resists compelled speech; 
waiver is the suspension of speech rights. Both are active and vol-
untary actions, and both are choices to not speak. Indeed, 
voluntariness is essential to waiver. The Supreme Court recently 
held that the waiver of First Amendment rights “must be freely given 
and shown by clear and compelling evidence.”61 Of course, waiver 
can be incentivized, and incentives can shade into coercion.62 But if 
an NDA were an exercise of the confidant’s right to not speak, then 
it would resist some directive, custom, or expectation that purported 
to coerce speech. That’s not the typical NDA. A confidant signs an 
NDA and chooses to not speak because of reasons that are independ-
ent of reasons generated by her right to not speak. In other words, a 
confidant signs an NDA to receive a benefit, not to resist coercion.  
                                               
58 Blocher, supra note 55, at 794, 795-96 (“[I]t is plausible to think that the 
value of speech would be degraded if people could be compelled to engage in it. 
Listeners would not know whether a speaker was sincere, and coerced speakers 
themselves might eventually lose the ability to determine and state their own 
‘true’ positions. The right to X must therefore include the right to not-X because 
the values underlying the right could not be vindicated by the former alone.”). 
59 Blocher, supra note 55, at 773 (waiver “relieves the government of a duty 
with regard to X rather than creating a duty with regard to not-X”).   
60 Id.   
61 Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2486. 
62 The boundary between incentives and coercion is not our primary concern 
here. Contract law polices the boundary between voluntary waiver and compul-
sion by unconscionability doctrines etc. 
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The justification for insulating an NDA from free speech scru-
tiny cannot rest on the premise that it constitutes an exercise of free 
speech rights. An NDA waives rather than exercises those rights. 
The height of confusion comes when an NDA is seen as an exercise 
of the right to not speak and the alienation of that right. In an other-
wise exemplary article, Solove and Richards said that “First 
Amendment rights are not merely alienable by individual speakers; 
the decision not to speak is also a First Amendment right.”63 How 
can someone both transfer a speech right and exercise that right sim-
ultaneously? 
B. Contextualizing NDAs
As noted above, NDAs are always executed in the context of 
some prior relationship between the parties. Because of their ubiq-
uity, NDAs cannot be sorted into a comprehensive or exhaustive 
typology. They can, however, be contextualized in the prior rela-
tionship; this relationship affects the strength of the rights and duties 
that an NDA creates. In the wake of the Harvey Weinstein scandal, 
the Women and Equalities Committee of the United Kingdom 
House of Commons released a report on workplace sexual harass-
ment.64 The report distinguished between NDAs in employment 
contracts and NDAs in settlement agreements.65 Employment and 
settlement are important, but they are not the only relational contexts 
in which NDAs are deployed. As this section shows, NDAs are pre-
sent in employment, dispute resolution, commerce, journalism, 
intimacy, and consumption. 
1. Employment
NDAs are used at every stage of the employment relationship—
when it begins, when it ends, and when it is ongoing. Prospective 
employees are often required to sign NDAs as a condition of em-
ployment. An analysis of 874 CEO employment contracts in the 
S&P1500 between 1996 and 2010 found that 87.1% contained an 
63 Solove & Richards, supra note 26, at 1688. 
64 WOMEN AND EQUALITIES COMMITTEE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE 
WORKPLACE, 2017–19, HC 725 (UK). 
65 Id. at 37–45. 
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NDA.66 And these are highly negotiated contracts where both par-
ties enjoyed significant bargaining power. For many employees, an 
NDA is non-negotiable. It is a condition of employment “offered by 
employers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”67 In an anonymous poll of 
10,242 tech workers, 15.3% of respondents agreed that an NDA had 
silenced them or their coworkers from speaking about important is-
sues.68 
Many employment NDAs are legitimate. Confidential and pro-
prietary information, especially trade secrets, must be protected. The 
House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee 
“acknowledge[d] that NDAs have a legitimate use in employment 
contracts” because they “are important to protect trade secrets that 
could otherwise undermine a company’s competitiveness in the 
marketplace.”69 A communications consultant, in an April 2018 let-
ter to the Financial Times, cautioned that “we have to be careful not 
to demonise the use of NDAs.”70 In 2017, the General Counsel of 
Adobe Systems revealed: “We . . . have pre-signed NDAs, and all 
are available to our employees in a very automated fashion . . . . We 
execute about 2,000 nondisclosure agreements a year at Adobe.”71 
NDAs are so common that the noun “NDA” is often used as a verb.72 
There are several overlapping categories of legitimate work-
place NDAs. First, and most important, are NDAs that protect trade 
secrets. Firms routinely require NDAs from employees to protect 
information that derives independent economic value from not be-
ing generally known. In fact, for information to qualify as a trade 
                                               
66 Bishara et al., supra note 8, at 4. 
67 Estlund, supra note 9, at 384–85. 
68 Kyle McCarthy, 15 Percent of Tech Workers Silenced by an NDA, BLIND’S 
WORK TALK BLOG (Sept. 4, 2018), https://blog.teamblind.com/in-
dex.php/2018/09/04/15-percent-of-tech-workers-silenced-by-an-nda/. 
69 WOMEN AND EQUALITIES COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 37. 
70 Gus Sellitto, Letter to the Editor, We must be careful not to demonise all 
use of NDAs, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2018, at 10. 
71 Dillon, supra note 10. 
72 John Winsor, Victors & Spoils, in PIONEERS OF DIGITAL: SUCCESS STORIES 
FROM LEADERS IN ADVERTISING, MARKETING, SEARCH, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 67, 
72 (Paul Springer & Mel Carson eds. 2012) (quoting the founder of a crowdsourc-
ing advertising agency as saying that for some projects “we put teams on it, 
usually around 10 people from around the world” and “[w]e NDA them and pay 
them up front”). 
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secret, it must be “the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”73 NDAs, therefore, not only 
protect trade secrets but can partly constitute them.74 These NDAs 
interlock with ongoing and independent obligations to protect trade 
secrets (fiduciary obligations, for example, or general employee du-
ties).75 Second, NDAs are often executed as part of noncompete 
clauses, and indeed can shade into noncompete clauses. In 2017, the 
South Carolina Court of Appeals invalidated an agreement, signed 
by an employee on his first day, as void against public policy, “be-
cause the nondisclosure provisions operated as noncompete 
provisions.”76 Third, NDAs are required from employees and con-
tractors for discrete projects. In fact, NDAs are now so widespread 
that they have infiltrated even mundane domestic affairs. Unknown 
tech executives are known to require NDAs from contractors who 
remodel their homes.77  
Employment and workplace NDA litigation does surface in the 
courts. Trade secret litigation, usually centering on a departing em-
ployee, is common,78 as is litigation seeking to enforce the 
confidentiality aspects of noncompete agreements. There are also 
reported cases of plaintiffs suing former employers for providing 
damaging information to a prospective employer, in breach of an 
                                               
73 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985). 
74 NDAs are central to trade secret law. Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Se-
cret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1556–63 (2018) (observing that 
NDAs play a key evidentiary role for establishing the existence of a trade secret, 
and arguing that NDAs therefore serve an important notice function for recipients 
of trade secret information). See also id. at 1556 (“[T]rade secret law itself en-
courages—and in many cases, seems to require—non-disclosure contracts as a 
condition of obtaining protection.”). 
75 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP 
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 318 (2008) (“Even in the absence of an explicit 
contract, most employees are held to have a duty to protect their employers’ in-
terests in the employers’ secret practices, information, and the like.”). 
76 Fay v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 799 S.E.2d 318, 322 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2017). 
77 Matt Richtel, For Tech Titans, Sharing Has Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2015, at BU4. 
78 Lemley, supra  note 75, at 318 (“Trade secret cases come up in three basic 
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NDA.79 Courts typically take a commonsense approach and enforce 
workplace NDAs that are reasonable limits on the time and scope of 
disclosure. But these reported cases are probably not a representa-
tive sample of employment confidentiality disputes, which are likely 
settled or arbitrated—and typically subject to confidentiality agree-
ments themselves—or informally resolved. 
2. Dispute Resolution
NDAs are routinely deployed in dispute resolution, usually in 
two broad categories: settlement/arbitration and discovery. Indeed, 
nowhere has the effect of NDAs been more discussed than in the 
context of settlement. NDAs shroud countless settlements in se-
crecy.80 Settlement is a “private, largely invisible, contractual 
phenomenon . . . requir[ing] only that the parties agree”81 on “terms 
without judicial oversight or interference.”82 Settlement contracts 
often include enforceable confidentiality provisions, sometimes 
concealing the very fact of the existence of a dispute.83 Since the 
early 1990s, secret settlements have constantly been the subject of 
news reporting and academic commentary.84 The debate has raged 
about confidentiality in civil settlements and criminal settlements. 
Advocates of secrecy have been arguing since the very beginning 
79 E.g., Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2000). 
80 The empirical problem vis-à-vis confidential (or invisible) settlement has 
long been recognized. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimi-
nation, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 962–67 (2006). 
81 David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leav-
ing Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 
94 GEO. L.J. 683, 697 (2006). Cf. Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the 
Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 663, 706 (2001) (“Settlements might occur … under the shadow of con-
fidentiality, but they are not invisible.”).
82 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Pri-
vate Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 429 (2016). 
83 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 498 (7th ed. 2008). 
84 Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let 
Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 
463 (2006); Minna J. Kotkin, supra note 80, at 945–50 (timing the public outcry 
earlier, from the late 1980s). 
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that parties are more likely to settle if confidentiality is assured.85 
Critics respond with arguments centering on the public good of ad-
judication and the interest in access to information of public 
concern.86 But the popular outcry and avalanche of scholarship have 
not damped litigants’ enthusiasm for confidential settlements. 
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, most notably arbi-
tration, are also regularly the subject of confidentiality clauses. 
Unlike the United Kingdom, there is no implied obligation of confi-
dentiality in arbitration in the United States. This means that explicit 
confidentiality clauses are common in arbitration agreements. More-
over, the “total privacy of the proceedings” is often touted as an 
important advantage of arbitration. Confidentiality and arbitration, 
therefore, are commonly linked, at least in the public mind and to 
the chagrin of one arbitration scholar.87 It is “the confidentiality pro-
vision, not the arbitration clause,” wrote Christopher Drahozal, that 
permits large corporations to hide misconduct.88 Absent an NDA, 
“arbitration is a private process, not a confidential one.”89 Although 
arbitration hearings are not open to the public, and the arbitrator and 
administrator are under an obligation of confidentiality, “the parties 
generally are under no such duty.”90 “[I]nformation about disputes 
remains available,” said Drahozal, “not from the court system but 
from the parties themselves.”91 (Of course, information held by 
courts is public; information held by the parties is not.) For 
Drahozal, our critical focus should be trained on confidentiality 
clauses, not on arbitration. 
                                               
85 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to 
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1991); Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-
Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 COR-
NELL L. REV. 311 (2018). This argument assumes that settlement itself is a public 
good, and it’s impossible to enter that debate here. 
86 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
87 Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28 (2015). 
88 Id. at 29. 
89 Id. at 30–31. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 47–48. 
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Discovery confidentiality agreements “have become routine.”92 
“[W]hen a litigant uses discovery to obtain damaging information 
about an opposing party,” noted Dustin B. Benham, “the opposing 
party will often pay money to avoid public disclosure through a con-
fidentiality agreement.”93 Although these agreements are generally 
enforceable, many parties remain uncomfortable unless the discov-
ery NDA is enshrined in a protective order.94 Breach of an NDA that 
has been converted (however mindlessly) into a protective order is 
no longer a matter of private ordering; rather, it implicates judicial 
authority and subjects the breaching party to contempt.95 
3. Commerce 
In business contexts, “[t]he need for confidentiality is . . . exten-
sive and palpable.”96 Parties to commercial arrangements 
commonly execute NDAs. At the outset of negotiations, participants 
know that sensitive or proprietary information will likely be shared. 
Two or more entities seeking to achieve a common objective, or to 
establish a specific relationship, must control the flow of infor-
mation within the entities and externally to the market. Well-crafted 
NDAs protect that information and regulate its flow. They are there-
fore an important part of interfirm business transactions. A survey 
of typical commercial confidentiality agreements is useful, but what 
follows is not exhaustive. 
NDAs are necessary in mergers and acquisitions; they are 
among the first contracts executed between putative buyers and 
sellers.97 An NDA executed early in negotiations is a powerful sig-
nal that the parties are serious. Inevitably, nonpublic information 
(financial information and important contracts, for example) is 
                                               
92 Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Eco-
nomic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 631 
(2018). 
93 Dustin B. Benham, Tangled Incentives: Proportionality and the Market for 
Reputation Harm, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 427 (2018). 
94 Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 357, 371 (2006). 
95 Id. 
96 GOLDFARB, supra note 6, at 157. 
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shared among the parties. The very existence of negotiations can be 
actively concealed. If the target is a private company, then an NDA 
is usually required even for basic information (for public companies, 
some information is already in the public domain).98 The target’s 
release of information to the buyer might be staged: commencing 
with the disclosure of high-level financial data, followed by the 
buyer’s access to management, then providing legal, accounting and 
tax information, and concluding with the most sensitive material. 
Confidentiality provisions are often coupled with non-use terms, 
prohibiting use of confidential information for any purpose other 
than evaluation and completion of the deal, and non-solicitation 
terms, prohibiting poaching employees or other key players. 
Commercial NDAs generally permit legally required disclosures 
(such as subpoena responses), but they also sometimes contribute to 
regulatory compliance. For example, Regulation FD, adopted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000, bans U.S. reporting 
companies from selectively disclosing material nonpublic infor-
mation to analysts and other securities market professionals.99 The 
final rule—which emerged from a worry that public companies were 
disclosing advance warnings of earnings results to a select few ana-
lysts and advisers—sought to level the informational playing field. 
Material information, if disclosed to one, must be disclosed to all. 
                                               
98 Deal NDAs contain “standstill” provisions, which restrict the buyer’s abil-
ity to acquire, vote, or dispose of stock in the seller. These provisions prevent a 
potential buyer from launching a hostile bid and assure a successful buyer that 
prior potential buyers are contractually bound not to overbid. For public company 
NDAs, standstill provisions are sometimes required to avoid transactions that trig-
ger Exchange Act disclosure requirements. 
99 SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2018). “FD” stands for “Fair Dis-
closure.” Regulation FD “prohibits a corporation from making selective 
disclosures of nonpublic, material information by requiring public disclosure once 
the private disclosure has been made.” J & R Marketing, SEP v. General Motors 
Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 393 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008). It applies to issuers with a class of 
securities registered under section 12, or issuers required to file reports under sec-
tion 15(d), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b). The 
SEC estimates that “approximately 13,000 issuers make Regulation FD disclo-
sures approximately five times a year for a total of 58,000 submissions annually, 
not including an estimated 7,000 issuers who file Form 8-K to comply with Reg-
ulation FD.” Securities and Exchange Commission, Submission for OMB 
Review; Comment Request, 83 Fed. Reg. 49959–60 (Sept. 27, 2018). 
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But Regulation FD’s disclosure requirements do not apply if the re-
cipient “expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in 
confidence.”100 An NDA may be necessary, then, for a public com-
pany to adhere to Regulation FD when it privately discloses material 
information to a credit rating agency.101  
Confidentiality agreements are necessary not only for mergers 
and acquisitions, but also for joint ventures, alternative structures, 
financing, private placements, and many other transactions. The ne-
gotiation and closing of a syndicated loan102 may require express 
confidentiality undertakings not only to protect sensitive financial 
information but also to comply with Regulation FD. Similarly, pri-
vate placements or unregistered offerings—securities offerings 
exempt from registration with the SEC—are confidential (general 
solicitation is prohibited and the offering memorandum often in-
cludes confidentiality clauses). And when public companies make 
private offerings (private investments in public equity), compliance 
with Regulation FD requires that potential investors enter into 
NDAs. 
NDAs are required in myriad commercial contexts outside fi-
nancing and restructuring. Anchor tenants share confidential 
information with their landlords.103 And recent decades demonstrate 
that NDAs are widespread in producing and selling goods, espe-
cially technology products. Software developers who license their 
platforms to customers normally include NDAs as part of the terms 
100 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2018). The agreement need not be in writ-
ing. 
101 When adopted, Regulation FD exempted communications to credit rating 
agencies. This exemption was repealed as required by section 939B of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Credit rating 
agencies are regulated as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
(NRSROs), which are specifically excluded from the definition of investment ad-
visors (and are typically not covered recipients under Regulation FD). However, 
not all credit rating agencies are NRSROs, necessitating confidentiality agree-
ments for compliance with Regulation FD. 
102 A syndicated loan is a credit facility where “multiple banks ‘syndicate’ 
under a lead arranger, each holding only a portion of the loan.” Loan Syndications 
and Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2018). There is an active 
secondary market for syndicated loans. Id. 
103 Confidentiality agreement, 2 Real Estate Leasing Practice Manual § 80:1. 
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of use. The Google Cloud Platform License Agreement and the Am-
azon Web Services Customer Agreement both include 
confidentiality provisions. For businesses licensing proprietary soft-
ware, the failure to include robust contractual duties of 
nondisclosure can be costly.104 Similarly, device manufacturers 
commonly require confidentiality in its supply chains. Apple, for 
example, maintains NDAs with its suppliers. During product devel-
opment, Apple’s NDAs are particularly onerous: Apple can audit 
the supplier’s compliance with the nondisclosure terms, the supplier 
must only refer to Apple and the project by code names, and the 
supplier is subject to a $50 million liquidated damages clause.105 
One final commercial context, which hinges on confidentiality, 
is illustrative: NDAs signed by business advisers and consultants. 
McKinsey is perhaps the best-known example, but there are many 
others. As its lawyers put it in a recent court filing, McKinsey’s “cli-
ents often require that McKinsey’s involvement with their 
organizations remains confidential, so as not to affect their opera-
tions and business strategies adversely.”106 NDAs, therefore, are 
simply “[o]ne manifestation of McKinsey’s commitment to main-
taining confidentiality of client names.”107 The consulting 
agreement with the Financial Oversight and Management Board for 
Puerto Rico, for example, includes a standard confidentiality clause. 
104 See, e.g., Broker Genius, Inc., v. Zalta, 280 F.Supp.3d 495, 517–18 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Nevertheless, because [plaintiff] regularly disclosed its alleged 
secrets to each of its customers without notifying them of the information’s con-
fidential nature or binding them to confidentiality agreements, [plaintiff] is 
unlikely to be able to show that it undertook reasonable measures to protect the 
secrecy of its alleged trade secrets.”). See also Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Com-
puter Corp., 527 Fed. App’x 910, (Fed. Cir. 2013) (failure to issue a written 
confidentiality memorandum—as required by the negotiating NDA designed to 
“further[] a business relationship”—fatal to breach of contract and misappropria-
tion of trade secret claims). 
105 Apple Inc. Confidentiality Agreement (Aug. 24, 2012); Apple Restricted 
Project Agreement Regarding Project Onyx (Oct. 31, 2013); Apple Inc. Statement 
of Work #1 (Oct. 31, 2013) (on file with author). 
106 Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 6–7, Alix 
v. McKinsey & Co., No. 1:18-CV-04141-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018).
107 Id.
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4. Journalism
Journalists routinely promise to keep the identity of sources se-
cret.108 According to the New York Times, “many important stories 
in sensitive areas like politics, national security and business could 
never be reported if we banned anonymous sourcing.”109 These 
agreements are necessary for journalists to gather information of 
public concern. In 1982, Dan Cohen, a Republican supporting 
Wheelock Whitney’s Minnesota gubernatorial campaign, offered 
information about a rival candidate to two newspapers. A condition 
precedent of Cohen’s offer was a promise of confidentiality from 
the newspapers. He then supplied records of unlawful assembly 
charges (later dismissed) and a petit theft conviction (later vacated) 
of Marlene Johnson, the Democratic candidate for lieutenant gover-
nor. Breaking their promises, both newspapers named Cohen as the 
source. He was promptly fired from his job at an advertising agency. 
He sued the newspapers and, eventually, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that he could recover damages under a promissory estop-
pel theory.110 
108 A content analysis of the front pages of the Washington Post and the New 
York Times from 1958 to 2008 found that anonymous sources peaked in the 1960s 
and 1970s and that reporters today provide more detail about them. Matt J. Duffy 
& Ann E. Williams, Use of Unnamed Sources Drops from Peak in 1960s and 
1970s, 32 NEWSPAPER RESEARCH J., no. 4, Fall 2011, at 6–21.  
109 Philip B. Corbett, How The Times Uses Anonymous Sources, N.Y. TIMES: 
READER CENTER (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/reader-
center/how-the-times-uses-anonymous-sources.html. See also ANONYMOUS
SOURCE TRACKER, https://schaver.com/anonymous/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) 
(non-exhaustive online tracker of anonymous sources in prominent news outlets). 
The use of anonymous sources is often criticized. Matt J. Duffy, Anonymous 
Sources: A Historical Review of the Norms Surrounding Their Use, 31 AM. JOUR-
NALISM 236 (2014). 
110 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). This litiga-
tion was on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
501 U.S. 663 (1991). Initially, the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that the 
newspapers’ promise of confidentiality was not a contract. Cohen v. Cowles Me-
dia Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990). Of course, this state law holding was not 
reviewable in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Minnesota Supreme Court held, fur-
ther, that “enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory 
estoppel theory would violate [the newspapers’] First Amendment rights.” Id. at 
205. This First Amendment holding was the subject of federal court review. The
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An unmasked source who was promised anonymity rarely liti-
gates. The few courts that have considered the issue generally hold 
that, without more, a journalist’s promise to keep the source confi-
dential is not an enforceable contract.111 But this conclusion is 
dependent on state law.112 In every state, a written and negotiated 
agreement between reporter and source, demonstrating privity of 
contract, is likely enforceable.113 And even where a journalist’s 
promise to keep a source’s identity secret is not an enforceable con-
tract, other rights of action, such as promissory estoppel, might be 
available. 
Press embargoes over new products—a common tactic of pub-
lishers, movie studios,114 technology developers, and so on—is a 
public relations exercise brought to you by time-limited NDAs.115 
In 2012, J.K. Rowling completed her first novel since Harry Potter. 
The publisher, bent on concealing details, required a reviewer to 
read the 512-page book in its New York office. The reviewer also 
signed an NDA “whose first draft—later revised—had prohibited 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “the Minnesota doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel … is generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens 
of Minnesota,” and “[t]he First Amendment does not forbid its application to the 
press.” Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. at 670. 
111 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev’d on 
other grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ’ns, Inc., 939 
F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991); Pierce v. The Clarion Ledger, 452 F.Supp.2d 661 (S.D.
Miss. 2006); Steele v. Isikoff, 130 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000). See also Ventura
v. The Cincinnati Enquirer, 396 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005).
112 See, e.g., Doe v. Am. Broad. Co., 152 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. 1st Dep’t 1989);
Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hospital, 573 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1991).  
113 E.g., Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F.Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 
1986); Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla. App. 
1998).  
114 Marshall Fine, Why Embargo Move Critics’ Reviews?, HUFFPOST (Mar. 
12, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/marshall-fine/why-embargo-movie-
critics_b_2859089.html; Jen Chaney, The ‘Girl With the Dragon Tattoo’ review 
controversy, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2011), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/celebritology/post/the-girl-with-the-dragon-tattoo-review-
controversy/2011/12/05/gIQAbcmXWO_blog.html. 
115 Matthew Bell, J K Rowling and the Publisher’s Moan, THE INDEPENDENT: 
VOICES (Sept. 23, 2012), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/j-k-
rowling-and-the-publishers-moan-8165843.html (“Embargoes are normal.”). 
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me from taking notes.”116 Other reviewers were asked to sign an 
NDA before the book was hand-delivered; one clause sought to keep 
the existence of the NDA itself a secret.117 Device manufacturers 
and software developers similarly strive to keep pre-launch details 
under wraps.118 In mid-2018, a GPU manufacturer sent a standalone 
NDA to several media outlets, which included a non-disparagement 
clause.119 Another device manufacturer included terms forbidding 
reporters from calling competitors to discuss the product.120 Insur-
ance companies, too, have required journalists to sign NDAs when 
announcing prescription drug plans.121 
5. Intimacy
Public figures sign NDAs with intimate partners to ensure dis-
cretion. The most salacious recent example is an NDA dated 
October 28, 2016, signed by adult film star Stormy Daniels, who 
alleges that she had an affair with President Trump from 2006 to 
2007. Trump denies the affair. He also denies signing the NDA,122 
but admitted that he reimbursed his lawyer who did sign it;123 the 
lawyer later told federal prosecutors that Trump personally directed 
116 Ian Parker, Mugglemarch, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2012, at 52. 
117 Bell, supra note 115. See also Jen Doll, J.K. Rowling and the N.D.A. of 
Secrets, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertain-
ment/archive/2012/09/jk-rowling-and-nd-secrets/323203/. 
118 Rob Pegoraro, ‘NDAs’: I Could Tell You, But I’d Have to Sue You, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 14, 2000, at E01. 
119 NVIDIA Non-Disclosure Agreement (on file with author). Section 3 pro-
vides, in part: “Recipient shall use Confidential Information solely for the benefit 
of NVIDIA.” 
120 Adam L. Penenberg, Embargoes, NDAs, and tech journalism’s way of do-
ing business, PANDO (Nov. 18, 2012), https://pando.com/2012/11/18/embargoes-
ndas-and-tech-journalisms-way-of-doing-business/. 
121 Ivan Oransky, Are NDAs the new embargo agreements? Humana and 
Walmart seem to think so, EMBARGO WATCH (Oct. 1, 2010, 12:21 PM), 
https://embargowatch.wordpress.com/2010/10/01/when-an-embargo-agreement-
isnt-enough-use-an-nda-say-humana-and-walmart/. 
122 Def.’s Notice of Mot. & Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Declaratory Relief Cause 
of Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, No. 2:18-CV-02217-SJO-FFM 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2018). 
123 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 3, 2018, 3:46 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/991992302267785216 
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the hush payment.124 The terms of the NDA covered information 
about Trump’s “children or any alleged children or any of his al-
leged sexual partners, alleged sexual actions or alleged sexual 
conduct or related matters.”125 In another example, Nicholas Per-
ricone, a celebrity doctor,126 signed a confidentiality agreement with 
his wife shortly after he commenced dissolution proceedings in 
2003. The agreement recited that the parties “fully understand that 
the plaintiff and his business interests may be severely harmed by 
the public dissemination of defamatory or disparaging information,” 
and prohibited them from “disseminat[ing] to the public and the 
press any such disparaging or defamatory information.”127 
6. Consumers
Consumers may be subject to NDAs simply by consuming. 
Some platforms’ terms of use, like ridesharing app Lyft and music 
service Spotify, include an NDA and an arbitration clause.128 Apple 
iCloud—which is built into every Apple device, and whose user 
base grew from 782 million in 2016129 to about 850 million two 
years later130—requires users to agree that it “contains proprietary 
and confidential information” and that they must “not use such pro-
prietary information or materials in any way whatsoever except . . . 
124 Joe Palazzolo et al., Trump Played Central Role In Payoffs, Despite De-
nials, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2018, at A1. 
125 Confidential Settlement Agreement & Mutual Release (Oct. 28, 2016) 
§ 4.1(a), Ex. 1 to First Am. Compl., No. 2:18-CV-02217-SJO-FFM (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2018).
126 Alex Witchel, Perriconology, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 6, 2005, at 28. 
127 Perricone v. Perricone, 972 A.2d 666, 671 (Conn. 2009). 
128 Spotify’s NDA is part of the arbitration clause, and Lyft’s NDA, although 
applying generically to “Users” most probably applies to drivers. Spotify Terms 
and Conditions of Use, SPOTIFY (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.spotify.com/us/le-
gal/end-user-agreement/; Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/api.lyft.com/static/terms.html. 
129 ‘“They Might Be Giants” With a Spanish Accent’, With Special Guests 
Eddy Cue and Craig Federighi (Feb. 12, 2016) at 32:57, https://daringfire-
ball.net/thetalkshow/2016/02/12/ep-146. 
130 Jordan Novet, The case for Apple to sell a version of iCloud for work, 
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in compliance with this Agreement.” Consumers also agree not to 
use iCloud to “disclose any trade secret or confidential information 
in violation of a confidentiality, employment, or nondisclosure 
agreement.”131 
Other software platforms with millions of users reserve NDAs 
for businesses rather than consumers. Confidentiality provisions are 
present, for example, in the terms for Google Cloud Services but not 
for the consumer search engine Google or consumer Gmail; in the 
terms for Amazon Web Services but not for the Amazon retail plat-
form. The Microsoft Product Terms includes a benchmarking clause 
(that prohibits users from publishing benchmark test results) only 
for server-side products. These benchmarking clauses, named 
DeWitt clauses after the computer science professor who dared to 
publish benchmark results for an Oracle database product in 1982, 
seem to have most bite in business-to-business software licenses.132 
Small categories of consumers actively agree to NDAs. Eager 
gamers voluntarily test “closed alpha” or “closed beta” versions of 
games, which require explicit assent to an NDA. Finally, it should 
be noted that consumers are routinely subject to forced arbitration, 
which keeps information out of the public domain: financial prod-
ucts and services (like credit cards) can require consumers to submit 
disputes to arbitration,133 as do ridesharing platforms like Uber,134 
dating apps like Tinder,135 hospitality companies like Airbnb,136 and 
newspapers like the Wall Street Journal.137 
                                               
131 Welcome to iCloud, APPLE: LEGAL (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.ap-
ple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/terms.html. 
132 Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech Rights: 
The Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 37 (2007). 
133 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 2 
(Mar. 2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-
report-to-congress-2015.pdf. 
134 Uber does not enforce the arbitration clause for individual claims of sexual 
assault or harassment against drivers. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Yielding to Critics, 
Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration in Sexual Misconduct Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 16, 2018, at B3. 
135 Terms of Use, TINDER (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.gotinder.com/terms/us-2018-05-09. 
136 Terms of Service, AIRBNB (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.airbnb.com/terms. 
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C. NDA Values 
Despite the ubiquity of NDAs, it’s difficult to empirically assess 
their effectiveness. If NDAs work, then they are hidden.138 The in-
ference is certainly open that NDAs are effective because they are 
so common and because they are comparatively rarely litigated. And 
anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that they are extremely potent. 
The Adobe General Counsel observed that in 2012: 
I held an all-hands meeting where I asked everyone to raise their 
hand if they had ever negotiated an NDA or prepared one. It 
was about 90 percent of the room. And then I asked them to 
raise their hand if in all those thousands of NDAs we collec-
tively had worked on, any of them had been the subject of a 
dispute or litigation. I think only two people raised hands.139  
Similarly, recent news reports marshalled evidence that NDAs were 
a crucial pillar of a Harvey Weinstein’s “complicity machine.”140 
And one can hardly imagine a cottage industry of NDA startups (ez-
NDA, EveryNDA, NDAExpress) sprouting if the basic product was 
worthless. 
This section makes explicit what the previous section suggests: 
NDAs serve a plurality of interests. Like all contracts, NDAs can 
serve autonomy and efficiency interests. I dare not enter here the 
debate raging in contract theory over the ultimate value or values of 
contract. Instead, I will focus on the concrete connection between 
NDAs and the values they serve, while remaining agnostic on 
whether one or other of those values truly is ultimate. NDAs can 
promote economic interests, privacy, administration of justice, de-
mocracy, and national security. No doubt there are others.141 
Although this section highlights that NDAs can promote these 
goods, it is equally important to realize that NDAs can undermine 
                                               
138 Andrea Contigiani et al., Trade secrets and innovation: Evidence from the 
“inevitable disclosure” doctrine, 39 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 2921, 2922 
(2018) (empirical trade secrecy scholarship is “understandably sparse” because 
“observability [is] a prerequisite for empirical analysis” and “managers have an 
economic incentive to keep trade secrets secret”); id. at 2938 (“Trade secrecy is 
an inherently difficult phenomenon to study empirically.”). 
139 Dillon, supra note 10. 
140 Twohey et al., supra note 2. 
141 Another example that springs to mind is perhaps related to autonomy: self-
development. An employee may sign an NDA for free simply for the professional 
opportunity to work with a select team on a secret, cutting-edge project. 
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these goods too. NDAs are like the curate’s egg: partly good, partly 
bad. 
1. Economy 
NDAs can serve private economic interests. When two firms en-
ter into a confidentiality agreement, they share valuable information 
that enables, or partly comprises, a transaction. The confidentiality 
provisions are designed to maximize the parties’ joint gains (or 
“contractual surplus,” in the argot of an influential contract the-
ory).142 Similarly, a party to a settlement agreement who is 
indifferent to the secrecy of its terms may extract a higher price for 
a confidentiality undertaking. An employer may require its employ-
ees, or a product developer its suppliers, to execute NDAs to 
maintain a competitive advantage (trade secrets, research and devel-
opment, and so on). NDAs prevent competitors free-riding on 
information that was costly to acquire.143 
The relationship between NDAs and public economic interests 
is not stable. On the one hand, the flow of market-sensitive infor-
mation can be controlled by judiciously deploying NDAs. 
Regulation FD shows that NDAs can contribute to market integrity 
by preventing the misuse of private information. On the other hand, 
management consultants use NDAs to perpetuate an information 
monopoly. Secrecy is the management consultant’s “most sacred 
promise.”144 While promising secrecy, consultants in fact are corpo-
rate executives’ “primary source of interorganizational 
                                               
142 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010). 
143 Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of Intellectual Prop-
erty: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 245, 254–55 (1991). See 
also H. Rep. 104-788, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023 (“For many 
companies [confidential] information is the keystone to their economic competi-
tiveness. They spend many millions of dollars developing the information, take 
great pains and invest enormous resources to keep it secret, and expect to reap 
rewards from their investment.”). 
144 Walt Bogdanich & Michael Forsythe, Cracking McKinsey & Company, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2019, at A2. 
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knowledge.”145 “The accumulation and sharing of privileged 
knowledge,” said John Gapper in the Financial Times, “is integral 
to how it works.”146 As Christopher McKenna put it, consultants ex-
ploit “economies of knowledge” by providing clients “access to 
crucial organizational knowledge through their previous consulting 
assignments,” thereby “transfer[ring] knowledge between rival or-
ganizations without incurring regulatory sanctions.”147 “The 
consultant,” concluded Gapper, “is a broker who attempts to amass 
so much knowledge that each company has to hire him, no matter 
how uncomfortable that feels.”148 
Similarly, NDAs have a contestable relationship with the public 
economic good of innovation.149 Trade secret owners claim that 
NDAs encourage firms to innovate: firms are incentivized to pour 
money into research and development if NDAs can protect the out-
put.150 In an economy where “innovation is increasingly 
characterized by a high degree of collaboration” and “external co-
operation,” trade secrets “facilitate flows of knowledge” by 
“establish[ing] secure channels for exchanges of know-how.”151 But 
it might not be that simple. If innovation consists in “new combina-
tions,” as Joseph Schumpeter famously wrote, then strong trade 
secret protection might limit idea recombination across firm and in-
dustry boundaries.152 Employees might be less inclined to innovate 
                                               
145 CHRISTOPHER D. MCKENNA, THE WORLD’S NEWEST PROFESSION: MAN-
AGEMENT CONSULTING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 20 (2006). 
146 John Gapper, Opinion, McKinsey model springs a leak, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2011, at 13. 
147 MCKENNA, supra note 145, at 24–25. 
148 Gapper, supra note 146. 
149 Scholarship typically investigates the connection between trade secrets 
and innovation. NDAs are crucial to the existence of trade secrets: “trade secrets 
arise in the bilateral context of confidentiality duties.” Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1649, 1675–76 (2009). 
150 Thomas Hellmann & Enrico Perotti, The Circulation of Ideas in Firms 
and Markets, 57 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 1813, 1821 (2011) (“If firms could not 
protect any trade secrets at all, incentives for innovation would be severely 
stunted.”). 
151 Jennifer Brant & Sebastian Lohse, Trade Secrets: Tools for Innovation 
and Collaboration, International Chamber of Commerce, Research Paper 3, at 12. 
152 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 66–
67 (1934); 1 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 84–86 (1939). See also 
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if trade secret law limits their mobility.153 Indeed, there is some em-
pirical evidence suggesting that the inevitable disclosure doctrine—
where courts prohibit employees from joining their employer’s com-
petitors if the employer can establish that the employee would 
inevitably disclose trade secrets in the new role—negatively affects 
innovation quality.154 In sum, if trade secret protection is too strict, 
on the one hand, then “market institutions for idea circulation may 
remain underdeveloped”; on the other hand, “if it is too lax, firms 
lose their ability to protect themselves and their employees from ex-
cessive appropriation.”155 
2. Privacy 
Confidentiality agreements are important privacy devices. Cor-
porate entities do not have an intrinsic interest in privacy; a firm 
values privacy only if it is instrumental to the firm’s assessment of 
its own economic interest.156 Natural persons, however, often have 
intrinsic privacy interests that NDAs can protect. Intimates and for-
mer intimates, especially those in the public gaze, sign NDAs to 
protect the closely-held details of their private lives. Similarly, con-
fidential discovery agreements and secret settlements ensure that the 
parties’ personal facts do not “leave the room.” In jurisdictions 
where there is no right to privacy, an NDA is an enforceable legal 
                                               
John Hagedoorn, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Schumpeter Revisited, 5 IN-
DUSTRIAL & CORPORATE CHANGE 883, 885–88 (1996); Mark Dodgson, Exploring 
new combinations in innovation and entrepreneurship: social networks, Schum-
peter, and the case of Josiah Wedgwood (1730–1795), 20 INDUSTRIAL & 
CORPORATE CHANGE 1119 (2011); Heinz D. Kurz, Schumpeter’s new combina-
tions: Revisiting his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung on the occasion of 
its centenary, 22 J. EVOL. ECON. 871 (2012). 
153 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 NYU L. 
REV. 575 (1999). 
154 Contigiani et al., supra note 138. 
155 Hellmann & Perotti, supra note 150, at 1821 n.13. 
156 Trade secrets are sometimes posited as part of a firm’s privacy. See, e.g., 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (Burger, C.J.) (“A most 
fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage 
is condoned or is made profitable.”). But the harm of trade secret misappropriation 
sounds in money, not privacy. 
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tool that guarantees at least some legal assurance and protection of 
privacy.  
3. Administration of Justice 
The relationship between NDAs and the administration of jus-
tice is contingent. Today, the law’s default position is that agreed-
upon secrecy in litigation encourages “quicker, more informal, and 
often cheaper resolutions for everyone involved.”157 Confidentiality 
promotes settlement and arbitration, which eases the burden on pub-
lic institutions.158 NDAs, therefore, are good for the administration 
of justice. It was not always thought so. Before 1925, courts did not 
order specific performance of contracts privatizing dispute resolu-
tion, partly because arbitration diverted disputes from public courts 
to private tribunals.159 Criticism persists: a chorus of scholars and 
journalists argues that secrecy in litigation is too much administra-
tion and not enough justice.  
4. Democracy 
NDAs can promote and erode democracy. Confidentiality agree-
ments between journalist and source, which courts occasionally 
characterize as ethical promises rather than enforceable contracts,160 
                                               
157 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018). Justice Gorsuch, 
for the Court, was writing about arbitration. But arbitration and confidentiality 
often go hand-in-hand. As Justice Ginsburg observed in dissent, “[a]rbitration 
agreements often include provisions requiring that outcomes be kept confiden-
tial.” Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
158 Levmore & Fagan, supra note 11. 
159 “Before 1925, English and American common law courts routinely re-
fused to enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes.” Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1621; 
accord id. at 1642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Riding circuit in 1845, shortly before 
his death, Justice Story wrote that “a court of equity ought not to compel a party 
to submit the decision of his rights to a tribunal, which confessedly, does not pos-
sess full, adequate, and complete means, within itself, to investigate the merits of 
the case, and to administer justice.” Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 
1320 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Case No. 14,065). Importantly, courts would not en-
force agreements to arbitrate before an award was made; once made, however, 
arbitral awards were enforced. Id. at 1320, 1321. 
160 E.g., Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ’ns, Inc., 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). 
Mark Felt told Bob Woodward: “The relationship was a compact of trust; nothing 
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insulate the source from discovery and therefore encourage full and 
frank disclosure. Some of the most significant political reporting in 
modern history relied on journalists agreeing to keep source identi-
ties confidential. The best-known example is Mark Felt, Bob 
Woodward’s confidential source for Watergate.161 There are many 
other examples,162 and a mass of scholarship focuses on the new-
sperson’s privilege.163 Of course, doubts about the motives of 
anonymous sources and the accuracy of their information will never 
subside; still, the argument for protecting the confidentiality of gov-
ernment sources is particularly strong.164 
5. National Security
The link between confidentiality and national security has long 
been recognized. But it is only in the last twenty years that policy-
makers have explicitly connected private NDAs to national security. 
In 1996, “against a backdrop of increasing threats to corporate secu-
rity and a rising tide of international and domestic economic 
espionage,” Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act.165 The 
Act created the federal crime of wrongfully copying or otherwise 
controlling trade secrets with intent to benefit a foreign govern-
ment.166 The House Report recited that “the development of 
about it was to be discussed or shared with anyone.” Bob Woodward, How Mark 
Felt Became ‘Deep Throat’, WASH. POST, June 2, 2005, at A01. 
161 In 2005, Bob Woodward recalled that Mark Felt insisted on utter confi-
dentiality. In Woodward’s telling, Felt was “relatively free with me [Woodward] 
but insisted that he, the FBI and the Justice Department be kept out of anything I 
might use indirectly or pass onto others. He was stern and strict about those rules 
with a booming, insistent voice. I promised, and he said that it was essential that 
I be careful. The only way to ensure that was to tell no one that we knew each 
other or talked or that I knew someone in the FBI or Justice Department. No one. 
… He beat it into my head: secrecy at all cost, no loose talk, no talk about him at 
all, no indication to anyone that such a secret source existed.” Id. 
162 See NORMAN PEARLSTINE, OFF THE RECORD: THE PRESS, THE GOVERN-
MENT, AND THE WAR OVER ANONYMOUS SOURCES (2007). 
163 E.g., Christina Koningisor, The De Facto Reporter’s Privilege, 127 YALE 
L.J. 1176, 1180–85 (2018) (collecting some of the literature).
164 Blasi, supra note 56, at 606.
165 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1998). 
166 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2018)). 
108
SILENCE FOR SALE 
proprietary economic information is an integral part of America’s 
economic well-being,” and that “threats to the nation’s economic 
interest are threats to the nation’s vital security interests.”167 Be-
cause NDAs are often partly constitutive of trade secrets, 
indictments under the Economic Espionage Act frequently allege 
that defendants breached private confidentiality agreements. For ex-
ample, a recent indictment alleges that a Huawei engineer twice 
emailed photographs of a proprietary T-Mobile robot in violation of 
signed NDAs.168 And of course, private NDAs can threaten national 
security. In 2017, for example, ZTE admitted to asking employees 
to sign NDAs that would hide its violations of Iranian sanctions.169 
II. SELLING SILENCE, SELLING OUT SPEECH
Given that NDAs serve important values, both generally (auton-
omy, for example) and concretely (privacy, say), courts willingly 
enforce them. And yet, the public gaze is intensely focused on NDAs 
and their impact on public discourse. Wrongdoers such as Harvey 
Weinstein have weaponized NDAs to silence women and conceal 
criminality. Public officials and figures, including President Trump, 
deploy NDAs to bury information of public concern. But even with-
out these examples, the capacity of NDAs to distort public discourse 
demands critical attention. A society’s enforcement of NDAs is rel-
evant to its free speech right. This Part argues that NDAs can 
conflict with many of the values and interests that justify free 
speech. Some NDAs—not all of them or even most of them—pose 
real challenges to our most basic free speech commitments. The goal 
is to shake our faith that freedom of contract always trumps freedom 
of speech. Selling silence sometimes sells out free speech. 
This section is focused on free speech theory. There is a distinc-
tion, often unobserved, between free speech and a right to free 
speech. The former is theoretical and the latter institutional. The 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment might embody a theory 
of free speech, which finds some institutional expression in the 
167 H. Rep. 104-788, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4023. 
168 Indictment at 4, 5–6, 9, 21, United States v. Huawei Device Co., No. 2:19-
CR-00010-RSM (W.D. Wash. Jan. 16, 2019). 
169 Factual Resume at 21, 23, United States v. ZTE Corp., No. 3:17-CR-
0120K  (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017). 
109
 SILENCE FOR SALE  
courts (and other legal institutions). Of course, free speech theory is 
connected to the free speech right to limit government regulation. 
But they are separate. Whether free speech serves certain values or 
interests is a question distinct from, but related to, what regulation 
is permitted. Free speech theory cannot provide a comprehensive 
account of a free speech right.170 The boundaries of the right to free 
expression in the United States and in Australia, say, are different 
because the institutional expression of the right is different.171  
A. How We Talk About Free Speech 
The usual argument for free speech is that it serves some other 
value: truth, democracy, and agency. The interminable bouncing 
around of a discrete set of values characterizes free speech theoriz-
ing, and these values constitute our free speech grammar. Kent 
Greenawalt called them free speech justifications and divided them 
into consequentialist and nonconsequentialist justifications.172 On 
the one hand, consequentialist justifications assert an empirical con-
nection between free speech and good consequences, or between 
censorship and bad consequences. To argue that free speech makes 
government more accountable is to adopt a consequentialist posi-
tion. Nonconsequentialist justifications, on the other hand, say that 
free speech is good, and censorship is bad, regardless of conse-
quences. On these views, censorship is a wrong in itself. Thomas 
Nagel maintained a similar distinction between instrumental justifi-
cations and intrinsic justifications.173 These distinctions are 
sometimes useful, but it is important to acknowledge that it can be 
hard to tell “where the intrinsic nature of the act stops and conse-
quences begin.”174 
                                               
170 Raz, supra note 54, at 305–06. 
171 Id. (“[S]o far as the core justification of the right goes, there is a flexible 
range of permissible or acceptable boundaries; the choice between them turns on 
their suitability for the institutional arrangements in the different societies.”). 
172 Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 
127–30 (1989). 
173 Thomas Nagel, Personal Rights and Public Space, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
83, 96 (1995). 
174 Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 129. 
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Remarkably, the structure of free speech argumentation has not 
changed since Milton published the Areopagitica in 1644. Milton’s 
dazzling poetic brilliance anticipated many of the modern arguments 
for free speech,175 particularly the argument from truth later devel-
oped by John Stuart Mill. The form of the Areopagitica—an address 
to Parliament urging repeal of the Licensing Order of 1643—and its 
classical allusion—Isocrates’s speech Areopagiticus written in 
355BC, which, in Milton’s words, was a “discourse to the Parliament 
of Athens [Areopagus], that persuades them to change the form of 
democracy which was then established”176—presage the argument 
from democracy177 that is today associated with Alexander Mei-
klejohn.178 Milton also suggested an autonomy-based argument by 
noting that prepublication licensing is a “manifest hurt” that not only 
“distrust[s] the judgment and the honesty” but is also “the greatest 
displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit.”179 “He who 
is not trusted with his own actions,” said Milton, “has no great argu-
ment to think himself reputed in the Commonwealth wherein he was 
born, for other than a fool or a foreigner.”180 
First Amendment scholars, then, typically work with the values 
that constitute our free speech grammar. But recently First Amend-
ment “Lochnerism” has seized the academic imagination.181 The 
law professoriate observes the powerful resemblance between Loch-
ner-era invalidation of economic regulations and the First 
Amendment’s deregulatory turn.182 The consequences of First 
                                               
175 Vincent Blasi, A Reader’s Guide to John Milton’s Areopagitica, the Foun-
dational Essay of the First Amendment Tradition, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273. 
176 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA; A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE 
LIBERTY OF UNLICENC’D PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), 
reprinted in 2 COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 486, 489 (Ernest Sir-
luck ed., 1959). 
177 Eric Nelson, “True Liberty”: Isocrates and Milton’s Areopagitica, 40 
MILTON STUD. 201 (2001). 
178 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
179 MILTON, supra note 176, at 530–31. 
180 Id. at 531. 
181 Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 NYU L. REV. 318 
(2018), 331 (referring to “the growing literature on First Amendment Loch-
nerism”), 331 n.57 (collecting literature). 
182 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015). 
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Amendment Lochnerism have been trenchantly criticized; the quest 
for a progressive First Amendment has begun.183 One of the most 
interesting responses to First Amendment Lochnerism is Leslie 
Kendrick’s clarification of free speech’s status as a “special 
right.”184 On this view, free speech is a special right if it is suffi-
ciently distinct (i.e., analytically independent from other rights and 
activities) and robust (i.e., protective of the activity).185 
Suffice it to say that this Article treats free speech as a special 
right because that is our social and constitutional practice. Kendrick 
focuses on conceptual distinctiveness, but says that “a right may be 
distinctive not conceptually but purely as a matter of social prac-
tice.”186 The First Amendment singles out “the freedom of speech,” 
and this “explain[s] . . . the existence of a special right.”187 An argu-
ment that subsumes free speech within a more general liberty 
right188 flies in the face of our constitutional practice. Rawls thought 
that freedom of political speech was of “great significance . . . to any 
fully adequate scheme of basic liberties.”189 Raz pointed to “the 
great importance of free expression” and “the need to make freedom 
of expression a foundational part of the political and civic culture of 
pluralistic democracies.”190 Our social and constitutional practice 
treats free speech as a special right. 
                                               
183 The Columbia Law Review’s 2018 Symposium was called, “A First 
Amendment for All? Free Expression in an Age of Inequality.” 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1953–2249 (2018). 
184 Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, 45 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 
(2017). 
185 Id. at 91–110. 
186 Id. at 92. 
187 Id. (“Perhaps a society has a constitutional text that mistakenly singles out 
a certain activity and for all practical purposes cannot be amended. Such circum-
stances would explain, and perhaps justify, the existence of a special right in that 
society.”). 
188 For one example, see Tara Smith, Just Sayin’—How the False Equivalence 
of Speech with Action Undermines the Freedom of Speech—and Action (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author). 
189 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 343 (2005). 
190 Raz, supra note 54, at 324. 
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B. Monism and Pluralism
Free speech pluralism argues that there are several values that 
justify free expression, and that none is privileged over others. T.M. 
Scanlon is the most articulate free speech pluralist, questioning a 
search for unity and doubting whether free speech values “can be 
helpfully subsumed under any single label.”191 Raz too advocated 
free speech pluralism, noting that “[t]here is no reason to think that 
just one consideration can provide a complete account of the 
right.”192 Raz pointed out that his argument (that free expression is 
valuable because public portrayal of forms and styles of life is vali-
dating) “joins three other arguments to form the foundation of a 
liberal doctrine of free expression,” namely the arguments from de-
mocracy, tolerance, and checking abuse of power.193 
Free speech monism contends that there is one value that best 
justifies free speech or is prior to (or more important than) other val-
ues. It’s useful to distinguish between free speech monism and First 
Amendment monism. It is one thing, said Robert Post, to note that 
there are many values contributing to a justification of free expres-
sion; “[i]t is quite a different question, however, whether 
constitutional doctrine should express each of these different rea-
sons.”194 Post is a First Amendment monist because he argued that 
the Free Speech Clause, not free speech generally, is rooted fore-
most in participatory democracy. He insisted on the “lexical 
priority” of “the principle of democratic participation.”195 This mon-
ism is grounded in institutional reasons: “pragmatic simplification, 
which is exemplified by my effort to develop a lexically fundamen-
tal purpose for First Amendment doctrine.”196 “Constitutional 
doctrine,” said Post, “must be formulated in a way that serves the 
need of the legal system to develop relatively simple, clear, and con-
sistent lines of precedent capable of guiding lower courts and 
191 T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 
97 VA. L. REV. 541, 543, 543–45 (2011). 
192 Raz, supra note 54, at 308. 
193 Id. at 324. 
194 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Re-
ply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 619 (2011). 
195 Post, supra note 33, at 489; Post, supra note 194, at 618. 
196 Id. at 617. 
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governmental actors.”197 These are claims about law and its institu-
tions, not about free speech theory. 
Post, then, is a First Amendment monist; he is not a free speech 
monist. Democratic participation supplies “the best possible account 
of our actual historical principles,” but “Americans have many di-
verse and disparate reasons for valuing freedom of expression.”198 
Similarly, James Weinstein acknowledged that “a multiplicity of un-
derlying values” and “multifarious norms” animate free speech 
theory, but there is no “common ground for judging the relative nor-
mative appeal of these contending theories.”199 “What uniquely 
qualifies participatory democracy as the core free speech norm,” he 
concluded, “is that it is the only contender that the case law does not 
massively contradict.”200 For both Post and Weinstein, doctrinal fit 
is an overriding concern. Weinstein especially: “if doctrinal coher-
ence and the pragmatic benefits that such coherence brings are to be 
given any significant weight, then among normatively appealing 
theories the one with the better doctrinal fit should be judged the 
best overall theory.”201 
 Seana Shiffrin is a free speech monist. She argued that “a 
thinker-oriented approach to freedom of speech offers a stronger 
foundation for freedom of speech protections than competing theo-
retical approaches.”202 In Shiffrin’s view, the “pitched battle” 
among competing free speech values is puzzling.203 Rather than add 
another value to the list, Shiffrin argued that “a deeper connection 
unifies them.”204 Traditional free speech values like truth and de-
mocracy assume the existence of “a developed thinker behind the 
scenes,” and “[r]easoning from the standpoint of the thinker and her 
interests can yield a more comprehensive, unified foundation for 
freedom of speech protection.”205 Shiffrin asserted a hierarchy 
                                               
197 Id. at 619–20.  
198 Post, supra note 33, at 477; Post, supra note 194, at 619. 
199 James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free 
Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 635, 650 (2011). 
200 Id. at 643. 
201 Id. at 635. 
202 SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 80. 
203 Id. at 83. 
204 Id. at 84. 
205 Id. at 84–85. 
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where the moral agency of a free thinker underwrites all other free 
speech values.206 
First Amendment monism is a mistake (put to one side the ques-
tion of free speech monism). First Amendment monists are 
preoccupied with doctrinal fit, even while they acknowledge the 
doctrine to be multifocal. In my view, the First Amendment achieves 
administrable coherence by treating free speech as exhausted by 
several different argumentative archetypes. These archetypes corre-
spond to the most influential free speech theories: arguments from 
truth, democracy, and agency. The First Amendment consists in 
these conventional argumentative practices. 
This is Philip Bobbitt’s constitutional theory writ smaller.207 
Bobbitt argued that constitutional law consists in, and is legitimized 
by, certain conventional argumentative practices. The so-called mo-
dalities of constitutional argument are historical, textual, structural, 
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical. Bobbitt contended that there is no 
grand hierarchy that integrates these modalities into a coherent 
whole, and he rejected any attempt to justify constitutional law by 
reference to external criteria alien to that practice. A grand hierarchy 
would need to be explained by some external justificatory criteria; 
but such justification cannot claim the legitimacy of constitutional 
law, because it would not proceed according to the modalities con-
stituting that law.208  
Just like there are modalities of constitutional argument, there 
are modalities of First Amendment argument. These free speech mo-
dalities—truth, democracy, agency—constitute our First 
Amendment grammar, and they comprise the First Amendment’s 
theoretical resources. A judge enforces the First Amendment when 
she and her colleagues engage in the conventional argumentative 
practices constituting the First Amendment. Every First Amend-
ment problem that arises is analyzed according to these conventional 
forms of argument. In an arresting passage, Bobbitt says: 
                                               
206 Free speech monism does not entail the view that the value underwriting 
free speech monism is exhaustive. Shiffrin says, “I do not mean to suggest that 
the connection between freedom of speech and moral agency exhausts the signif-
icance of freedom of speech.” Id. at 85–86; see also Raz, supra note 54, at 305. 
207 BOBBITT, supra note 33. 
208 Id.; Philip Bobbitt, Youngstown: Pages from the Book of Disquietude, 19 
CONST. COMM. 3 (2002). 
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If you were to take a set of colored pencils, assign a separate 
color to each of the kinds of arguments, and mark through pas-
sages in an opinion of the Supreme Court deciding a 
constitutional matter, you would probably have a multi-colored 
picture when you finished. Judges are the artists of our field, 
just as law professors are its critics, and we expect the creative 
judge to employ all the tools that are appropriate, often in com-
bination, to achieve a satisfying result.209 
The same is true for First Amendment cases. The rich American free 
speech tradition reflects and embodies aspects of all its argumenta-
tive archetypes, not just one. Although often posited as rivals, these 
theories are not necessarily inconsistent; they are overlapping and 
sometimes mutually supporting. Political speech might vindicate in-
dividual autonomy. Of course, the scope of each theory’s limitation 
on government regulation of speech varies. The First Amendment 
aesthetic is the uneasy embodiment of these sometimes consistent, 
sometimes opposing theories. 
The primary case for First Amendment monism leans heavily on 
two institutional arguments. The first is a perceived need for “ease 
of explanation and comprehension” and “feasibility of implementa-
tion in an imperfect institutional environment.”210 This is really a set 
of aspirations that begs the question. How do we know when a doc-
trine is sufficiently comprehensible and institutionally feasible? If 
privileging participatory democracy is institutionally feasible, why 
not participatory democracy and truth? Why not First Amendment 
dualism? Why is one the magic number and not two? The incom-
prehensibility of First Amendment doctrine is unlikely to be because 
there is more than one animating value. It’s probably because the 
judicial articulation of the discrete set of free speech values is defi-
cient. Winnowing free speech values down to one is not going to 
remedy that deficiency, especially when each traditional free speech 
value is multifaceted and subsumes subsidiary and competing val-
ues itself.211 
                                               
209 BOBBITT, supra note 33, at 93–94. 
210 Post, supra note 194, at 617 (quoting with approval Vincent Blasi, Dem-
ocratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and 
Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 531 (2011)). 
211 For example, Vincent Blasi pointed out that the argument from democracy 
embraces not only a participation rationale, but also constituent-service, in-
formed-voter, and checking rationales. Blasi, supra note 210, at 536 (“It is by no 
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The second argument for First Amendment monism is that the 
preferred value—for Post and Weinstein, participatory democ-
racy—fits best with our constitutional practice. But First 
Amendment monism itself does not fit with our constitutional prac-
tice. Prioritizing participatory democracy, or any other major free 
speech value, chronically undersells the First Amendment; it is akin 
to saying that historical argument, say, best fits with our tradition of 
constitutional argumentation and should be privileged for that rea-
son. It ignores vast swathes of our constitutional canvas. One needs 
to grapple with the argument from truth, for example, on its own 
terms to provide a plausible account of our First Amendment tradi-
tion.212 
The cost of privileging one free speech value over others when 
applying the First Amendment would be borne by our constitutional 
culture. First Amendment monism, instead of producing doctrine 
shot through with the multi-colors of intellectual diversity and ide-
ological variety, is a recipe for doctrinal stasis and monotony. Do 
we really prefer Meiklejohn to Milton? Would a focus on participa-
tory democracy have denied us Justice Holmes’s marketplace of 
ideas? Or Justice Brandeis’s rhapsodizing on character? Indeed, 
First Amendment monism works an irony. It stultifies the develop-
ment of other values in First Amendment doctrine, almost to censor 
them. Nearly four hundred years ago, Milton wrote about free 
speech environmentalism and the importance of inquisitive energy, 
the “musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas” and “fast 
reading, trying all things.”213 We should be wary of a First Amend-
ment monism that threatens this culture. 
means obvious that the normative appeal of participation as a rationale for free 
speech is greater than that of constituent-service, informed-voter, or checking ra-
tionales, each of which also derives from the foundational commitment to 
democracy.”). 
212 Blasi, supra note 210, at 538 (“Any explanatory analysis of either the case 
law or the public understanding of the freedom of speech needs to address the 
pervasiveness and durability, even to the extent of gaining traction in popular cul-
ture, of the marketplace-of-ideas figure of speech.”). 
213 MILTON, supra note 176, at 554. 
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C. Free Speech Values and NDAs 
Whether a certain practice threatens free speech depends on “the 
normative theory” adopted.214 Consistent with First Amendment 
pluralism, this section will argue that NDAs conflict with many of 
our First Amendment values. The analysis here gathers a variety of 
theories under three values: truth, democracy, and agency. No doubt 
there is reason to cavil with these labels. I acknowledge that the clas-
sificatory regime adopted here is not necessarily stable. But these 
represent our foundational commitments to free speech, and if 
NDAs pose a substantial threat to even one of them, then there is 
reason to worry.215 
1. Truth 
Poetically voiced by Milton,216 analyzed by Mill,217 and rhetor-
ically repurposed by Holmes,218 the argument from truth is 
extraordinarily powerful and popular. It says that ideas converge to 
truth only when they are subjected to, and refined by, the continual 
examination and criticism entailed by free speech. Of truth, Milton 
famously said: “Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth 
put to the worse in a free and open encounter.”219 There are echoes 
of Milton in Mill’s assertion that truth “has to be made by the rough 
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile ban-
ners,”220 and in Holmes’s celebrated maxim that “the best test of 
                                               
214 Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the “Speech” in “Freedom of 
Speech”, 116 MICH. L. REV. 667, 695, 699, 701–02 (2018). 
215 In a recent article, Jeremy Waldron takes a similar methodological ap-
proach when arguing that free speech values do not require the suppression of 
heckling. Jeremy Waldron, Heckle: To Disconcert with Questions, Challenges, or 
Gibes, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17, 15–21. 
216 MILTON, supra note 176. 
217 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) ch. 2, reprinted in 18 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 228 (J. M. Robson ed., 1977). 
218 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
219 MILTON, supra note 176, at 561. 
220 MILL, supra note 217, at 254. 
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market.”221 
It is impossible to do perfect justice to this theory (or its detrac-
tors222) here, but a few observations may be made. First, the 
argument from truth is focused primarily on audience and third-
party interests, namely, their interest in approaching truth by expo-
sure to the competition between ideas.223 Second, it is a process-
oriented theory.224 It is not fixated on evaluating the substantive 
rightness or wrongness of an idea; rather, the validity of an idea is 
judged on its capacity to survive or adapt under critical stress. Third, 
it is an instrumental or consequentialist theory of free speech.225 
Free speech, on this view, is not intrinsically valuable but only val-
uable to the extent that it contributes to the emergence of truth. 
Fourth, the argument from truth rests, at least by Mill’s lights, on 
human fallibility.226 Because we could be wrong, maybe partially, 
about any of our beliefs, suppressing the contrary view might im-
pede our path to truth. Finally, this theory permits expression of 
false beliefs because they challenge us to fasten our true beliefs to 
the most secure foundation. “A man may be a heretic in the truth,” 
said Milton, “and if he believes things only because his pastor says 
so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, 
though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his 
heresy.”227 
                                               
221 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
222 For example, Ronald Dworkin highlighted “Mill’s doubtful epistemol-
ogy.” Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY vii 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). Similarly, Frederick Schauer criticized 
the argument from truth because it is alien to our actual processes of truth acqui-
sition. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
Others have also dismissed the argument from truth as implausible. But I’m less 
concerned here with the validity of the theories. Whether we like it or not, the 
argument from truth has a prominent place in our First Amendment tradition and 
forms part of our First Amendment grammar. 
223 T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 
40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 528–29 (1979). 
224 SCHAUER, supra note 222. 
225 Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 130. 
226 David Dyzenhaus, John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography, 102 
ETHICS 534, 547–48 (1992). 
227 MILTON, supra note 176, at 543. See also Brian Leiter, Justifying Aca-
demic Freedom: Mill and Marcuse Revisited (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
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An NDA removes information or beliefs from the marketplace 
of ideas. As far as the argument from truth is concerned, that is a 
harm. Regardless of the substantive rightness or wrongness of the 
information or belief, its absence impedes our path to the truth. That 
is not to say, of course, that there may be valid reasons for executing 
an NDA. Google’s search engine algorithm is a valuable trade se-
cret; Google employees sign NDAs to keep the algorithm under 
wraps. But the argument from truth is not responsive to the value of 
the information suppressed. It is only concerned with our capacity 
to arrive at the truth by continual disputation. Without Google’s al-
gorithm, the state of artificial intelligence and the mechanism of 
information dissemination are opaque to us, and we cannot ade-
quately adjust or test our beliefs on these matters. Plainly, NDAs are 
a problem for the argument from truth. 
Of course, not all harms to the “marketplace” are created equal. 
A single NDA may not pose a systemic threat to the argument from 
truth. But collectively it is a different matter. Thanks to President 
Trump’s Twitter feed, we know that NDAs are “very common 
among celebrities and people of wealth” and are routinely enforced 
in arbitration proceedings.228 Vast numbers of employees sign 
NDAs too.229 These agreements cover a large quantity of infor-
mation that is suppressed by an opaque decision-making system. No 
doubt an employee is chilled from discussing even information that 
is not covered by her NDA. And an injunction (or an order for spe-
cific performance) against an employee threatening to disclose 
information operates as a prior restraint. From the perspective of the 
argument from truth, the enormous number of NDAs coupled with 
large-scale arbitration presents a serious threat to free speech. 
That said, it is possible to argue that NDAs actually serve the 
argument from truth. Some NDAs suppress falsehoods. Consider the 
rapid settlement of a frivolous claim. Rather than risk the cost of a 
potential reputational hit, the defendant might prefer to quietly and 
swiftly settle the claim with an NDA to silence the plaintiff. Trump 
                                               
with author) at 10 (expressing Mill’s argument that “even if we believe what is 
true already, being challenged by false beliefs insures that we hold our beliefs for 
sound reasons, not just dogmatically”). 
228 Trump, supra note 7. 
229 Bishara et al., supra note 8; Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s 
What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. DIGITAL ARTICLE (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change. 
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also maintains that hush payments were made to silence false infor-
mation. In this guise, NDAs might protect the marketplace of ideas 
from distortion by reducing the currency of falsity and preventing 
unnecessary harm. The difficulty with this view, of course, is that 
the argument from truth celebrates its protection of falsity. It does 
not itself supply criteria to decide whether information is true or 
false; falsity is valuable because it “serve[s] to polish and brighten 
the armory of Truth.”230 All propositions are permitted expression. 
NDAs, then, conflict with the argument from truth, especially given 
the scale at which they are routinely (and opaquely) enforced today. 
2. Democracy
The argument from democracy or self-government is a genus of 
theories where Meiklejohn is the dominant species.231 Meiklejohn, 
sometimes dismissed as sonorous and impressionistic,232 argued that 
freedom of expression is necessary to meaningfully exercise the 
right to vote. Unless criticism of public officials and candidates for 
public office is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”233 voters will 
not be sufficiently informed about their electoral choice. This “in-
formed voter” species of the argument from democracy assumes that 
the people are sovereign and paradigmatically exercise that sover-
eignty at the ballot box. The exercise of their sovereign powers 
requires free examination of candidates and policies, and free com-
munication among the people.234 
Another important species of the argument from democracy is 
Vincent Blasi’s articulation of the checking value of the First 
Amendment.235 According to Blasi, “free speech, a free press, and 
230 MILTON, supra note 176, at 567. 
231 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 178. 
232 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 173 (2012); Jeremy Wal-
dron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein, 32 CONST. 
COMM. 697, 697–98 (2017). 
233 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
234 James Madison, Virginia Resolution on the Alien and Sedition Acts (pro-
testing the Alien and Sedition Acts because they confer “a power . . . levelled 
against that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed, 
the only effectual guardian of every other right”). 
235 Blasi, supra note 56. 
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free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power by public 
officials.”236 In the 1960s and 70s, the First Amendment “facili-
tat[ed] a process by which countervailing forces check the misuse of 
official power”: witness the Civil Rights Movement, peace marches, 
Vietnam, and Watergate.237 Although the checking value is a spe-
cies of the argument from democracy, Blasi positioned it as deriving 
from “the democratic theory of John Locke and Joseph Schumpeter, 
not that of Alexander Meiklejohn.”238 The “role of the ordinary cit-
izen,” on this view, “is not so much to contribute on a continuing 
basis to the formation of public policy as to retain a veto power to 
be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain bounds.”239 
A professional, organized, and financed commentariat is necessary 
to ensure citizens can exercise that veto power.240 Notably, Blasi did 
not argue that the checking value grounded First Amendment mon-
ism; rather, he intended “to further the understanding of one basic 
value which has been underemphasized” and which “should be a 
significant component in any general theory of the First Amend-
ment.”241 
By contrast to the informed voter and checking value theories, 
which are consequentialist, another version of the argument from 
democracy posits that “freedom of speech is not just instrumental to 
democracy but constitutive of that practice.”242 Ronald Dworkin 
grounded this argument in political legitimacy, claiming that it is 
illegitimate for the state to enforce an official decision against dis-
senters who were forbidden from expressing their objection to the 
decision before it was taken. The state, said Dworkin, must treat 
each individual as a free and equal member of the political commu-
nity, and therefore must accord everyone the opportunity to express 
their political, moral and cultural convictions, tastes and prejudices. 
236 Id. at 527. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 542. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 541–42. 
241 Id. at 528. 
242 Dworkin, supra note 222, at v. 
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Otherwise, it is illegitimate for the state to coerce individuals who 
dissent from the collective decision.243 
For the informed-voter and checking-value theories, an NDA is 
problematic if it prevents individuals from contributing to the ongo-
ing development of public opinion or from checking egregious 
abuses of public power. There are many reasons to think that the 
widespread use of NDAs could produce an electorate that is poorly 
informed on political matters and could debilitate the citizenry’s 
power to veto a candidate or his policies. A culture of concealment 
nourished by NDAs will prevent the formation of public opinion, 
obstruct the checking of government malfeasance, and reduce diver-
sity of viewpoint. Indeed, the capacity of NDAs to interfere with the 
informed-voter and checking-value theories is recognized by the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine. The normative basis of that 
doctrine is that the government cannot prohibit its employees from 
criticizing it. History shows that government employees who speak 
out are necessary for the healthy development of public opinion and 
for checking serious abuses of power. President Trump’s require-
ment that White House officials sign NDAs was thus rightly 
criticized.244 
It does not quiet concern to say that the NDA counterparty was 
a private entity and not government. To be sure, the instrumental 
243 This argument is an outgrowth of the debate on the legitimacy of hate 
speech laws. As with the other First Amendment values, my discussion here is 
incomplete. For more, see Jeremy Waldron, Hate Speech and Political Legiti-
macy, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 329 (Michael Herz & 
Peter Molnar eds., 2012); Ronald Dworkin, Reply to Jeremy Waldron, in THE 
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 341 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar 
eds., 2012); James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Le-
gitimacy, 32 CONST. COMM. 527 (2017); WALDRON, supra note 232, at 173–97; 
Waldron, supra note 232. 
244 Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Hoping What Happens in the White House 
Stays in the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2018, at A15; Ruth Marcus, Non-
disclosure agreements at the White House, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2018, at A17; 
Ronan Farrow, A Lawsuit by a Campaign Worker is the Latest Challenge to 
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arguments from democracy regard NDAs with government as pre-
sumptively questionable.245 But NDAs with private parties can be 
equally troubling. Consider the practice, known as “catch and kill,” 
where media outlets purchase rights to, and then bury, stories critical 
of a public official or candidate.246 If the information caught and 
killed affects public discourse or reveals public malfeasance, then 
these arguments from democracy say it should be released. Substi-
tuting the government for a private party does not remove the free 
speech concerns. If anything, it underscores the need for an inde-
pendent press, which is one of the explicit premises of the checking 
value.247 
The argument that NDAs are problematic from the point of view 
of political legitimacy is structured differently. Dworkin suggested 
a distinction, developed by others,248 between “upstream” laws and 
“downstream” laws.249 Upstream laws are those that regulate the ex-
pression of individual views; downstream laws are those that are 
responsive to the views expressed by the speech regulated upstream. 
The example used is hate speech. Laws against hate speech, plainly 
enough, are upstream. Laws against hate crimes and discrimination 
are downstream: they protect victims against consequences of, or 
practices dependent on, the views expressed by hate speech. It seems 
plausible that the regulation of upstream speech will more effec-
tively deal with downstream consequences. But Dworkin says that 
is a mistake. The gist of his argument is that suppressing views up-
stream diminishes the legitimacy of laws downstream. In a crucial 
passage, Dworkin said: 
We must protect [minorities] against unfairness and inequality 
in employment or education or housing or the criminal process, 
for example, and we may adopt laws to achieve that protection. 
But we must not try to intervene further upstream, by forbidding 
245 Of course, legitimate reasons (such as classified information) can, all 
things considered, justify a regime of nondisclosure.  
246 Ronan Farrow, Donald Trump, A Playboy Model, and a System for Con-
cealing Infidelity, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/donald-trump-a-playboy-model-
and-a-system-for-concealing-infidelity-national-enquirer-karen-mcdougal. 
247 Blasi, supra note 56, at 541–42. 
248 Waldron, supra note 243, at 331; WALDRON, supra note 232, at 177–81; 
Weinstein, supra note 243, at 529. 
249 Dworkin, supra note 222, at viii. 
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any expression of the attitudes or prejudices that we think nour-
ish such unfairness or inequality, because if we intervene too 
soon in the process through which collective opinion is formed, 
we spoil the only democratic justification we have for insisting 
that everyone obey these laws, even those who hate and resent 
them.250 
Put differently, the state should stop people from acting on invidious 
views, but it should not stop them from expressing those views. 
Laws that censor hate speech prevent the expression of opposition 
to, and therefore delegitimize, antidiscrimination laws.  
The question, then, is whether NDAs are sufficiently upstream, 
in the sense that they suppress the expression of individual views, to 
degrade the legitimacy of a downstream collective decision for 
which the suppressed views would be relevant. Two examples 
demonstrate that NDAs can damage the legitimacy of the election 
of a candidate for public office (a downstream collective decision). 
First, suppose the Democratic or Republican nominee for President 
purchases the silence of a former extramarital paramour. Rightly or 
wrongly, the former paramour’s speech would have figured in the 
collective decision to elect the candidate. Suppose, second, a corpo-
rate entity formerly controlled by a public official purchased the 
silence of current employees about allegations of sexual harassment 
against the official. Such NDAs may not necessarily condemn a sub-
sequent election but would, to some degree, delegitimize it.251  
What matters is that NDAs can be upstream censors that degrade 
downstream collective decisions like elections. Elections that sup-
press all opposition speech are rightly stamped as illegitimate. The 
suppression of facts or empirical information that could form the 
foundation of ethical or normative opposition to a candidate must 
also impair the legitimacy of an election. A male candidate for Pres-
ident who purchases, through his agents, a woman’s silence over an 
alleged extramarital affair robs the public of an empirical basis for 
ethical opposition to that candidate. The fact of the affair, if there 
was one, is no doubt important for some voters. But more important 
is the fact of the NDA itself, and its capacity to bury relevant infor-
mation, in a political culture that peddles in Newspeak like 
“alternative facts,” “fake news,” and “post-truth.” 
250 Id. 
251 For Waldron, legitimacy is a matter of degree. WALDRON, supra note 232, 
at 186–92. 
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3. Agency
Like the other defenses of free speech, the argument from 
agency is a broad church referring to theories centered on human 
autonomy or moral agency. By one count, autonomy grounds no less 
than six defenses of free speech.252 Scanlon, who supplied one such 
account in 1972253 and later renounced it,254 exhorts us to stop talk-
ing about autonomy because it covers too many varying interests.255 
Fair enough. But until our free speech theorists and First Amend-
ment scholars and practitioners and judges eradicate talk of 
autonomy, we are obliged to use the label. It is, as Greenawalt put 
it, one of “the subtle plurality of values that does govern the practice 
of freedom of speech.”256 
In 1972, Scanlon argued for what he called the Millian Princi-
ple.257 This holds that the justification for speech regulations cannot 
include two kinds of harms. The first is false beliefs that the speech 
would lead people to hold; the second is harmful consequences of 
actions that the speech would lead people to consider worthwhile. 
Scanlon’s argument for the Millian Principle was that autonomous 
citizens cannot accept such justifications. “To regard himself as au-
tonomous,” Scanlon wrote, “a person must see himself as sovereign 
in deciding what to believe and in weighing competing reasons for 
action.”258 An autonomous person cannot unquestioningly accept 
another’s beliefs or reasons for action; she must, in relying on an-
other’s judgment, “be prepared to advance independent reasons for 
thinking their judgment likely to be correct, and to weigh the evi-
dential value of their opinion against contrary evidence.”259 If a 
person accepts the government’s justification for speech regulation 
that certain beliefs are false or that certain actions supported by 
252 Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 
312 (1998). 
253 Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204 (1972). 
254 Scanlon, supra note 223. 
255 Scanlon, supra note 191, at 546. 
256 Greenawalt, supra note 172, at 119. 
257 Scanlon, supra note 253, at 213. 
258 Id. at. 215. 
259 Id. at 216. 
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speech are in fact harmful, then he fails to regard himself as auton-
omous. Scanlon backed away from this view but it remains 
influential.260 
While the Millian Principle prioritized audience interests, other 
accounts of free speech that appeal to agency emphasize speaker in-
terests as well. Seana Shiffrin, for example, focused on “the 
autonomy of the individual mind,” arguing that free speech is nec-
essary for us to externalize our mental contents and thus for our self-
development and the development of meaningful relations with oth-
ers.261 This “thinker-based” approach to free speech says that the 
interests of individuals as thinkers justify free speech because 
speech and expression are uniquely capable of externalizing one’s 
mental contents. Those interests include “capacities for autonomous 
deliberation and reaction, practical judgment, and moral rela-
tions.”262 Our practical capacity to express our mental contents, and 
to receive others’ expression of theirs, is necessary for personal and 
interpersonal development. This makes free speech necessary for 
moral agency. 
There is an interesting relationship between the agency theories 
and the democracy theories. Agency theorists assert that the argu-
ment from democracy presupposes that the informed voter, say, is 
an autonomous agent exercising political choice.263 Shiffrin moti-
vated her thinker-based approach partly because other “theories all 
presuppose, in one way or another, that there is a developed thinker 
behind the scenes.”264 Scanlon’s autonomy theory, which he later 
260 He backed away from this view partly because of its breadth. The Millian 
Principle would condemn, for example, laws against deceptive advertising. It 
overvalued the audience interest in autonomy and precluded the inquiry of 
whether that interest could sometimes be advanced by restricting some expres-
sion. Scanlon’s later view did not use autonomy to limit the set of legitimate 
justifications of authority, as the Millian Principle did, but instead regarded “au-
tonomy, understood as the actual ability to exercise independent rational 
judgment, as a good to be promoted.” Scanlon, supra note 223, at 533. The view 
Scanlon arrived at was “neither democracy-based, nor autonomy based, but irre-
ducibly pluralist.” T.M. Scanlon, Comment on Baker’s Autonomy and Free 
Speech, 27 CONST. COMM. 319, 325 (2011). 
261 SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 85. 
262 Id. at 88. 
263 Weinstein, supra note 199, at 672–73. 
264 SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 84–85. 
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repudiated, was in fact an attempt to generalize Meiklejohn’s argu-
ment beyond political speech.265 
The existence of this relationship is sometimes put as a challenge 
to democracy theorists: if the argument from democracy depends on 
the argument from agency, then there is no reason to limit free 
speech to political expression.266 There are two responses. The first 
is that even granting the dependency, discussing agency at this level 
of generality does not yield meaningful insights about when we 
should view government regulations of speech suspiciously. The ar-
gument from democracy, pitched at a lower level of abstraction, 
crisply explains why a public official should be held to a higher 
standard when bringing defamation claims against those critical of 
his conduct. The structure of an argument based on agency lacks this 
directness and clarity. The second response distinguishes between 
values and evaluative presuppositions. Autonomy “is not an under-
lying value served by participatory democracy but rather a 
presupposition of that practice.”267 This view apparently derives 
from Raz’s reconstruction of Kelsen’s argument that legal science 
presupposes the basic norm without morally committing to it (what 
Raz called a detached statement).268 Similarly, it might be possible 
to argue that autonomy is an underlying normative presupposition 
for statements using the thick concept of democracy; arguing that 
free speech promotes democracy presupposes, but does not assert, 
autonomy.269 
265 Scanlon, supra note 223, at 530–31. 
266 Weinstein, supra note 199, at 672–73. 
267 James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves, and the Protection of Commercial 
Speech: A Response to Professor Redish, 41 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 133, 165 n.129 
(2007). 
268 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 140–45 (2d ed. 2009); Joseph Raz, 
The Purity of the Pure Theory, 35 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 448, 
451–55 (1981). 
269 David Enoch & Kevin Toh, Legal as a Thick Concept, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 257, 271–74 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan 
Sciaraffa eds., 2013). 
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It’s tempting to argue that NDAs do not infringe the argument 
from agency. If anything, NDAs reinforce agency because they per-
mit speakers to sell their free speech rights whenever they wish.270 
But this mistakenly assumes that the free speech arguments from 
agency center solely on speaker interests. The basis of Scanlon’s re-
tracted autonomy theory was the audience-related Millian Principle. 
Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach emphasized the ability to receive 
others’ externalization of their mental contents as a necessary part 
of moral agency. To be sure, some autonomy accounts focus on the 
speaker. The best known is probably Baker’s argument that the First 
Amendment’s basic purposes are individual self-fulfillment and par-
ticipation in social and democratic change.271 Even then, however, 
audience interests aren’t absent; indeed, Baker acknowledges that 
the “listener, like the speaker, uses speech for self-realization or to 
promote change.”272 
For the agency theories that value audience interests at least as 
highly as speaker interests (early Scanlon and Shiffrin), the argu-
ment that NDAs infringe free speech is structurally similar to the 
argument that NDAs threaten the informed-voter or checking-value 
theories. A community’s routine enforcement of NDAs deprives 
agents of information necessary to decide for themselves what to 
believe and to weigh competing reasons for action. For example, a 
private actor who uses NDAs to conceal egregious or widespread 
criminality denies us access to reasons and evidence for our inde-
pendent judgments. Deception or lack of information interferes with 
autonomy because it prevents or limits what an agent believes or 
does.273 In sum, being kept ignorant is an obvious interference with 
autonomy.274 NDAs, moreover, can infringe our capacity to form 
moral relations with one another. Suppose an employee wants to un-
burden himself to his spouse with information covered by an NDA. 
Even if the information is not scandalous, but simply stressful, then 
                                               
270 In an otherwise very fine article, Solove and Richards take this view and 
(wrongly) consider Scanlon’s early autonomy theory to be speaker-based. Solove 
& Richards, supra note 26, at 1687–88, 1687 n.186. 
271 BAKER, supra note 29. 
272 Id. at 67. 
273 GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 14 
(1989); see also Brison, supra note 252, at 333. 
274 DWORKIN, supra note 273, at 16. 
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a prohibition on disclosure hampers the development of their moral 
relations, in particular the capacity of the spouse to empathize or 
sympathize with, or simply to understand, the stress. 
NDAs are troubling, too, for the agency theories that value 
speaker interests at least as highly as audience interests (Shiffrin and 
Baker). It is common for NDAs to prohibit the disclosure of infor-
mation to family members, friends, and associates. For example, an 
NDA that prohibits discussing injuries with family and friends 
would hinder coming to terms with those harms.275 Both Shiffrin 
and Baker highlight the necessity of free speech to self-develop-
ment, self-realization, and self-knowledge. NDAs blunt our freedom 
to externalize the content of our minds (Shiffrin)276 and to choose to 
express and therefore define our identities (Baker).277 An NDA po-
tentially renders silence (which counts as a speech act) involuntary, 
or at least subject to the purchaser’s say-so, and therefore “the 
speech act does not involve the self-realization or self-fulfillment of 
the speaker.”278 
III. BUSTING THE FREE SPEECH MONOPOLY
If selling silence can sell out speech, then NDAs should not en-
joy a free pass from free speech scrutiny. Regrettably, however, our 
free speech vocabulary has been wholly colonized by constitutions, 
and it is highly unlikely that courts will use the First Amendment to 
evaluate NDAs enforceable under state common law. There is a se-
rious concern that the judicial enforcement of a private contract 
cannot count as state action. The Supreme Court has stuck fast to 
the state action doctrine,279 notwithstanding a scholarly assault.280 
275 This is not an idle concern. Ian Gibbons, the former chief scientist at 
Theranos, became depressed and felt he could not confide in his wife because of 
an NDA he had signed. He later committed suicide. CARREYROU, supra note 4, at 
146. 
276 SHIFFRIN, supra note 30, at 89–93. 
277 BAKER, supra note 29, at 51–54. 
278 Id. at 54. 
279 As Justice O’Connor put it, the Court’s state action cases “have not been 
a model of consistency.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 
(1991). Nevertheless, she maintained that a coherent principle was discernible. Id. 
280 E.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization and State Action: Do Campus Sexual 
Assault Hearings Violate Due Process, 96 TEX. L. REV. 15, 15–16, 16 n.7, 27–45 
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The landmark decisions that seem to reject the doctrine are distin-
guished or confined to their facts. Shelley v. Kraemer281 famously 
held that the enforcement by a state court of a racially restrictive 
covenant violated the Fourteenth Amendment. But BeVier and Har-
rison, who defend the state action doctrine, suggest that Shelley is 
only a “small” exception.282 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan283—
our index case deploying the First Amendment to limit state com-
mon law—the plaintiff was a public official and, in any event, the 
holding has been limited to state common law torts.284 
The typical strategy, when the federal constitution has run out, 
is to turn to state constitutions. “State constitutions, too,” William 
Brennan reminded us over forty years ago, “are a font of individual 
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”285 In what was 
dubbed the “new judicial federalism,”286 Brennan exhorted readers 
not to forget about the “independent protective force of state law.”287 
Unfortunately, just like their federal counterpart, state constitutions 
                                               
(2017); Martha Minow, Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine in the Era of 
Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: Directing Law to Serve 
Human Needs, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 145, 145–46, 147–52 (2017). For con-
textual work on the state action doctrine, see Jud Mathews, State Action Doctrine 
and the Logic of Constitutional Containment, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 655. For some 
scholarly defenses of the state action doctrine, see Lillian BeVier & John Harri-
son, The State Action Principle and its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2010); 
Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281 (2013). Some schol-
ars, it should be noted, neither offer a full-throated defense nor suggest eradication 
of the doctrine. Nathan S. Chapman, The Establishment Clause, State Action, and 
Town of Greece, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 405 (2015).  
281 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
282 BeVier & Harrison, supra note 280, at 1801. 
283 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
284 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Snyder v. Phelps, 
562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
285 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); see also id. at 495–98 (state courts 
resist federal rights abridgment by expanding rights under state law). 
286 Justice Brennan’s article inaugurated the “new judicial federalism,” en-
couraging state courts to extend the protection of individual rights under state law 
beyond the federal baseline. See generally Lawrence Friedman, The Constitu-
tional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HAST. CONST’L L. 
Q. 93 (2000). 
287 Brennan, supra note 285, at 491 
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usually come bundled with a state action requirement.288 The en-
forcement of a private right of action sounding in contract simply 
does not qualify as state action. 
The solution, this Part argues, is to tap into the common law doc-
trine that contracts against public policy are unenforceable. States 
should refuse to enforce, as against public policy, NDAs that pose 
significant threats to free speech. In giving more precise content to 
that general proposition, this Part attempts to wrest partial control 
over free speech discourse from the First Amendment. 
A. The Free Speech Monopoly 
One of the great victories of twentieth century constitutionalism 
was the colonization of free speech. A primary driver was the First 
Amendment being incorporated to reach into individual states. Alt-
hough the first case to do so (Gitlow v. New York,289 decided in 
1925) did not invalidate the New York law, it furnished Holmes an 
opportunity in dissent to declaim against punishing defendants for 
their “redundant discourse.”290 Many of the First Amendment cases 
in the following decades, some effecting profound changes, limited 
the authority of local officials.291  
                                               
288 Committee For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ As-
sociation, 929 A.2d 1060, 1070–71 (N.J. 2007) (state action is a prerequisite for 
asserting free speech rights in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Michi-
gan, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Washington, and Wisconsin).  
289 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
290 Id. at 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). I am inclined to think that hav-
ing one’s prose condemned by Holmes is punishment enough. 
291 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (on appeal from 
Alabama courts); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (California); Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (California); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 
418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida); Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444 (1938) 
(Georgia); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (Illinois); Niemotko v. Mar-
yland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (Maryland); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) 
(Minnesota); Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (Ne-
braska); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (New Hampshire); Saia 
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (New York); Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents of the University of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (New 
York); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ohio); De Jonge v. Oregon, 
299 U.S. 353 (1937) (Oregon); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) 
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A second important factor is that lawyers tended to be the twen-
tieth century’s most eloquent expositors of free speech. Judges like 
Hand, Holmes, and Brandeis developed their mature free speech 
theories in judicial opinions. Holmes is occasionally singled out for 
special veneration. His dissent in Abrams v. United States292 was 
recently described as “the foundational document of America’s free 
speech tradition,” transforming the First Amendment from some-
thing of “an unfulfilled promise” to “our preeminent constitutional 
value and a defining national trait.”293 “[F]ree speech in America 
was never the same after 1919,” runs another recent account, and the 
“triumph of the free speech principle was inevitable after Holmes 
unleashed his Abrams dissent on the minds of generations longing 
to break with the restrictive traditions of the past.”294 In short, 
“Holmes arguably invented modern freedom of speech in his 
Abrams dissent.”295 
Before the twentieth century, major free speech figures were not 
lawyers. John Milton was a poet. James Madison and John Stuart 
Mill were political philosophers and politicians; neither was a law-
yer.296 A corollary, perhaps, of the judge-as-free-speech-theorist is 
that free speech scholarship centered on law schools. Law professors 
comprised the primary scholarly audience of free speech theory, 
even for the influential non-lawyers (Alexander Meiklejohn and 
T.M. Scanlon). True: maybe the singularly poetic defenders of free 
speech in the twentieth century just happened to be judges. Holmes, 
                                               
(South Carolina); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Texas); Landmark 
Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (Virginia); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia).  
292 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
293 THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 
3, 7, 245 (2013). 
294 Ronald K.L. Collins, Epilogue: The Long Shadow, in THE FUNDAMENTAL 
HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND READER 349, 377 (Ronald K.L. Col-
lins ed., 2010). 
295 Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 798 
(2016). 
296 RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 55–56, 145 (1971); 
Edward S. Corwin, The Posthumous Career of James Madison as Lawyer, 25 AM. 
B. ASS’N J. 821 (1939). 
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Brandeis, and Hand are known for their rhetorical capacity and un-
paralleled prose. Even so, the consequence of the (possibly 
coincidental) fact that these three judges advanced free speech is that 
lawyers claimed professional expertise over the trio’s writing. 
Third, free speech theory is legalized, typically cashed out in 
terms of what government regulations are legitimate or illegitimate. 
It is not centrally concerned with the social conditions that promote 
the development and communication of ideas. An example might be 
the pedagogical practices that maximize free speech environmental-
ism. Instead, theorists occupy themselves with an account of the free 
speech right, which is a sword wielded against authority. The “free 
speech on campus” debate surfaces periodically, but far less public 
attention is devoted to the practices that educators should employ to 
inculcate habits of mind that are receptive and sensitive to free 
speech. 
Moreover, despite the new judicial federalism, the First Amend-
ment’s robustness has crowded out analogous state constitutional 
free speech guarantees. A selection of quotes from the law reviews 
makes the point. In 1968, a note in the Stanford Law Review said: 
The pervasive influence of the Supreme Court in developing 
standards for the preservation of free expression is remarkable 
in view of the facts that the Court is only one of thousands of 
tribunals that sit in this country, that it normally interprets only 
one of 51 constitutions that guarantee freedom of speech and of 
the press, and that it was not until well into the 20th century that 
it began to devote serious attention to this area of individual 
rights.297 
A justice of the Washington Supreme Court wrote in 1985 that 
“more judicial and scholarly effort has been devoted to divining the 
meaning and scope of the United States Bill of Rights than has been 
expended on all fifty state bills of rights combined.”298 And it was 
not until 2002 that a scholar published “the first sustained examina-
tion of Pennsylvania’s constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
297 Peter P. Miller, Note, Freedom of Expression Under State Constitutions, 
20 STAN. L. REV. 318, 318 (1968). 
298 Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Con-
stitutional Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
157, 157 (1985). 
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press since the dawn of the twentieth century,” and “the first com-
prehensive study to synthesize the two and a quarter century history 
of Pennsylvania’s protection of free expression.”299 
Finally, the dominance of the First Amendment in the twentieth 
century is strongly suggested by the Google Ngram Viewer. Figure 
1 shows the frequency of certain two- and three-word phrases (First 
Amendment, free speech, free expression, freedom of speech, free-
dom of expression) as a percentage of, respectively, all two- and 
three-word phrases occurring in a corpus of American English 
books in the twentieth century.300 The phrase “First Amendment” 
rocketed skyward from the late 1930s, overtaking “free speech” in 
the mid 1950s. 
Figure 1: Frequency of Free Speech Phrases 
The graph is highly suggestive, even if not demonstrative. One lim-
itation is that it does not distinguish between the several First 
Amendment rights. 
299 Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Ex-
pression, 5 U. PA. J. CONST’L L. 12, 13 (2002). 








(last visited Mar. 31, 2019). 
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B. Contracts Against Democratic Public Policy
Let’s get the customary aphorism out of the way: the doctrine 
that contracts against public policy are unenforceable is “a very un-
ruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where 
it will carry you.”301 That famous rebuke, issued by Sir James Bur-
rough in 1824, was soon quoted approvingly in an American 
opinion.302 Yet the doctrine that contracts against public policy are 
unenforceable had already gained a strong foothold in the United 
States.303 The gist of the doctrine is that, in some cases, courts will 
not enforce a private contract that violates some public good.304 The 
rationale is two-fold: to deter future illegal bargains (deterrence) and 
to refuse state assistance in enforcing them (non-assistance).305 The 
301 Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing. 229, 252 
(Burrough J) (Ct. Com. Pl.). See generally David Adam Friedman, Bringing Or-
der to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2012). 
302 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 164 (N.Y. 1839). 
303 Mount & Wardell v. G. & R. Waite, 7 Johns. 434 (N.Y. 1811) (Kent, Ch. 
J.); Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87, 91–93 (N.J. 1828) (collecting American authori-
ties and quoting an opinion of James Kent). The doctrine arose in England by the 
fifteenth century as contracts in restraint of trade were held void. W.S.M. Knight, 
Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207, 207 (1922); William L. Letwin, 
The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 373–
75 (1954). 
304 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Intro. Note to ch. 8 (1981).  
305 Id. Corwin favored the deterrence rationale and dismissed non-assistance 
as a “pious fear that the ‘judicial ermine’ might otherwise be soiled.” 6 ARTHUR 
LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE
RULES OF CONTRACT LAW 1058 (1951). A reviewer disagreed. Harold C. Hav-
ighurst, Book Review, 61 YALE L. J. 1138, 1144–45 (1952) (“In most instances, 
then, the protection of the good name of the judicial institution must provide the 
principal reason for the denial of a remedy to one who has trafficked in the for-
bidden. This is, moreover, a very good reason.”). The non-assistance rationale is 
impressively pedigreed. Holman v. Johnson (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 
(K.B.) (Lord Mansfield) (“No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his 
cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff’s own 
stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the 
transgression of a positive law of this country, there the Court says he has no right 
to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes; not for the sake of the de-
fendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.”). 
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short form of the doctrine refers to a blanket notion of unenforcea-
bility; in fact, it is marked by significant remedial flexibility.306 
It’s striking and, now, forgotten, that the classical doctrine traf-
ficked in democratic principles. Although common law judges 
differed on whether wagering contracts contravened public pol-
icy,307 all agreed that election wagers violated democratic norms. In 
1785, the full King’s Bench held that a wager between two voters 
over the election of a member of Parliament was void.308 Whether 
the winner of the bet is entitled to recover, said Lord Mansfield, 
turns on the species and nature of the contract; and if that be in 
the eye of the law corrupt, and against the fundamental princi-
ples of the constitution, it cannot be supported by any Court of 
Justice. One of the principal foundations of this constitution de-
pends on the proper exercise of this franchise, that the election 
of members of Parliament should be free, and particularly that 
every voter should be free from pecuniary influence in giving 
his vote.309 
The wager was therefore void because it placed the two voters under 
a pecuniary influence.310  
Unsurprisingly, Mansfield’s reasoning found a receptive audi-
ence across the Atlantic.311 As early as 1799, Jeremiah Chase, 
306 Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study 
in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 118–21 (1988). 
307 WARREN SWAIN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1670–1870 (2015) at 233, 239–
44. 
308 Allen v. Hearn (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 969; 1 T.R. 56 (K.B.). This was a 
decision on a point of law from a special case found by a jury. Id. at 969; see 3 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *378. All four judges agreed that the 
election wager was void. Allen v. Hearn (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. at 971; 1 T.R. at 59–
60. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. Another ground for the decision was that an election wager, if valid, 
could be a pretext for a bribe. Id. 
311 Every state court that considered the issue concluded that election wagers 
were contrary to public policy. Smyth v. M’Masters, 2 Browne 182, 189–90 (Pa. 
Ct. Com. Pl. 1812); Denniston v. Cook, 12 Johns. 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); 
M’Allister v. Hoffman, 16 Serg. & Rawle 147 (Pa. 1827); Rust v. Gott, 9 Cow. 
169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); Stoddard v. Martin, 1 R.I. 1 (1828); Brush v. Keeler, 5 
Wend. 250 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Laval v. Myers, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 486 (1830); 
Wood v. McCann, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 366 (1838); Russell v. Pyland, 21 Tenn. (2 
Hum.) 131 (1840); Jeffrey v. Ficklin, 3 Ark. 227 (1841); Wheeler v. Spencer, 15 
Conn. 28 (1842); Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8 (1843); Tarleton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 
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second cousin to Samuel,312 wrote that a bet between two residents 
entitled to vote for county sheriff would be “against sound policy, 
and ought not to be sanctioned by a court of justice.”313 “It is a fun-
damental principle of our constitution that elections should be free,” 
said Chase, and he charmingly continued: 
[T]he election of a sheriff is of great importance to the commu-
nity, and ought to be free from corrupt and undue influence; and 
such wagers, if countenanced by the court, would certainly have 
a malignant and evil tendency by making the parties, their con-
nexions and friends, partizans in the election, and creating an 
interest and views incompatible with the general good and 
sound policy which is best promoted by selecting those men 
who are the most fit and best qualified for the office.314 
Similarly, in 1809, William Van Ness, a thirty-three-year-old justice 
of the New York Supreme Court, held that a gubernatorial election 
wager was void on Mansfield’s authority.315 If democratic reasons 
voided an election wager in England, said Van Ness, “how much is 
their force increased, when applied to an analogous case in our own 
country, in which the very existence of every department of the gov-
ernment, depends upon the free, and unbiassed exercise of the 
elective franchise.”316 James Kent, who agreed with Van Ness, 
wrote to similar effect five years later: 
9 (1843); Machir v. Moore, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 257 (1845); Givens v. Rogers, 11 
Ala. 543 (1847); Bettis v. Reynolds, 34 N.C. (12 Ired.) 344 (1851); Gregory v. 
King, 58 Ill. 169 (1871); Hill v. Kidd, 43 Cal. 615 (1872); Cooper v. Rowley, 29 
Ohio St. 547 (1876); Motlow v. Johnson, 39 So. 710, 711 (Ala. 1905). 
312 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985) at 739 n.2. 
Both Chases voted against the ratification of the Constitution. The Maryland Con-
vention Proceedings, Saturday, 26 April 1788, in 12 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 647–48 (John P. Kaminski 
et al. eds., 2015). See also CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MAR-
YLAND, A HISTORY 100–02 (1928). 
313 Wroth v. Johnson, 4 H. & McH. 284, 286 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1799). Although 
it was not at the apex of Maryland’s judicial hierarchy, the General Court was 
“the great court of the people of Maryland while it existed.” BOND, supra note 
312, at 87–91. 
314 Wroth v. Johnson, 4 H. & McH. at 286–87. 
315 Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). 
316 Id. at 436. 
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when we consider the importance of popular elections to the 
constitution and liberties of this country, and that the value of 
the right depends upon the independence, moderation, discre-
tion, and purity with which it is exercised; we cannot but be 
disposed to cherish a decision which declares gambling upon 
such elections to be illegal, as being founded in the clearest and 
most incontestable principles of public policy.317 
Kent expressly “place[d] the decision of this case upon those great 
and solid principles of public policy which forbids this species of 
gambling, as tending to debase the character, and impair the value 
of the right of suffrage.”318 
The federal courts, too, nixed election wagers. William Cranch, 
sitting on the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in 1831, 
voided on public policy grounds a wager between two residents of 
Washington DC that Andrew Jackson would not receive Kentucky’s 
electoral vote.319 After reviewing the authorities, Cranch held that 
“one of the maxims of sound public policy in all elective govern-
ments, [is] that elections should be pure and free,” and that “[a]ny 
contract which would tend to substitute a corrupt for a patriotic mo-
tive to influence a vote either directly or indirectly, would be 
contrary to that maxim.”320 For Cranch, any monetary interest, even 
an indirect or contingent one, created a corrupt motive. “It is the 
nature and tendency of the contract, not the degree of mischief 
which it may effect,” he said, taking his cue from Mansfield, “that 
decides its validity.”321 In a passage that now seems quaint, Cranch 
worried that the betting parties, prompted by corrupt motives, might 
sully the election “by exciting the passions, by holding up the prom-
ise of their influence in obtaining offices for those who seek them, 
or by denouncing those already in office; by circulating false re-
ports, by hiring writers and printers to extol their candidate and 
slander his opponent.”322 No: “So far as the influence used in an 
                                               
317 Vischer v. Yates, 11 Johns. 23, 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814). 
318 Id. at 32. The judgment was reversed, on unrelated grounds, on a writ of 
error to the Senate sitting as the Court for the Correction of Errors. Yates v. Foot, 
12 Johns. 1 (N.Y. 1814). 
319 Denney v. Elkins, 7 F. Cas. 464 (C.C.D.C. 1831) (No. 3,790). 
320 Id. at 466–67. 
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election is prompted by a pecuniary motive, so far it is corrupt, and 
in violation of the maxim, that elections should be pure.”323 
The two basic democratic principles animating these cases found 
their fullest expression in an opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, speaking through Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, in 
1847 (the same year, incidentally, that Shaw’s daughter married 
Herman Melville).324 The first principle centers on an individual’s 
reasons for voting. As Shaw put it, all voters must exercise “free 
choice,” that is, they must be “free to inquire and to judge, free to 
will and determine, and free to act with purity and intelligence, un-
influenced and unseduced by interested, sinister, or corrupt 
motives.”325 Otherwise, said Shaw, “they act without regard to the 
fitness of the candidate, or to their own sense of duty.”326 As the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas said in 1812, a voter who bets 
on an election “puts the mind … completely into trammels,” and 
“cannot act freely.”327 The second democratic principle is cumula-
tive. Shaw noted: “If one bet can be made on an election, many can 
be made. If small sums can be staked, large ones can. So that, on a 
great and exciting popular election, a large amount of money may 
depend on the result.”328 The electorate, in the aggregate, “will have 
a common, and may have a large, pecuniary interest in the issue.”329 
Often, Shaw reminded us, “a few thousand, or even a few hundred, 
votes may decide the election of a State; and the election of a State 
may decide that of the Union.”330 In short, “[a]n election so influ-
enced could not be regarded as the expressed will of an intelligent 
constituency.”331 
A tendril of English reasoning nearly took firm root in the 
United States. Wagers that “tend[ed] to introduce indecent discus-
sions” were deep-sixed by the common law.332 In Atherfold v. 
                                               
323 Id. 
324 Ball v. Gilbert, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 397 (1847). 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Smyth v. M’Masters, 2 Browne 182, 189–90 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1812). 




332 Atherfold v. Beard (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 328, 331; 2 T.R. 610, 615 (K.B.). 
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Beard, the King’s Bench voided a bet that the collection of hops 
duties in Canterbury for 1786 would exceed that for 1785.333 En-
forcing this wager, said one judge, “might be attended with 
mischievous consequences to permit any two persons, by the means 
of laying an impertinent wager, to bring forward a discussion of this 
sort, and expose to all the world the amount of the public reve-
nue.”334 “[T]his wager could not be proved,” said another, “without 
searching the books relating to the revenues of the country.”335 Van 
Ness, in his 1812 opinion for the New York Supreme Court, noticed 
this reasoning. He referred obliquely to the disputed 1792 guberna-
torial election and thought that an election wager could generate “a 
discussion calculated to endanger the peace and tranquility of a com-
munity, already sufficiently heated and agitated.”336 There was a 
separation of powers element too. One of the judges in Atherfold 
said that “Parliament is the proper place in which these questions are 
to be discussed; and it would be improper to permit it elsewhere.”337 
And the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas insisted that the va-
lidity of an election “ought never to be brought into discussion,” 
because “the legislative and judicial authorities might be put into a 
state of collision, upon a question, which it is apprehended, the leg-
islature alone is competent to determine.”338 But by 1831, Cranch 
(in his opinion for the D.C. Circuit Court) was “not so clear” on this 
aspect of public policy, preferring to rest “mainly upon the tendency 
of such contracts to introduce corruption into our elections.”339 
C. Contracts Against Free Speech Public Policy
The doctrine that contracts against public policy are void, then, 
is no stranger to constitutional principles. Indeed, the logic holding 
election wagers unenforceable shares a common structure with the 
informed-voter variant of the argument from democracy. Recall that 
on that view, speech regulations are illegitimate when they deprive 
333 Id. 
334 Id. (Ashurst J). 
335 Id. (Buller J). 
336 Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426, 435 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) 
337 Atherfold (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. at 331; 2 T.R. at 615 (Ashurst J). 
338 Smyth v. M’Masters, 2 Browne 182, 189 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1812). 
339 Denney v. Elkins, 7 F. Cas. 464, 467 (C.C.D.C. 1831) (No. 3,790). 
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the citizen of information necessary to meaningfully vote. Likewise, 
courts voided election wagers because they corrupted the franchise. 
An election subject to widespread betting, just like an election where 
critics are censored by the threat of libel damages, “could not be 
regarded as the expressed will of an intelligent constituency.”340 
Despite this affinity, no American court has squarely held that 
an NDA is contrary to public policy for concealing information from 
the voting public. To be sure, the first Restatement of Contracts in-
cluded the following tantalizing illustration: 
A, a candidate for political office, and as such advocating cer-
tain principles, had previously written letters to B, taking a 
contrary position. B is about to publish the letters, and A fearing 
that the publication will cost him his election, agrees to pay 
$1000 for the suppression of the letters. The bargain is illegal. 
But it is unclear whence this illustration came. The second Restate-
ment dropped it. 
The general rule, even when the first Restatement was pub-
lished, is that public policy permits “a contract for silence so long as 
it is not in contemplation to conceal and prevent the punishment of 
a crime.”341 The closest cases arose from bargains between newspa-
pers and candidates, but the few opinions that exist are old and 
inconsistent.342 In 1902, the Vermont Supreme Court voided a con-
tract where a political candidate secretly purchased the editorial 
support of a newspaper.343 “To secure a free and exact expression of 
sovereign will,” the Court said, “there must be a proper selection of 
candidates as well as an honest election.”344 Because “the editorial 
column is relied upon as a public teacher and adviser, there can be 
no more dangerous deception than that resulting from the secret pur-
chase of its favor.”345 A New York court, however, reached the 
                                               
340 Ball v. Gilbert, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 397 (1847). 
341 Wells v. Sutton, 85 Ind. 70, 74 (1882). 
342 English authority also holds as contrary to public policy a bargain that a 
newspaper be paid to refrain from exercising its right to comment. Neville v. Do-
minion of Canada News Co [1915] 3 K.B. 556 (C.A.). 
343 Livingston v. Page, 52 A. 965 (Vt. 1902). 
344 Id. at 966. 
345 Id. See also Miller v. Glockner, 1 Ohio App. 149 (1913) (“the secret pur-
chase of the editorial influence of a newspaper is void”). 
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opposite conclusion in 1882.346 The judge thought that “[t]he press 
is not a social organ of the people at all; the people have nothing 
whatever to do with it.”347 “And even if it were a subject of public 
advantage or disadvantage to have a conscientious press,” he in-
sisted, “it cannot … be a ground of interference if the contract was 
in itself legal.”348 
In a thoughtful article, Alan Garfield has argued that the public 
policy against enforcement of an NDA must “clearly outweigh” the 
countervailing enforcement interests.349 He approached the problem 
from opposite ends of the public policy spectrum. At one end of the 
spectrum, contracts protecting disclosure of trade secrets are pre-
sumptively enforceable. The sources of public policy weighing in 
favor of enforcement include tort law (improper use or disclosure of 
trade secrets is independently actionable), agency law (agents are 
not typically authorized to use or disclose trade secrets), the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules protect trade secrets during dis-
covery), the Federal Rules of Evidence (same), and the Freedom of 
Information Act (which exempts trade secrets).350 At the other end 
of the spectrum, contracts to conceal a crime are void against public 
policy (although it is an open question whether contracts between 
offender and victim are unenforceable).351 Garfield argued that the 
balance struck by existing law should guide the evaluation of NDAs 
in the middle of the spectrum. Other legal rights and duties might 
already weigh disclosure interests against confidentiality interests. 
When the law imposes compulsory duties (for example, misappro-
priation of trade secrets or a prohibition on criminal conduct), then 
that provides guidance for what is inevitably a fact-intensive in-
quiry.352 
The problem is that this approach does not reflect the practical 
shape of NDAs. For Garfield, the task is to place every NDA on a 
“spectrum” between those contracts that conceal crime (and there-
fore violate public policy) and those contracts that maintain trade 
secrets (and therefore do not violate public policy). But what about 
                                               
346 Gade v. Robinson Consolidated Mining Co., 26 Alb. L.J. 423 (1882). 
347 Id. 
348 Id. at 424. 
349 Garfield, supra note 17, at 315. 
350 Id. at 301–02. 
351 Id. at 306–09. 
352 Id. at 316–18. 
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contracts that do both? Presumably, an employment confidentiality 
agreement broad enough to cover trade secrets and criminality 
would be read down to exclude the latter. Yet some trade secrets 
might be intimately bound up with criminal or tortious conduct (for 
example, trade secrets about widely used yet highly dangerous sub-
stances). Or, to take another example, suppose that I, an alien, 
neglect to file a tax return. I pay the penalty and the Internal Revenue 
Service agrees not to report my misdemeanor to Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement. Because it conceals a crime, is this contract 
automatically unenforceable? The “spectrum” framework is insuffi-
cient. There is a plurality of values that animate confidentiality 
agreements, as Part I detailed. Some of these values are incommen-
surable. Moreover, the public policy exception to contract 
enforceability is eclectic. There is no grand theory; an approach that 
imposes a spectrum on the doctrine invalidly reduces the incommen-
surable to a common metric. As Frederick Pollock wrote in 1876, 
the doctrine that contracts against public policy are unenforceable 
“presents itself as a clustered group of analogies rather than a linear 
chain of authority.”353 It’s a scatterplot, not a spectrum. 
D. Modern Times 
Modern courts are wary of the public policy exception to NDA 
enforceability because public policy strongly favors freedom of con-
tract. The U.S. Supreme Court, when it was still in the business of 
general law, emphasized the “general rule” that “competent persons 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their agreements 
voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the 
courts.”354 Accordingly, “[t]he principle that contracts in contraven-
tion of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with 
caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that 
                                               
353 FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND EQUITY 221 
(Stevens & Sons 1876). This language survived every subsequent edition; the fi-
nal (thirteenth) edition was published in 1950. PERCY H. WINFIELD, POLLOCK’S 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 261–62 (13th ed. 1950). 
354 Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931). 
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doctrine rests.”355 This view is influential in state courts.356 It is 
compounded when applied to NDAs, because written agreements 
waiving speech rights are typically viewed as voluntary and rational 
bargains.357 Today, NDAs are voided on public policy grounds if 
they purport to prohibit a party from reporting criminal misconduct 
to law enforcement authorities358 or subsequent employers,359 or if 
they conceal civil wrongs like trespass360 or breach a contract with 
a third person.361 
Aside from the common law public policy doctrine, there are 
two contexts in which modern courts examine the enforceability of 
NDAs. The first concerns the judicial application of Pickering v. 
Board of Education of Township High School District 205,362 which 
“continue[s] to be the meter by which the First Amendment rights 
                                               
355 Id. at 356–57. See also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union 
of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 
(1983) (“a public policy … must be well defined and dominant, and is to be as-
certained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general 
considerations of supposed public interests”). 
356 Livingston v. Tapscott, 585 So.2d 839, 841 (Ala. 1991); Bailey v. Lincoln 
General Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1045 (Colo. 2011); Collins v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 321 A.2d 444, 449 (Conn. 1973); City of Largo v. AHF-Bay Fund, LLC, 215 
So.3d 10, 15–16 (Fla. 2017); Emory University v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903, 
904–05 (Ga. 1981); Robinson v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 
398, 408–09 (Iowa 2012); Terrien v. Zwit, 648 N.W.2d 602, 608 n.9 (Mich. 
2002); Ramapo River Reserve Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Oakland, 
896 A.2d 459, 467–68 (N.J. 2006); Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Surety 
Co., 392 P.3d 262, 268 (Okla. 2017); In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 822 (Tenn. 
2014). 
357 Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F.Supp. 1227, 1234–35 (D.R.I. 1995) (“[P]ermit-
ting an individual to waive his rights in such a manner advances the fundamental 
principle of personal autonomy. [Plaintiff] made an arguably rational decision. To 
deny him the opportunity to exercise his options in the face of a potentially more 
severe alternative outcome compromises his ability to choose. This is an interest 
the public shares individually and collectively that should not be lightly dis-
counted.”). 
358 Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of Army, 247 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
359 Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio App. 1988). 
360 Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 
1972). 
361 Unami v. Roshan, 659 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
362 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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of public employees are measured.”363 Under Pickering, the validity 
of a restraint on public employee speech is determined by “arriv[ing] 
at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
[government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”364 Under the 
Pickering framework, public employees cannot be dismissed for 
criticizing their employer365 or for uttering political remarks to other 
employees in private conversation.366 Nor can they be prohibited 
from accepting compensation for making speeches or writing arti-
cles.367 
Pickering generated a developed jurisprudence that demon-
strates how courts can weigh disclosure interests against 
confidentiality interests. For example, recently the D.C. Circuit in 
Baumann v. District of Columbia368 upheld the suspension of a po-
lice officer for releasing to the news media police radio 
communications recorded during an exchange of gunfire. On confi-
dentiality interests,369 the court noted the police department’s 
“weighty interest in preserving confidential information that, if re-
leased publicly, could jeopardize the successful conclusion of a 
criminal investigation.”370 Confidentiality protected the integrity of 
363 Baumann v. District of Columbia, 795 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). It’s too early to 
discern the effect of Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018), on the Pickering framework. In dissent, Justice Kagan 
thought that Janus will simply create “an exception, applying to union fees alone, 
from the usual rules governing public employees’ speech.” Id. at 2491 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
364 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
365 Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
366 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
367 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 
(1995). 
368 795 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
369 The court stated that in disclosing the recording the officer was speaking 
as a union official, not a police officer, on a matter of public concern. Id. at 215–
16. 
370 Id. at 216. 
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investigations “by preventing the premature and unauthorized dis-
closure of the communications.”371 The court acknowledged that the 
officer and the public “have a strong interest in his speaking to the 
public about safety issues related to the [department’s] manage-
ment.”372 It was crucial, however, that aside from releasing the audio 
itself, the officer was free to speak publicly about the incident. And 
the prohibition on releasing the audio was not indefinite. Because 
these obligations were “sufficiently tailored temporally and in scope 
to enable law enforcement better to investigate criminal activity and 
police operations implicating police safety,” the confidentiality in-
terests outweighed the disclosure interests.373 
The other context in which courts assess NDAs are anti-SLAPP 
special motions to dismiss or to strike pleadings. Some state courts 
have held that the local anti-SLAPP statute does not reach lawsuits 
seeking to enforce NDAs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, for example, denied an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss 
because an NDA was a “substantial basis” for the claims independ-
ent of the confidant’s “petitioning activity.”374 California courts, by 
contrast, evaluate some NDAs rather closely. If the defendant makes 
a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action “arises 
from” its exercise of free speech rights, then the plaintiff must show 
a probability of prevailing on the claim.375 If the complaint lacks all 
merit, it will be struck; but if it states and substantiates a legally suf-
ficient claim, it will survive.376 In fact, the anti-SLAPP statute 
“poses no obstacle to suits that possess minimal merit.”377 In deter-
mining whether the defendant satisfied the threshold “arising from” 
                                               
371 Id. at 217. The court pointed to other legal contexts requiring confidenti-
ality of investigatory information: grand jurors, court reporters, and prosecutors 
in grand jury proceedings; judicial employees who receive confidential infor-
mation in the course of their official duties; and the Freedom of Information Act’s 
exclusion of records on law enforcement investigations and proceedings. Id. at 
216. 
372 Id. at 217. 
373 Id. at 212. 
374 Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943–44 
(Mass. 1998). 
375 Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (Cal. 
2002). 
376 Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002). 
377 Id. at 712. 
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condition, the court looks to “the gravamen or principal thrust” of 
the plaintiff’s action.378 “The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional fo-
cus,” explained the Supreme Court of California, “is not the form of 
the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that 
gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity 
constitutes protected speech.”379 It is, then, an inquiry that privileges 
substance over form. 
The Supreme Court of California stressed that “the anti-SLAPP 
statute neither constitutes—nor enables courts to effect—any kind 
of ‘immunity’ for breach . . . of contracts affecting speech.”380 But 
the anti-SLAPP jurisprudence does demonstrate judicial capacity to 
subject NDAs to free speech scrutiny. For example, in Vivian v. 
Labrucherie,381 an ex-husband (a police officer) alleged that his ex-
wife’s statements to the family court and to a sheriff’s department 
internal affairs investigation breached the non-disparagement clause 
of their settlement agreement. The California Court of Appeal 
granted the ex-wife’s special motion to strike. First, the ex-husband 
sought “to impose liability on [his ex-wife] for having made her 
statements to the internal affairs investigators and in her family court 
papers.”382 Second, the court observed that the non-disparagement 
clause was relatively narrow because it exempted statements made 
by the ex-wife to the family court and did not obviously prohibit the 
ex-wife from making statements to the internal affairs investigators. 
Moreover, the ex-wife’s statements to investigators were privileged. 
The litigation privilege “promotes full and candid responses to a 
public agency,” and “the dispute in this case involves a significant 
public concern—a governmental investigation into inappropriate 
conduct by a police officer.”383 
E. Methodological Choice 
A court deciding whether an NDA is void for violating public 
policy is faced with a methodological choice. The classical common 
                                               
378 Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 73 (Cal. 2009). 
379 Navellier, 52 P.3d at 711. 
380 Id. at 712. 
381 214 Cal.App.4th 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
382 Id. at 274. 
383 Id. at 277. 
 
148
 SILENCE FOR SALE  
law public policy cases adopt a categorical approach: if a bargain is 
an election wager, then it is unenforceable; if an NDA purports to 
prohibit reporting crimes to law enforcement, then it is unenforcea-
ble. The modern approach, by contrast, weighs contract enforcement 
interests against free expression interests. In Perricone v. Per-
ricone,384 the Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether a 
confidential discovery agreement in marriage dissolution proceed-
ings violated public policy. The court lined up enforcement 
interests: freedom of contract, administration of justice, personal au-
tonomy, and privacy.385 It then assembled disclosure interests: free 
speech, law enforcement, public information, and official accounta-
bility.386 The court, after noting that the NDA was neutral as to law 
enforcement and public information, and that the plaintiff was not 
an official, concluded that there was no public policy violation.387 
The category/balance binary is a hackneyed First Amendment 
trope.388 In almost every case, one side excoriates the other for arbi-
trary categories or impenetrable balances. The predictable dynamic 
played out in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31,389 where a sharply divided court 
struck down an Illinois law permitting public-sector unions to 
charge nonmembers fees for collective bargaining. Justice Alito’s 
analysis placed the state regulation in the category of laws compel-
ling the subsidization of private speech. That was, essentially, the 
end of the inquiry. In his mind, the court was “simply enforcing the 
First Amendment as properly understood” when the state law 
“abridged fundamental free speech rights.”390 The case which the 
                                               
384 972 A.2d 666, 686–89 (Conn. 2009). 
385 Id. at 687–88. 
386 Id. at 688. 
387 Id. at 688–89. While Perricone v. Perricone demonstrates that courts ac-
tually employ the balancing methodology, I am not suggesting that the court got 
it right or even did it well. 
388 See generally Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1 (2016); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION 
AND REALITY 35–58 (2001). See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral 
Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1214–
18 (2010); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: 
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34–36 (1986).  
389 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
390 Id. at 2486 n.28. 
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majority overruled, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,391 was 
criticized as unprincipled, malleable, and discretionary.392 For good 
measure, Alito’s opinion faulted Justice Kagan’s dissent for 
“propos[ing] that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review, 
that is, that we ask only whether a government employer could rea-
sonably believe that the exaction of agency fees serves its 
interests.”393 “This form of minimal scrutiny,” huffed Alito, “is for-
eign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”394 For her part, Kagan in 
dissent took issue with the arbitrariness of the result. Her “key point” 
was that Alito’s opinion is anomalous and “creates an unjustified 
hole in the law.”395 
These methodological approaches are typically seen as adver-
saries, but the real issues are who does the balancing and when. A 
category, to be established and justified, is the result of an upstream 
balancing process. Perricone illustrates this: lower courts will not 
relitigate the balance that the Connecticut Supreme Court struck be-
tween enforcement interests and free speech interests. Rather, they 
will apply Perricone categorically as establishing a rule that confi-
dentiality clauses in divorce settlements are enforceable. In the 
result, then, courts will rely on precedent to decide whether a partic-
ular NDA enforceability problem should be resolved categorically 
or as a balancing exercise. Stare decisis may foreclose a substantive 
inquiry. 
F. Now We’re Talking: Two Examples
When do the free speech implications of an NDA become so 
acute that it is against public policy to enforce it? Baked into this 
question is the assumption that a confidentiality agreement is pre-
sumptively enforceable. Yet it is not simply a matter of stamping an 
NDA with the “waiver” label and concluding that free speech is not 
implicated. Nor is it a matter of voiding all NDAs that conceal in-
formation of public concern. 
391 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
392 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481. 
393 Id. at 2465. 
394 Id. 
395 Id. at 2497. 
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1. Clifford v. Trump 
In October 2016, Michael Cohen (on behalf of a company called 
Essential Consultants LLC, or EC) and Stephanie Clifford signed an 
agreement.396 Cohen, once a lawyer and fixer for President Trump, 
signed the agreement to pay $130,000 to Clifford in exchange for 
her silence over information designated as confidential. There is a 
live issue about the agreement’s parties. It says that it is between 
“‘EC, LLC’ and/or David Dennison, (DD), on the one part, and 
Peggy Peterson, (PP), on the other part.”397 (The “and/or” contem-
plates that it is not essential that both EC and DD be parties.) The 
agreement notes that the names “are pseudonyms whose true iden-
tity will be acknowledged in a Side Letter Agreement.”398 The “side 
letter agreement” identifies Peggy Peterson as Stephanie Clifford 
(the identification of David Dennison is redacted in the court fil-
ing).399 The nominal David Dennison has not signed the agreement. 
On each page, there is space for “PP” and “DD” to initial, and the 
letters “EC” are always in the space reserved for “DD.”400 The ad-
dress for service on DD is an address for Cohen of Essential 
Consultants, and Cohen signed the agreement as attorney for Essen-
tial Consultants. Trump has publicly acknowledged that he knew 
about the agreement and reimbursed Cohen. Most likely, Cohen was 
acting as Trump’s agent. 
The agreement defines confidential information as follows: 
(a) All intangible information pertaining to DD and/or his fam-
ily, (including but not limited to his children or any alleged 
children or any of his alleged sexual partners, alleged sexual 
actions or alleged sexual conduct or related matters), and/or 
friends … 
(b) All intangible information pertaining to the existence and 
content of the Property; 
                                               
396 Confidential Settlement Agreement & Mutual Release (Oct. 28, 2016) 
§ 4.1(a), Ex. 1 to First Am. Compl., No. 2:18-CV-02217-SJO-FFM (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 26, 2018). 
397 Id. at § 1.1. 
398 Id. 
399 Ex. A to Confidential Settlement Agreement & Mutual Release, supra 
note 396. 
400 Confidential Settlement Agreement & Mutual Release, supra note 396 
passim. 
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(c) All intangible private information (i.e., information not gen-
erally available to and/or known by the general public) relating 
and/or pertaining to DD, including without limitation DD’s 
business information, familial information, any of his alleged 
sexual partners, alleged sexual actions or alleged sexual con-
duct, related matters or paternity information, legal matters, 
contractual information, personal information, private social 
life, lifestyle, private conduct … 
(d) All tangible materials of any kind containing information 
pertaining to DD … including without limitation letters, agree-
ments, documents, audio or Images recordings [sic], electronic 
data, and photographs, canvas art, paper art, or art in any other 
form on any media. [These] are collectively referred to as, the 
“Property.”401 
The agreement permanently prohibits Clifford from disclosing any 
confidential information—except if compelled by legal process, but 
she must provide Dennison with ten days’ notice—and requires the 
transfer of all the “Property” to Dennison. Liquidated damages are 
set at one million dollars per breach, and confidential arbitration is 
required. The existence of the NDA itself is deemed confidential.402 
Would the enforcement of this agreement violate public policy? 
For now, assume the following. First, that Dennison is Trump 
(which seems to be a matter of public notoriety). Trump was the 
Republican nominee for President when the agreement was signed. 
Second, that Trump is bound by the agreement, because his agent 
Cohen was acting within authority to sign the NDA. Third, that the 
agreement is not a settlement agreement, despite it being styled a 
“Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release.” There is 
no evidence, when this agreement was signed, that there was any 
formal dispute to settle. 
This NDA is amenable to a classic public-policy categorical 
analysis. The fundamental point is that courts cannot be enlisted to 
delegitimize a presidential election. The bargain strikes at the heart 
of the free speech argument from democracy, and there is a strong 
analogy to the election wager cases. American courts have voided 
election wagers even for county sheriff because they can distort the 
franchise. The presidency is the most consequential office in the 
country. The stakes for ensuring that voters are not thwarted from 
                                               
401 Id. at § 4.1.  
402 Id. at §§ 3.3, 4.4, 4.4.1, 5.1.2, 5.2, 7.1. 
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contributing to the ongoing development of public opinion could 
hardly be higher. Whether a candidate adheres to traditional norms 
of sexual morality matters to a large portion of voters. The categor-
ical conclusion is that courts should not enforce an NDA if it 
purports to conceal information relevant for the evaluation of a pres-
idential candidate. 
It’s worth pausing to emphasize the importance of Trump’s sta-
tus as a candidate for public office when the NDA was signed. 
Candidates waive some of their privacy rights. The very act of an-
nouncing one’s candidacy expresses an intent to represent others’ 
interests, to act on their behalf, and to exercise official power over 
them. A private individual is entitled to exercise autonomy by pay-
ing others to keep secrets; but a potential representative who intends 
to claim governmental authority over others partially waives that 
power. A candidate’s claim that she will represent her constituency 
implicates her discretion, judgment, and morality. It puts her char-
acter in issue. Her qualities of judgment and integrity are relevant to 
the ongoing formation of public opinion. 
On a balancing approach, the free speech interests are familiar. 
Enforcement interests include: freedom of contract, privacy, and de-
mocracy itself. Freedom of contract is, of course, very important, 
but its importance is already taken into account by the default posi-
tion of enforceability. Moreover, a presidential candidate’s privacy 
interest is diminished; that which is usually private and intimate is 
publicly salient. The democracy interest derives from Trump’s con-
tinued insistence that the information is false. The NDA may protect 
democratic discourse and opinion formation by ensuring they are 
not polluted with falsity. But we’ve seen this argument before. Fal-
sity is valuable because it can shine light on truth. And, as Justice 
Brennan emphasized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a rule that 
protects only true information deters criticism of government, “even 
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, 
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so.”403 It therefore “dampens the vigor and 
limits the variety of public debate.”404 
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Does the conclusion that the Clifford NDA is against public pol-
icy change with the three assumptions? Suppose, first, that David 
Dennison really is Elliot Brody, a prominent Republican fundraiser 
who is neither a public official nor a candidate.405 An NDA seeking 
to conceal information about Brody’s influence over public officials 
may very well violate public policy. But the link between Brody’s 
extramarital affairs and an informed electorate is rather more atten-
uated. An NDA hiding information about Brody’s polygamy does 
not enlist a court to be complicit in electoral secrecy. Second, as-
sume that Cohen acted entirely independently of Trump, and was 
not his agent. Enforcing such an NDA would still conscript the 
courts to deny voters information necessary for them to intelligently 
exercise the franchise. Finally, suppose that the NDA was signed as 
part of a real settlement agreement of, say, a speech tort action 
brought by Trump against Clifford. This is a much closer call. The 
information at issue may have already been publicly disclosed as 
part of the conduct underlying the speech tort. Also, free expression 
interests would have played a role in the speech tort action: a public 
official extracting a settlement may indicate that the defendant con-
cededly acted with something close to Sullivan-style actual malice. 
And there is the administration of justice interest in settlement. But 
the import of the information about public officials is so great, and 
the limitation to settlements reached by public officials sufficiently 
circumscribed (and the value of confidential settlements so dis-
puted), that I am inclined to say that this NDA violates public policy 
too. 
2. Perkins v. Weinstein
Twenty years ago, Zelda Perkins signed an NDA as part of a 
settlement with Miramax, a company controlled by Harvey Wein-
stein and his brother. Perkins alleged that Weinstein had sexually 
harassed her for several years. Miramax agreed to pay Perkins 
£125,000 to settle her claim confidentially. The NDA prohibited 
405 Joe Palazzolo & Michael Rothfeld, GOP Official Resigns After Secret 
Payments, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2018, at A1; Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, 
Top GOP Fundraiser to Stop Hush Payments Over Affair, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 
2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-gop-fundraiser-to-stop-hush-
payments-over-affair-1530477047. 
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Perkins from retaining a copy of the agreement. It required Perkins 
to give notice if “any criminal legal process” involving Weinstein or 
Miramax required her testimony, and it required her to “use all rea-
sonable endeavours to limit the scope of the disclosure as far as 
possible.”406 
If this NDA were signed outside the settlement context, then 
there is little doubt that it would violate public policy for concealing 
tortious and perhaps criminal conduct. Some state legislatures have 
struck the balance in favor of nonenforcement even for confidential 
settlements, voiding such agreements in cases of sexual harassment 
or abuse.407 One commentator has argued for a significant tripartite 
reform to capture repeat offenders.408 These laws and proposals 
rightly focus on the harm to victims and third parties.409 NDAs were 
the primary engine of Weinstein’s impunity. 
There are substantive reasons, grounded in free speech, support-
ing the conclusion that the confidential settlement of a sexual 
harassment claim may violate public policy. For one, provisions 
purporting to fetter Perkins’s future testimony and prevent her from 
accessing the NDA are problematic from a traditional public policy 
standpoint. Perkins “is astonished by a system that prevents her from 
having a copy of her own agreement.”410 But most importantly, the 
morass of NDAs shielding sexual harassment works serious free 
speech harms. Free speech, if understood as truth-promoting, is un-
dermined when a network of NDAs conceals widespread workplace 
wrongdoing. The scale of employment NDAs and confidential arbi-
tration presents, in the aggregate, a fundamental threat to the 
argument from truth. Similarly, free speech, if understood as 
agency-enhancing, is frustrated when a vast NDA web hides data 
and therefore prevents autonomous agents from deciding what to 
believe and what to do. For example, NDAs prevented moviegoers 
from forming independent beliefs about Weinstein, and prevented 
406 Matthew Garrahan, ‘I was made to feel ashamed for disclosing his behav-
iour’, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2017, at 9. 
407 E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1002 (West 2018). 
408 Ayres, supra note 16. 
409 For an argument that public policy is all about third-party harms, see Hoff-
mann & Lampmann, supra note 19. 
410 Garrahan, supra note 406. 
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them from weighing reasons for paying to see the movies he pro-
duced. 
As Julia Apostle, Twitter’s former lead counsel, wrote in the Fi-
nancial Times, the sheer number confidential settlements is 
salient.411 “Eight is a lot,” she wrote with reference to Weinstein, 
“no matter the timeframe.”412 The difficulty, of course, is proving 
that there are more confidential settlements out there. For the mon-
eyed predator, the whole point of the NDA is to ensure that victims 
do not transmit information to one another. The value of each sub-
sequent victim’s claim increases if she knows that it is part of a 
pattern of wrongdoing rather than an isolated occurrence. Because 
of this inevitable information asymmetry, which was so destructive 
to so many for so long, it seems that a prophylactic rule is an appro-
priate solution. Mansfield, and the numerous American judges who 
followed him, voided election wagers because of their “tendency” 
to violate fundamental constitutional principles. One election wager 
might be insignificant, but allowing one allows all. The #MeToo 
movement has unleashed an unprecedented communal reckoning 
with the profound damage and hurt inflicted by NDAs. Each NDA 
that purports to conceal sexual harassment or abuse has the tendency 
to harm free speech. Courts should recognize that enforcing sexual 
misconduct NDAs makes the judicial process complicit in this harm. 
CONCLUSION 
Too often, NDA doctrine is driven by dogma. Whenever free 
speech side-eyes an NDA, a defensive chorus rises: “Rights waived 
are rights lost.” “NDAs exercise free speech rights.” “Public policy 
favors the enforcement of contracts.” These are natural, instinctive, 
and internalized voices. We have lived with them for decades. But 
they are wrong. NDAs do not exercise free speech rights; they waive 
them. Rather than simply assert that voluntary waiver trumps free 
speech, in the wake of the NDA crisis it’s necessary to actually 
weigh the competing interests. This Article has suggested how 
courts should structure that weighing process. 
411 Julia Apostle, Opinion, Weinstein’s case shows how power corrupts in 
legal bargains, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14–15, 2017, at 12. 
412 Id. 
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COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
Jeffrey Steven Gordon∗ 
This Article argues that the strength of a federal free speech 
guarantee varies with a country’s particular species of judicial fed-
eralism. It first develops a theoretical framework for comparative 
judicial federalism, that is, the relationship between local (state) 
and central (federal) courts. The framework is structured around 
judicial federalism’s three dimensions: institutional, jurisdictional, 
and jurisprudential. After justifying these three dimensions, the Ar-
ticle deploys the theoretical framework to compare Australia and 
the United States. It concludes that in one context—the enforcement 
of federal free speech norms against the common law—Australia’s 
normally modest implied freedom of political communication 
matches and might even surpass the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The High Court of Australia insists that the implied freedom of 
political communication differs from the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment to the United States (US) Constitution. The Court 
refused ‘to adopt the United States doctrine’ that posits the national 
constitution as an external bar to the enforcement of conflicting state 
common law; rather, Australian law forms ‘one system of jurispru-
dence’.1 And the Court rarely neglects to intone that the implied 
freedom neither confers an individual right nor extends beyond dis-
cussion of political matters.2 Yet despite these differences, the 
implied freedom and the First Amendment look very similar when 
enforced against the common law. Both the High Court of Australia 
and the US Supreme Court fashioned national common law de-
fences to speech torts. They rewrote the common law in the name of 
federal constitutional free speech guarantees. If there is a difference 
between the implied freedom and the First Amendment in the con-
text of the common law, it is one of degree rather than kind. 
In fact, in one respect the implied freedom of political commu-
nication may very well outshine the Free Speech Clause. In the US, 
the combined force of the state action doctrine and freedom of con-
tract makes it highly unlikely that the First Amendment will be 
deployed to limit the state common law of contract. The Supreme 
Court3 in 1991 all but foreclosed that possibility, holding that prom-
issory estoppel escapes free speech scrutiny because it ‘simply 
requires those making promises to keep them’.4 But in Australia, the 
implied freedom is not so hamstrung. ‘Of necessity’, said the unan-
imous High Court in 1997, ‘the common law must conform with the 
Constitution’ and ‘the common law in Australia cannot run counter 
1 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563–
64. 
2 McCloy v NSW (2015) 257 CLR 178, 229 [120] (Gageler J) 258 [219] (Net-
tle J) 283 [317] (Gordon J). 
3 Unless context dictates otherwise, ‘Supreme Court’ refers to the US Su-
preme Court and ‘High Court’ refers to the High Court of Australia. 
4 Cohen v Cowles Media Co (1991) 501 US 663, 671. 
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to constitutional imperatives’.5 The implied freedom ‘has an im-
portant role in the formulation of common law principle’, including 
the development of a new category of qualified privilege for defa-
mation and limits on breach of confidence in equity.6 Analogously, 
as I argue in this Article, there is ample scope for the development 
of a public policy of political communication that voids some con-
fidentiality agreements.  
If the US ‘stands alone … in the extraordinary degree to which 
its Constitution protects freedom of speech and of the press’,7 then 
what explains the remarkable scope of Australia’s purportedly mod-
est implied freedom? This Article argues that the answer lies in each 
country’s system of judicial federalism. Judicial federalism — the 
relationship and extent of integration between local (state) and cen-
tral (federal) courts — has received very little comparative 
attention.8 In part, this is because domestic law of judicial federal-
ism tends to be intricate and complex; intricacy begets myopia.9 
5 Lange (n 1) 566. 
6 Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 
CLR 199, 220 [20] 224 [35] (Gleeson CJ). 
7 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (OUP 1996) 195. 
8 Comparative judicial federalism should be distinguished from comparative 
judicial review, which has enjoyed an explosion of scholarship since 1990. See, 
eg, Erin F Delaney and Rosalind Dixon (eds), Comparative Judicial Review (Ed-
ward Elgar 2018); Theunis Roux, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial 
Review: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge UP 2018); Benjamin Bricker, Vi-
sions of Judicial Review: A Comparative Examination of Courts and Policy in 
Democracies (ECPR Press 2016); Gerhard van der Schyff, Judicial Review of 
Legislation: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
South Africa (Springer 2010); Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judi-
cial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Princeton UP 2008); Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Con-
stitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge UP 2003); Yong Zhang (ed), 
Comparative Studies on the Judicial Review System in East and Southeast Asia 
(Kluwer 1997); Donald W Jackson and C Neal Tate (eds), Comparative Judicial 
Review and Public Policy (Greenwood 1992). ‘Constitutional theory has been ob-
sessed for many years with an attempt to provide an adequate justification for 
judicial review.’ Alon Harel and Adam Shinar, ‘The Real Case for Judicial Re-
view’ in Erin F Delaney and Rosalind Dixon (eds), Comparative Judicial Review 
(Edward Elgar 2018) 13.  
9 Martin Redish diagnosed judicial federalism’s ‘doctrinal myopia’. Martin 
H Redish, ‘Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero 
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This Article develops a general analytical framework for compara-
tive judicial federalism by isolating its three dimensions and applies 
that framework to the US and Australia. 
In contrast to the welter of literature on comparative judicial re-
view, comparative judicial federalism scholarship is small and splits 
into two camps. The first is consciously comparative, focused on 
specific pairwise comparisons anchored by the US. There is, for ex-
ample, work on judicial federalism in the US and the European 
Union (EU). The second camp is not explicitly comparative but its 
implicit comparativism sheds light on an instantiation of judicial 
federalism.10 It is popular fare in Australian legal scholarship to ex-
amine the fidelity and heresy of Chapter III against the Article III 
scripture. This literature does not brand itself as comparative judicial 
federalism, but its comparative analysis brings the Australian judi-
cial structure into sharper relief. 
The theoretical apparatus developed here provides analytical 
horsepower for thinking systematically about judicial federalism. It 
argues that there are three dimensions to judicial federalism: institu-
tional, jurisdictional, and jurisprudential. First, the institutional 
dimension concerns the existence of separate systems of state and 
federal courts. The US, for example, has maintained a separate net-
work of inferior federal courts since 1789. India’s judiciary, by 
contrast, is unitary. Second, the jurisdictional dimension refers to 
the distribution of judicial power between the central and local 
courts. For example, inferior federal courts in the US are statutory, 
but that statutory jurisdiction is wide, encompassing diversity and 
federal question cases. Compare this to Canada, where the jurisdic-
tion of the most important federal trial court is narrow and 
specialised, and the provincial courts loom much larger in the ad-
ministration of justice. The third dimension is jurisprudential: 
identifying the sources of law binding on the central and local 
courts. The High Court administers a national common law, binding 
on state and federal judges alike; but in the US there is no federal 
general common law, and each state articulates its own common 
law. 
                                               
Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem’ (2000) 75 Notre Dame 
L Rev 1347, 1347.  
10 Ran Hirschl calls these single-country studies. Ran Hirschl, Comparative 
Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2014) 232–
35. 
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After developing the analytical framework for comparative ju-
dicial federalism, this Article applies it to the US and Australia. The 
ultimate conclusion draws on a well-known fact about the jurispru-
dential dimension, namely that there is a national common law in 
Australia over which the state courts do not have the final, authori-
tative say. This is similar to American judicial federalism before 
1938, under the regime of Swift v Tyson,11 when American federal 
and state courts were free to develop the general common law inde-
pendently of each other. But in 1938 Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins12 
overthrew Swift, recasting the common law as state law to which 
federal courts had to defer. Today in the US, the primary site of the 
common law is the states and there is no federal general common 
law. The High Court administers a regime that is functionally equiv-
alent to a binding version of Swift v Tyson, which I call Swift-plus.  
The latter part of the Article deploys the theoretical framework 
in two contexts: torts and contracts. It argues that the enforcement 
of federal constitutional free speech guarantees in defamation cases 
and in breach of confidentiality cases is partly determined by the 
existence of a national common law. Although the implied freedom 
is weaker than the First Amendment, its operation is strengthened 
by Australia’s judicial federalism. Thanks to the close integration of 
federal and state courts in Australia, the application of the implied 
freedom to the common law of defamation operates very similarly 
to the First Amendment. And in cases involving breach of nondis-
closure agreements, the implied freedom may very well eclipse the 
Free Speech Clause. Australian judicial federalism, in other words, 
augments the implied freedom. 
It makes sense to choose the US and Australia to investigate the 
influence of judicial federalism on the status of free speech. This is 
not merely because the US and Australia share similar common law 
heritages, constitutional traditions, political institutions and cultural 
propensities. American public law is deeply influential in Australia. 
The Australian framers were particularly taken with Article III, 
modifying and adapting it to create Chapter III. Although they were 
mostly faithful to the Article III precedent, in crucial details they 
deviated. The theoretical framework refines our capacity to pinpoint 
similarities and differences in versions of judicial federalism. 
                                               
11 42 US 1 (1842). 
12 304 US 64 (1938). 
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This Article, then, makes two contributions. First, it generates 
an analytical framework for the critical evaluation of judicial feder-
alism. Disentangling the different ways in which judiciaries divide 
along the three dimensions of judicial federalism provides analytical 
clarity and a platform for critical analysis.13 Second, this Article 
connects constitutional structure to constitutional rights. It shows 
that judicial federalism impacts rights in unexpected and diverse 
ways. The analytical framework illuminates the surprising conclu-
sion that Australian federal-state judicial integration augments free 
speech protection, even in the absence of a national bill of rights. 
I. COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
Modern comparative federalism is partly focused on categorical 
and conceptual refinement (‘classical federalism’) and partly on the 
relationship between federalism and self-determination (‘post-con-
flict federalism’).14 In its definitional mode, federalism is a ‘genus 
of political organization’15 defined by ‘the coexistence within a 
compound polity of multiple levels of government each with consti-
tutionally grounded claims to some degree of organizational 
autonomy and jurisdictional authority’.16 There are many species of 
federalism: the US and Australia, for example, are federations, com-
pound polities combining the federal government and the 
constituent states, ‘each possessing powers delegated to it by the 
people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with 
the citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its legislative, 
                                               
13 Hirschl (n 10) 238 (one type of comparative inquiry ‘is meant to generate 
concepts and analytical frameworks for thinking critically about constitutional 
norms and practices’). 
14 Sujit Choudhry and Nathan Hume, ‘Federalism, devolution and secession: 
from classical to post-conflict federalism’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon 
(eds), Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 356, 357–59, 363–
68; Sujit Choudhry, ‘Classical and post-conflict federalism: Implications for Asia’ 
in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law in 
Asia 163 (Edward Elgar 2014). 
15 Ronald L Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’ 
(1998) 1 Annual Rev of Political Science 117, 120. 
16 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judici-
ary’ in Gregory A Caldeira, R Daniel Kelemen and Keith E Whittington (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 142, 142. 
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administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its 
citizens’.17 The EU, by contrast, is usually designated a hybrid.18 
The literature on comparative judicial federalism is dwarfed by 
the welter of comparative scholarship on federal supreme courts and 
judicial review. And the little that exists focuses on the US and the 
EU, noting institutional deficiencies and suggesting reform.19 One 
scholar, for example, argued that the lack of integration between 
member state court systems and the EU judiciary will hinder the 
EU’s long-term goal of political integration.20 Another drew from 
the EU preliminary ruling system to argue for a certification practice 
of questions of federal law by American state courts to their federal 
Supreme Court.21 This Article generalises by developing a workable 
analytical framework. 
A. The Three Dimensions of Judicial Federalism 
In comparing judicial federalism in the US and the EU, Michael 
Wells ‘locate[d] both systems on a spectrum, in which weaker forms 
of judicial federalism are at one end and stronger ones at the other’.22 
On this account the EU has a ‘stronger’ judicial federalism than the 
US because local courts are a stronger constraint on central author-
ity.23 Wells highlighted two factors establishing the comparative 
‘strength’ of EU judicial federalism. First, the courts of member 
states are primarily entrusted with the enforcement of EU law. The 
EU does not have a network of courts of first instance distributed 
throughout the member states.24 Second, the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) does not have general appellate jurisdiction over member 
                                               
17 Watts (n 15) 121. 
18 ibid 120–21.  
19 For a notable exception (more than twenty years ago), see the symposium 
on federal jurisdiction in issue 5 of volume 46 of the South Carolina Law Review 
(1995) 46 SCL Rev 641, 641–1074. 
20 Michael L Wells, ‘Judicial Federalism in the European Union’ (2017) 54 
Hous LR 697.  
21 Jeffrey C Cohen, ‘The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme 
Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Feder-
alism’ (1996) 44 Am J Comp L 421. 
22 Wells (n 20) 719.  
23 ibid 702–03, 719, 723–24.  
24 ibid 702, 722–23, 727–33.  
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state courts on matters of EU law. Member state courts must first 
request that the Court of Justice decide a question of law, and once 
decided, the member state court implements the ruling.25 
The idea that judicial federalism is a spectrum is suggestive, but 
it needs development. Wells notes, for example, that neither the US 
Supreme Court nor the ECJ has jurisdiction to decide matters of lo-
cal law.26 Germany’s federal courts, by contrast, do possess 
jurisdiction to resolve questions of purely local law.27 The US is 
therefore a ‘stronger’ judicial federalism because, in the absence of 
applicable federal law, the national courts lack power to revise state 
law. ‘But,’ says Wells, ‘Germany tilts toward a “strong” form of 
judicial federalism in another way; the absence of a network of 
lower federal courts’.28 There is, then, more than one ‘spectrum’ of 
judicial federalism. 
These considerations suggest at least three dimensions to judi-
cial federalism: institutional, jurisdictional and jurisprudential. The 
institutional dimension concerns the existence of separate systems 
of state and federal courts. On this dimension, the only necessary 
corollary of a federal constitution is one court issuing final decisions 
on federal law. At the US Constitutional Convention, for example, 
John Rutledge urged that state courts should decide all cases at first 
instance; the right to appeal to the Supreme Court would be suffi-
cient to uniformly enforce federal law. James Madison objected on 
pragmatic grounds and his compromise — conferring a legislative 
power but not duty to create federal trial courts — eventually pre-
vailed. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established a network of inferior 
federal courts which, although initially relatively weak, today exerts 
enormous influence in settling questions of federal law.29 But in the 
early days of the US Constitution, it was possible for Congress to 
refuse to exercise its power to establish inferior federal courts, 
which would have ordained a very different conception of judicial 
                                               
25 ibid 722–23, 733–46, 765–74. 
26 ibid 719–20. 
27 ibid 719.  
28 ibid 721.  
29 Richard H Fallon Jr and others, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts 
and The Federal System (7th edn, Federation Press 2015) ch 1. 
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federalism.30 By contrast, for most of the twentieth century the Aus-
tralian federal judiciary was minimal. Before the 1970s, Parliament 
created only two federal courts of limited jurisdiction (bankruptcy 
and labor).31 State courts exercised original jurisdiction in nearly all 
matters subject to general appellate review in the High Court.32 And, 
to take a final example at the other extreme, in India there is a unitary 
central judiciary and no separate system of local courts.33 
The second dimension is jurisdictional: the distribution of judi-
cial power between the central and local courts. In the US, the 
federal and state judiciaries are partly integrated by relatively intri-
cate jurisdictional rules. State courts ‘have inherent authority, and 
are thus presumptively competent’ to decide cases arising under fed-
eral law; Congress may, however, affirmatively vest federal courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction over particular federal claims.34 Federal 
courts have ‘“limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power au-
thorized by Constitution and statute,”’35 but that jurisdiction, though 
limited, is wide, encompassing diversity and federal question cases. 
The result is a large area of concurrent jurisdiction, where cases can 
be brought in either state or federal court, and there is significant 
dialogue between the court systems. 
Compare this to Canada, where the jurisdiction of the most im-
portant federal trial court is ‘narrow and specialized’,36 and the 
provincial courts loom much larger in the administration of justice. 
The provincial superior courts ‘have always occupied a position of 
                                               
30 This view is not uniformly accepted. Theodore Eisenberg, ‘Congressional 
Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction’ (1974) 83 Yale LJ 498. 
31 Harry Gibbs, ‘Developments in the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts’ (1981) 
12 UQLJ 1, 4. 
32 The Privy Council also heard appeals from state courts exercising state 
jurisdiction until the enactment of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth). Section 39(2)(a) 
of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) prohibited appeals to the Privy Council from state 
courts exercising federal jurisdiction. Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) 
(1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1137-1140. 
33 Anil Chandra Banerjee, The Constitution of the Indian Republic (2nd edn, 
A Mukherjee 1950) 63. 
34 Tafflin v Levitt, 493 US 455, 458–59 (1990). 
35 Gunn v Minton, 568 US 251, 256 (2013), quoting Kokkonen v Guardian 
Life Insurance Co of America, 511 US 375, 377 (1994). 
36 Garry D Watson, ‘Finality and Civil Appeals—A Canadian Perspective’ 
(1984) 47 LCP 1, 1. 
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prime importance in the constitutional pattern of this country’,37 
partly because, ‘[a]s courts of general jurisdiction, the superior 
courts have jurisdiction in all cases except where jurisdiction has 
been removed by statute’.38 And the Supreme Court of Canada has 
successively narrowed the jurisdiction of the federal trial court. Re-
cently, for example, the Court held that the federal trial court had no 
jurisdiction to hear a claim for declaratory relief by ‘a federal com-
pany, created under a specially enacted federal statute, whose sole 
function under the statute is to operate a federal undertaking and 
whose claim for declaratory relief focusses exclusively on its right 
to carry out its statutory mandate free from unconstitutional con-
straints imposed by municipal bylaws’.39 The effect is that the 
docket of Canada’s federal trial court is dominated by challenges to 
specific decisions of federal bodies.40 
It is worth pausing to emphasise that consideration of each di-
mension of judicial federalism is necessary before any general 
conclusions can be drawn. Looking at jurisdiction alone, for exam-
ple, it is tempting to conclude that judicial federalism is ‘stronger’ 
in Canada than the US, because the jurisdiction of the federal trial 
court in Canada is so narrow. But the institutional dimension reveals 
a more complex reality. The provincial superior courts are, in fact, 
federal in one important respect: their judges are appointed and paid 
by the federal government.41 Because of this institutional arrange-
ment — provincial courts are provincially administered but 
federally appointed — these courts ‘cross the dividing line, as it 
were, in the federal-provincial scheme of division of jurisdiction’,42 
                                               
37 A-G (Canada) v Law Society of British Columbia [1982] 2 SCR 307, 327 
(Estey J). 
38 Windsor (City) v Canadian Transit Co [2016] 2 SCR 617 [32] (Kara-
katsanis J). 
39 ibid. The characterisation of the case quoted is from the dissenting judg-
ment of Justices Moldaver and Brown. ibid [118]. 
40 ibid [18] (Karakatsanis J) (the trial judge ‘observed that the [plaintiff] is 
not challenging a specific decision of a federal body, as is normally the case in 
the Federal Court’). 
41 British North America Act 1867, ss 96, 100. 
42 Law Society of British Columbia (n 37) 327 (Estey J). 
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and ‘they weave together provincial and federal concerns and act as 
a strong unifying force within our federation’.43 
The third dimension of judicial federalism is jurisprudential: 
identifying the sources of law binding on the central and local 
courts. An intertemporal comparison in the US is revealing. Before 
1938,44 a federal district judge enforcing a state right of action was 
duty-bound to follow state statutes (including state court interpreta-
tions of those statutes) and, on matters of local concern, the 
decisions of state courts. But on matters ‘of general law not regu-
lated by statutes, and not essentially local in their nature’,45 he46 was 
free to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies the just 
rule furnished by the principles of general law governing the case.47 
This opened ‘a wide field of general jurisprudence in which the fed-
eral courts decide[d] cases according to their independent 
judgment’.48 In such cases, federal courts could ignore state com-
mon law when enforcing state-created rights; state law was a weak 
constraint on federal court authority. 
American judicial federalism before 1938 gave federal judges 
access to a body of ‘general’ common law — what Justice Holmes 
dismissed as ‘one august corpus … a transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it’49 — which 
could, at the federal judge’s discretion, displace state common law. 
Suppose, for example, that a landowner sued a rail company in fed-
eral court for negligently starting a fire that raced across several 
                                               
43 Windsor (n 38) [32] (Karakatsanis J). See Peter W Hogg, ‘Federalism and 
the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts’ (1981) 10 UNBLJ 9, 15 (‘The courts were 
provincial: their constitution, organization and maintenance was a provincial re-
sponsibility. However, it seems likely that the framers … did think of them as 
national courts.’). 
44 In 1938, the US Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 
US 64 (1938), which overruled Swift v Tyson, 41 US 1 (1842). 
45 George C Holt, The Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Federal and State 
Courts (Baker, Voorhis & Co 1888) 160. 
46 Before 1950, all federal district judges were men. Burnita Shelton Mat-
thews was the first woman appointed to a federal district court in 1950.  
47 Swift (n 44). 
48 Cole v Pennsylvania Railroad Co, 43 F2d 953, 955 (2d Cir 1930). See also 
Erie (n 44) 75 (referring to ‘the broad province accorded to the so-called “general 
law” as to which federal courts exercised an independent judgment’). 
49 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co v Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co, 276 US 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes J). 
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parcels of land before destroying the plaintiff’s property.50 Suppose 
also that the New York common law of negligence limited the de-
fendant’s liability only to damage caused to adjacent properties.51 
Because ‘the logic of the situation and the overwhelming weight of 
authority [on the general law of negligence] without doubt sup-
port[ed] the plaintiff’s position’, the federal judge could freely 
ignore the settled New York doctrine.52 
This practice changed with the momentous 1938 decision Erie 
Railroad Co v Tompkins. Erie limited federal judicial power and de-
nied federal judges the authority to ignore state common law. After 
Erie, state courts enjoy sovereignty over all state law, subject to the 
supremacy clause in Article VI. Thus when a federal district court 
decides a question of state law, that decision binds no one except the 
parties; state courts may adopt the federal court decision but it is of 
no formal precedential value. The Fifth Circuit popularised a cute 
term to describe a district court’s prediction of how a state supreme 
court would resolve an unsettled question of state law: an Erie 
guess.53 Importantly, state court freedom from inferior federal court 
doctrine goes the other way too: state courts are not bound by federal 
district court decisions even on issues of federal law — although this 
conventional view is up for debate.54 
These three dimensions may not be exhaustive. They are in-
tended to facilitate the comparative task by acting as a useful 
analytical technology, isolating the dimensions along which differ-
ent instantiations of judicial federalism usually differ. The three 
dimensions can overlap. They focus on the separation between cen-
tral and local judiciaries, and they highlight that this separation is 
contingent and dynamic. And where the power of judicial review 
resides is a reflection of judicial federalism (indeed, one aspect of 
judicial review, the power of central courts to review local courts at 
                                               
50 Cole (n 48). 
51 ibid 954. 
52 ibid 955. 
53 Grey v Hayes-Sammons Chemical Co, 310 F2d 291, 295 (5th Cir 1962) 
(‘Today, we must make an Erie, educated guess as to the law.’). 
54 Amanda Frost, ‘Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower 
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least on issues of central law, is an aspect of the jurisdictional di-
mension, namely, appellate jurisdiction). 
B. Judicial Federalism in Australia and the US 
The influence of US constitutional law in Australia is strong. 
The fourth opinion ever issued by the High Court — the first inter-
preting the Australian Constitution — unabashedly celebrated 
McCulloch v Maryland.55 The American influence is especially ap-
parent in Chapter III, where Australia’s framers found Article III ‘an 
incomparable model’, entrenching a separation of federal judicial 
power.56 The Australian framers ‘adopted so definitely the general 
pattern of Art. III, but in their variations and departures from its de-
tailed provisions evidenced a discriminating appreciation of 
American experience’.57 Months before the High Court first con-
vened, Andrew Inglis Clark, who counted Holmes among his 
                                               
55 D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 111 (Griffith CJ) (referring to ‘the 
celebrated case of McCulloch v Maryland’ and concluding that ‘as the United 
States Constitution and the Constitution of the Commonwealth are similar, the 
construction put upon the former by the Supreme Court of the United States may 
well be regarded by us in construing the Constitution of the Commonwealth, not 
as an infallible guide, but as a most welcome aid and assistance’). Before being 
appointed the fifth Justice of the High Court of Australia in 1906, HB Higgins 
published an article in the Harvard Law Review describing the High Court’s em-
brace of McCulloch. HB Higgins, ‘McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia’ (1905) 
18 Harv L Rev 559, 560 (referring to ‘the great and continuous stream of masterly 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court’). 
56 Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ in Severin Woinarski (ed), 
Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses 44 (2nd edn, William S Hein & 
Co 1997). The strict separation of judicial power was not constitutionally en-
trenched until 1956. R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 
94 CLR 254. 
57 Dixon (n 56) 44. Scholarship has documented that the Australian framers 
were in thrall to Article III and explored the similarities. Zelman Cowen, ‘Diver-
sity Jurisdiction: The Australian Experience’ (1955–1957) 7 Res Jud 1; WMC 
Gummow, ‘Pendent Jurisdiction in Australia—Section 32 of the Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976’ (1979) 10 FL Rev 211. Some of the comparative scholarship 
published in Australian law reviews is the work of American professors. William 
G Buss, ‘Andrew Inglis Clark’s Draft Constitution, Chapter III of the Australian 
Constitution, and the Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United 
States’ (2009) 33 MULR 718. 
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personal friends,58 published on the ‘supremacy of the judiciary’ in 
the US and Australia in the Harvard Law Review.59 Invocations of 
Marbury v Madison in the High Court followed on the heels of fed-
eration;60 by 1951 ‘the principle of Marbury [wa]s accepted as 
axiomatic’.61 The three dimensions of judicial federalism show the 
depth of the fidelity, and the heresy, of Chapter III when compared 
to the Article III scripture. 
1. Institutional Dimension 
On the institutional dimension, as noted above, the establish-
ment of inferior federal courts was one of the first orders of business 
for the US Congress.62 By contrast, Australia embraced the Madi-
sonian Compromise for the better part of the twentieth century, 
lacking a broad network of inferior federal courts until the creation 
of the Federal Court of Australia in 1976.63 The Federal Court of 
Australia, initially limited to a discrete number of express jurisdic-
tional grants, today can hear and determine all federal questions.64 
In the US, general federal question jurisdiction was conferred on the 
                                               
58 John Reynolds, ‘AI Clark’s American Sympathies and his Influence on 
Australian Federation’ (1958) 32 ALJ 62, 63–64. The US was Clark’s spiritual 
home. Alfred Deakin described Clark as ‘centring … especially upon the United 
States, a country to which in spirit he belonged, whose Constitution he reverenced 
and whose great men he idolised’. ibid 65, quoting Alfred Deakin, The Federal 
Story (Robertson & Mullens 1944) 30. 
59 A Inglis Clark, ‘The Supremacy of the Judiciary Under the Constitution of 
the United States, and Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia’ 
(1903) 17 Harv L Rev 1.  Clark’s essay is dated July 1903. 
60 Ah Yick v Lehmert (1905) 2 CLR 593 (Griffith CJ). 
61 Australian Communist Party v Cth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262 (Fullagar J). 
62 The Judiciary Act of 1789 was the twentieth statute passed by the first 
Congress. 
63 An influential article reignited the proposal to establish a federal superior 
court. M H Byers and P B Toose, ‘The Necessity for a New Federal Court’ (1963) 
36 ALJ 308. See Gerard Brennan, ‘Creation of the Federal Court: A Reflection’ 
(2017) 91 ALJ 461; Michael Black, ‘The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30 
Years’ (2008) 31 MULR 1. 
64 Mark Leeming, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia 
(Federation Press 2012) 136–38. 
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inferior federal courts in 1875.65 Like the US, state courts in Aus-
tralia are courts of general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court and the 
High Court are federal courts established by Article III and Chapter 
III respectively; unlike the Supreme Court, the High Court is the 
final judicial authority on matters of federal and state law.66 
In the comparative enterprise, a little realism goes a long way. 
One of the original justifications for a federal supreme court in both 
the US and Australia was the uniformity of federal law. This claim 
is repeated still. But it must be overstated because the opportunity 
for those courts to perform that function is limited: during the 2015 
Term, the US Supreme Court issued 81 opinions; in 2016, the High 
Court of Australia handed down 53 judgments. Today’s empirical 
reality is that the US Supreme Court and Australian High Court 
make little difference to uniformity.67 
2. Jurisdictional Dimension 
The model of federal jurisdiction in the US is atomised. Ameri-
can federal jurisdiction, to adopt a famous characterisation of 
American federal law, is generally interstitial in nature. It is exer-
cised by courts created under Article III.68 Importantly, Congress 
may not vest federal judicial power in state courts. State courts are 
bound by federal law under Article VI’s supremacy clause, and 
when they decide federal questions they do so in the exercise of state 
                                               
65 Fallon and others (n 29) ch 1. For completeness, general federal question 
jurisdiction was conferred on federal circuit courts in 1801, but the grant was re-
pealed in 1802. Judiciary Act of 1801, s 11; Wythe Holt, ‘The First Federal 
Question Case’ (1985) 3 LHR 169. 
66 It is true as a general proposition that the US Supreme Court has no power 
to decide matters of purely state law. On rare occasions, the Court will judge the 
adequacy of a state law judgment if it was rendered antecedent to, contrary to, and 
intended to evade, a federal right. E Brantley Webb, ‘How To Review State Court 
Determinations of State Law Antecedent to Federal Rights’ (2011) 120 Yale LJ 
1192, 1204–23. 
67 Abbe R Gluck, ‘Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine’ (2011) 120 Yale LJ 1898, 1966; Barry Friedman, 
‘Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and 
State Courts’ (2004) 104 Colum L Rev 1211, 1218–20. 
68 Federal ‘legislative courts’, for example bankruptcy and tax courts, also 
exercise judicial power. The limits of Congress’s power to create legislative 
courts are not settled. 
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judicial power. Federal judicial power extends, among other things, 
to all cases arising under federal law and to controversies to which 
the US is a party, between two or more states and between citizens 
of different states.69 The Supreme Court possesses original jurisdic-
tion in all cases affecting ambassadors and where a state is a party, 
and appellate jurisdiction in all other cases to which federal judicial 
power extends.70 
By contrast, Australia adopts a gestalt model of federal jurisdic-
tion. The pervasiveness of federal jurisdiction in Australia 
contributes to the close integration of state and federal courts. Fed-
eral jurisdiction is essentially co-extensive with the ‘matters’ 
(Chapter III’s catch-all substitution for Article III’s ‘cases’ and 
‘controversies’) enumerated in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitu-
tion. Section 75 spells out the mandatory original jurisdiction of the 
High Court (including matters where the federal government is a 
party, between states, between residents of different states, between 
a state and a resident of another state, and, to deal with one of Mar-
bury’s specific holdings, where mandamus, prohibition or 
injunction is sought against a federal officer). Section 76 details the 
permissive original jurisdiction of the High Court (including matters 
arising under the Constitution, involving the interpretation of the 
Constitution and arising under federal law). Section 77 then confers 
legislative power to invest the High Court’s original jurisdiction in 
inferior federal courts or — in stark contrast to Article III — state 
courts. There is a live debate about how far section 77 extends.71 
                                               
69 This list is not exhaustive. For the complete list, see section 2 of Article III, 
which must be read in conjunction with the Eleventh Amendment. 
70 The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is subject to ‘such Exceptions, 
and under such regulations as the Congress shall make’. Art III, s 2, cl 2. Precisely 
what this clause permits has been disputed since the founding without definite 
resolution. Henry Paul Monaghan, ‘Jurisdiction Stripping, Circa 2020: What “The 
Dialogue” (Still) Has To Teach Us’ (on file with author). 
71 All justices agree that section 77 empowers Parliament to replace state ju-
risdiction over the matters in sections 75 and 76 with federal jurisdiction in state 
courts. But Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ argue that section 77 also authorises 
Parliament to exclude state jurisdiction in non-court tribunals over those matters. 
Gageler J takes a narrower view of section 77. Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15 
[70]–[79] (Gageler J) [128], [139]–[141] (Nettle J) [162], [178]–[179] (Gordon J) 
[212]–[224], [253]–[255] (Edelman J). But Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gageler JJ 
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Compared to the US Supreme Court, the expansive original and 
appellate jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia plays an im-
portant symbolic role in the close integration of the federal and state 
courts. Section 73 of the Australian Constitution confers appellate 
jurisdiction on the High Court not only on questions of federal law 
but also ‘from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences … of 
the Supreme Court of any State’. Notably, this includes questions of 
purely state law. Exaggerated claims that Australia enjoys a unified 
judicial system are therefore based on nuggets of truth that ‘all ave-
nues of appeal lead ultimately to’ the High Court, which, ‘as the 
final appellate court for the country, is the means by which th[e] 
unity in the common law is ensured’.72 Talk of the unity of the na-
tional common law of Australia surely strikes a dissonant chord to 
American ears, accustomed as they are to the Supreme Court’s re-
buke of a federal general common law. These jurisprudential 
differences are taken up in more detail below. 
The jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts in the US and Aus-
tralia is statutory. Before 1875, US inferior federal courts were not 
vested with general federal question jurisdiction.73 At that time, di-
versity was the primary head of jurisdiction for the lower federal 
courts; today, it is federal question jurisdiction. The Federal Court 
of Australia has always been primarily a federal-question court. It 
was not until 1997 — more than 120 years after Congress conferred 
federal question jurisdiction on the circuit courts — that Parliament 
conferred general federal question jurisdiction in civil cases on the 
Federal Court.74 
                                               
held that Ch III itself prohibits state parliaments from conferring federal jurisdic-
tion on non-court tribunals. Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ deny the Ch III 
implication. Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15 [38]–[55] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane 
JJ) [69], [94]–[106] (Gageler J) [134]–[137] (Nettle J) [175]–[188] (Gordon J) 
[205]–[207], [212]–[251] (Edelman J). 
72 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574 (Gummow and 
Hayne JJ); Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15 [20] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ) 
[125] (Nettle J). 
73 18 Stat 470 (1875). Except for a brief period in 1801. See n 65. 
74 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B(1A)(c) (‘The original jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court of Australia also includes jurisdiction in any matter … arising under 
any laws made by the Parliament, other than a matter in respect of which a crim-
inal prosecution is instituted or any other criminal matter.’). 
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The gestalt and atomised models of federal jurisdiction are illus-
trated by the similar concepts of associated jurisdiction in Australia 
and supplemental jurisdiction in the US. In Australia, the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Court was initially piecemeal, defined statute-by-
statute. The Court’s power was inflated by the development of as-
sociated jurisdiction,75 in which ‘jurisdiction is conferred on the 
Court in respect of matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction that 
are associated with matters in which the jurisdiction of the Court is 
invoked’.76 The American equivalent, supplemental jurisdiction,77 
‘enables federal district courts to entertain claims not otherwise 
within their adjudicatory authority when those claims “are so related 
to claims … within [federal-court competence] that they form part 
of the same case or controversy”’.78 Because jurisdiction in the US 
is atomised, federal courts are required to distinguish the federal 
claims from the state claims. So federal courts may decline to exer-
cise supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims that raise a 
novel or complex issue of state law. And ‘[w]hen district courts dis-
miss all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss as well all related state 
claims’.79 But in Australia’s gestalt model of federal jurisdiction, 
lawsuits based on common law or state law are part of a single Chap-
ter III ‘matter’, and there is neither need nor power to remand state 
law claims to state court. Indeed, with the general conferral of fed-
eral question jurisdiction, associated jurisdiction is now considered 
otiose at best and mischievous at worst.80  
The pervasiveness of federal jurisdiction in Australia is ce-
mented by the important role played by state courts in its exercise. 
Chapter III expressly authorises Parliament to invest state courts 
                                               
75 Leslie Zines, ‘Federal, Associated and Accrued Jurisdiction’ in Brian R 
Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (Mel-
bourne UP 2000) 290; Leeming (n 64) 113–21. 
76 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 22. See Zines (n 75) 296. 
77 Before 1990, supplemental jurisdiction in the US was also known as pen-
dent, ancillary and tag-along jurisdiction. Statutory reform standardised the label. 
28 USC § 1367. For an early influential Australian comparison, see Gummow 
(n 57). 
78 Artis v District of Columbia, 138 S Ct 594, 597 (2018). 
79 ibid 597–98. 
80 Leeming (n 64) 113–14. 
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with federal jurisdiction. And so Parliament did, with gusto: Aus-
tralia’s first judiciary legislation conferred on state courts federal 
jurisdiction over some of the matters (for example, diversity cases) 
enumerated in Chapter III.81 The judiciary legislation repealed and 
replaced: repealed from state courts existing state jurisdiction over 
certain matters and replaced it with federal jurisdiction over those 
matters.82 In the late 1980s, Parliament went further and invested 
state courts with all the civil jurisdiction83 of the inferior federal 
court.84 In state and federal courts, a Chapter III ‘matter’ does not 
split into constituent components of federal and state jurisdiction; a 
matter falling under federal jurisdiction is wholly federal.85  
3. Jurisprudential Dimension 
‘There is’, said Justice Brandeis in Erie, ‘no federal general 
common law’.86 Underwriting this holding were two famous 
Holmes dissents ridiculing Swift v Tyson, the 1842 Supreme Court 
case that authorised federal courts to ignore state court pronounce-
ments on general common law.87 Rather than focusing on Swift’s 
narrow statutory holding, Holmes trained his critical eye on a ‘ques-
tion [that] is deeper’,88 namely, one of government authority. The 
centrepiece of Holmes’s criticism was Swift’s endorsement of an au-
thority in the federal courts to decide questions of general common 
                                               
81 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39. 
82 Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367, 412–13 (Walsh J); Burns v Corbett 
[2018] HCA 15 [131]–[132] (Nettle J). 
83 Subject to enumerated exceptions. Leeming (n 64) 160. 
84 In limited cases, an appeal lies from a state court to the inferior federal 
court, eg Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), ss 190, 195(1)(a). This appellate jurisdic-
tion is rarely used. 
85 James Allsop, ‘Federal jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Federal Court 
of Australia in 2002’ (2002) 23 Aust Bar Rev 29, 41–42. 
86 Erie (n 44) 78. This does not preclude the existence of federal common law 
in the US. Henry J Friendly, ‘In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common 
Law’ (1964) 39 NYU L Rev 383. Federal common law, often conceptualised as 
emanations from statute, overrides inconsistent state law (including state legisla-
tion). Mark Leeming, ‘Common law within three federations’ (2007) 18 PLR 186. 
87 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 531 (Holmes J); Kuhn v Fairmont Coal Co, 
215 US 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes J). 
88 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 535; Kuhn (n 87) 372. 
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law independently of the states.89 The ‘subtle fallacy’,90 as Holmes 
termed it, lay in the assumption that there is ‘a transcendental body 
of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it’.91 The 
assumption is mistaken because ‘law … today does not exist without 
some definite authority behind it’.92 That authority is the state. Fed-
eral courts were wrong, then, to treat the common law ‘as a unit’ or 
as ‘one august corpus’ by ‘cit[ing] cases from this Court, from the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, from the State Courts, from England and 
the Colonies of England indiscriminately’.93 They were wrong be-
cause the out-of-state cases were not backed by state authority. The 
real question is whether the state supreme court has said, ‘with an 
authority that no one denies … that thus the law is and shall be’.94 
‘In Australia’, said Sir Owen Dixon in 1943, ‘we subscribe to a 
very different doctrine’.95 According to the High Court, ‘[t]here is 
but one common law in Australia which is declared by this Court as 
the final court of appeal’.96 Australia’s Constitution requires state 
and federal courts to treat the common law as one august corpus. 
Australian judges ‘regard Australian law as a unit’ whose ‘content 
comprises besides legislation the general common law which it is 
the duty of the courts to ascertain as best they may’.97 Later, Dixon 
observed that in Australia ‘[w]e act every day on the unexpressed 
assumption that the one common law surrounds us and applies 
where it has not been superseded by statute’.98 ‘In contrast to the 
position in the United States’, the High Court has said, ‘the common 
law as it exists throughout the Australian States and Territories is 
not fragmented into different systems of jurisprudence, possessing 
different content and subject to different authoritative interpreta-
tions’.99 So, for example, there is no need in Australia for a state law 
                                               
89 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 532-33; Kuhn (n 87) 372. 
90 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 532. 
91 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 533; Kuhn (n 87) 372. 
92 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 532. 
93 ibid. 
94 ibid 535; Kuhn (n 87) 372. 
95 Owen Dixon, ‘Sources of Legal Authority’ in Woinarksi (n 56) 198, 199. 
96 Lange (n 1) 562. 
97 ibid. 
98 Owen Dixon, ‘The Common Law As An Ultimate Constitutional Founda-
tion’ in Woinarski (n 56) 205. 
99 Lange (n 1) 563. 
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certification system because a ‘federal judge sitting in the original 
jurisdiction of his court would feel himself not only entitled but 
bound to pronounce upon State law in the same way as he would 
upon federal law’.100 
This does not mean that Australian common law is ‘a transcen-
dental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory 
within it’.101 There is a Holmesian authority behind the common law 
of Australia that makes it binding on state and federal judges alike. 
But the identity and nature of that authority depends on ‘a fact of 
legal history’: that the common law was ‘antecedent in operation to 
the constitutional instruments which first divided Australia into sep-
arate colonies and then united her in a federal Commonwealth’.102 
According to Dixon, the federation of the six Australian colonies 
‘did not proceed from an extra-legal transaction’ but ‘arose under 
the [common] law’, and it is this common law, ‘the law immemori-
ally recognized’, which itself acts as the ultimate Holmesian 
authority behind the one common law of Australia.103 
The High Court can be characterised as a Swift-plus court. The 
important jurisprudential similarity between the High Court and the 
Swift-era US Supreme Court is methodology. The High Court 
weighs decisions from different jurisdictions, treating the common 
law as a unit — just like the Supreme Court under Swift. When man-
ifest in the Supreme Court, Holmes thought this practice merely a 
symptom of Swift’s fallacy. For the High Court, the status of the 
common law as a Holmesian authority is demonstrated by the fact 
that, as late as 1963, it was an extraordinary step for the Court to 
expressly refuse to follow a decision of the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords.104 The High Court, then, is not precisely analo-
gous to the Swift-era Supreme Court. When the Supreme Court, 
                                               
100 Dixon (n 95) 198, 199. 
101 Black & White Taxicab (n 49) 533. 
102 Dixon (n 95) 198, 199. 
103 ibid 198, 199–201. 
104 Parker v R (1963) 111 CLR 610, 632–33. In Parker, Dixon CJ, speaking 
for the whole Court, stridently refused to follow a decision of the House of Lords 
which was authority for ‘fundamental’ ‘propositions … which I believe to be mis-
conceived and wrong’. ibid. Parker ‘was a decisive landmark in the evolution of 
the High Court’s independence in developing Australian law’. Tony Blackshield, 
‘Parker v The Queen’ in Michael Coper and others (eds), The Oxford Companion 
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acting under the auspices of Swift, refused to follow state general 
common law, state courts were not bound to follow suit. But the 
High Court’s articulation of the unitary common law binds all state 
and federal courts. 
The US and Australian jurisprudential differences are manifest 
in the various judicial attitudes to federal and state law. In 1961 HLA 
Hart famously distinguished between the internal and the external 
points of view of a social group equipped with rules of conduct. The 
external point of view is an attitude towards the rules of the group 
‘as an observer who does not himself accept them’.105 The internal 
point of view towards the rules is the attitude of ‘a member of the 
group [who] accepts and uses them as guides to conduct’.106 Hart 
illustrated by way of a traffic light on a busy street. The external 
point of view, he said, is limited to the view of an observer who says 
that ‘when the light turns red there is a high probability that the traf-
fic will stop’.107 But this ‘will miss out a whole dimension of the 
social life’ of the drivers, who adopt the internal point of view by 
treating the red light ‘not merely [as] a sign that others will stop’, 
but ‘as a signal for them to stop, and so a reason for stopping in 
conformity to rules which make stopping when the light is red a 
standard of behaviour and an obligation’.108 The substantive internal 
point of view, as reconstructed by Shapiro, is ‘the practical attitude 
of rule acceptance’,109 or, according to Barzun, is ‘the attitude of 
someone who accepts a given rule as a guide for his or her con-
duct’.110 A person ‘takes the internal point of view towards a rule 
when one intends to conform to the rule, criticizes others for failing 
to conform, does not criticize others for criticizing, and expresses 
one’s criticism using evaluative language’.111  
                                               
to the High Court of Australia (OUP 2001). Paul Finn thought that Parker em-
bodied Australia’s ‘first stirrings of judicial independence’ from the United 
Kingdom. PD Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22 UWAL Rev 7, 9. 
105 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1994) 89. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid 90. 
108 ibid. 
109 Scott J Shapiro, ‘What Is The Internal Point Of View?’ (2006) 75 Fordham 
L Rev 1157, 1157, 1159, 1161. 
110 Charles L Barzun, ‘Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction 
in Legal Scholarship’ (2015) 101 Va L Rev 1203, 1218. 
111 Shapiro (n 109) 1163. 
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Federal judges in the US and Australia take the substantive in-
ternal point of view towards state law. They display a practical 
attitude of acceptance of state law: they intend to conform to state 
law (except where it is pre-empted by or inconsistent with federal 
law), criticise other judges if they fail to apply state law correctly, 
view the fact of criticism as legitimate, and use evaluative language. 
But there are, nevertheless, crucial differences in the expression of 
the practical attitude of state law acceptance in Australian and US 
federal courts. Thanks to the gestalt model of federal jurisdiction in 
Australia, federal courts are seen as equal authors of state law. State 
courts deciding questions of state law exercising federal jurisdiction 
(as occurs, oddly enough, when state courts exercise diversity juris-
diction), ‘become[] part of the Federal Judicature’.112 Federal courts 
likewise exercising federal jurisdiction can decide questions of state 
law, even when those questions are unsettled and may require the 
development of state law. An Australian federal court is ‘not only 
entitled but bound to pronounce upon State law in the same way as 
he would upon federal law’.113 As a species of the substantive inter-
nal point of view, this is the authorial attitude to state law by federal 
courts. Both sets of courts are joint authors of state law. 
By contrast, American federal courts adopt another species of 
the substantive internal point of view: scribal.114 Thanks to Erie, 
absent applicable federal law, federal courts have no authoritative 
say in the content of state law. When federal courts apply state law 
in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and state law has run out, the 
federal court can either hazard an Erie guess or, in some instances, 
certify the question to the state supreme court. (In Australia, there is 
need for neither the notion of an Erie guess nor a certification pro-
cedure.) In a run-of-the-mill case, the federal court ascertains state 
law as best it can, seeking to capture and apply state law as it exists, 
point-in-time. This scribal attitude thus takes a substantive internal 
point of view by seeking a current but static snapshot of state law. 
                                               
112 Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 91 ALJR 707, 712 (Kiefel CJ), 717 (‘The 
“Federal Judicature” … includes … State courts invested with federal jurisdic-
tion.’) (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 
15 [3], [15], [20], [22] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). 
113 Dixon (n 95) 198, 202. 
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And while federal courts ‘need no longer be a ventriloquist’s 
dummy’,115 it was not until 1991 that the US Supreme Court adopted 
de novo rather than deferential review of lower federal court deter-
minations of state law.116 Federal courts are not authors but scribes 
of state law. 
What about state court attitudes to federal law? In Australia, the 
answer is simple in virtue of state court exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion.117 State courts adopt an authorial attitude to federal law as ‘part 
of the Federal Judicature’.118 They ‘examine and pass upon federal 
law if in the course of exercising its jurisdiction a federal law comes 
in question’.119 In the US state courts do not exercise federal juris-
diction. It is true, ‘the supremacy clause considered … that state 
courts do not bear the same relation to the United States that they do 
to foreign countries’.120 Accordingly Congress has empowered state 
courts to enforce federal civil laws and crimes. This ensures that 
state courts adopt a substantive internal point of view towards fed-
eral law. State courts are obligated to enforce federal law, but in 
doing so they exercise state jurisdiction, that is, the judicial power 
of the state. The decisions on federal law by a state supreme court 
are of no precedential value to the federal courts, and subject to cor-
rection by the US Supreme Court. And, moreover, ‘today the vast 
majority of state courts address federal constitutional questions free 
of any felt need to defer to federal circuits, including their own’.121 
That said, the Supreme Court’s enforcement of Article VI’s su-
premacy clause requires not only that state courts take a practical 
attitude of acceptance of federal law, but also that they are authorial 
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in that attitude. State courts do not seek to ascertain a point-in-time 
snapshot of federal law, nor do they make a ‘reverse-Erie’ guess as 
to its content.122 There is no certification mechanism from state to 
federal courts on questions of federal law. Given the Madisonian 
compromise and the theoretical possibility of no inferior federal 
courts, state courts must be equipped with the constitutional capac-
ity to take the authorial attitude to federal law.123 
II. AUGMENTING THE IMPLIED FREEDOM 
The enforcement of constitutional free speech guarantees 
against the common law illustrates the importance of comparative 
judicial federalism. In short, what has been achieved by a muscular 
personal right of free speech in the First Amendment — authority to 
rewrite state common law to comply with the Free Speech Clause 
— has been achieved in Australia by a weaker implied freedom of 
political communication combined with a national common law. 
The burly First Amendment and the scrawny implied freedom look 
very similar when enforced against the common law of torts; and in 
fact, while the Free Speech Clause stops hard against freedom of 
contract, the implied freedom encounters no similar obstacle. Inter-
estingly, two material differences in the constitutional arrangements 
— different free speech guarantees, different judicial federalisms — 
actually add up to similar doctrinal regimes. 
A. Free Speech and Tort Liability 
The constant challenge of comparative law is to capture salient 
legal differences while keeping in mind each jurisdiction’s ‘own 
                                               
122 Omar K Madhany, ‘Towards a Unified Theory of “Reverse-Erie”’ (2014) 
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patois, its own unique cadence’,124 the ‘different intuitive sensibili-
ties’,125 and ‘the political, sociological, cultural, psychological, and 
economic milieu in which the [freedom of speech] exists and out of 
which it has developed’.126 
1. Australia 
On 13 October 1983, Phil Lockyer was ‘totally unrepentant’.127 
The previous night he had punched Tom Stephens in the face.128 The 
episode is unremarkable except that at the time Lockyer and Ste-
phens were sitting members of the upper house of the Parliament of 
Western Australia. The altercation occurred in the members’ bar of 
Parliament House; according to Lockyer, Stephens had made ‘a 
comment that was almost unrepeatable’.129 Lockyer explained to the 
press: ‘I’m a Norwester, mate. I was born and bred in the north-west. 
Up there it’s just not on – you get marched out into the bull-ring’.130 
Lockyer was charged with assault.131 References to the squabble — 
including renewed threats132 and almost nostalgic recollections133 
— are sprinkled throughout Hansard for nearly thirty years.  
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Neither Lockyer nor Stephens resorted to fists after the 1983 fra-
cas.134 But the acrimony between them lasted. Under cover of 
parliamentary privilege, both hurled personal accusations. Stephens 
alleged that Lockyer co-owned a brothel in the Philippines called 
‘The Randy Ram’.135 Lockyer accused Stephens of criminal mis-
conduct in his dealings with Giwajbem people.136 Stephens called 
Lockyer a ‘scumbag’.137  
In June 1992, outside Parliament and unshielded by its absolute 
privilege, Lockyer accused Stephens and five other members of se-
cretly going on ‘a junket of mammoth proportions’ to New Zealand, 
the United States and Canada, on the public dime.138 The West Aus-
tralian newspaper printed the allegation, provoking Stephens and 
the other parliamentarians to sue the publisher for defamation.139 
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amation Act 2005 (WA), s 47 sch 4 item 2 (‘It is lawful … [t]o publish in good 
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Although proceedings were commenced in state court, they were re-
moved to the High Court.140 A bare majority of the High Court 
affirmed the freedom of political communication necessary for the 
system of representative government embodied by the Australian 
Constitution, and held that ‘[t]he basis of that implication has its 
counterpart in the Constitution of Western Australia’. This grounded 
an affirmative defence to the state defamation action: a publication 
is not actionable if the defendant shows that it acted reasonably. 
The more famous companion case, Theophanous, was heard and 
decided at the same time as Stephens. In November 1992, the Vic-
torian newspaper The Sunday Herald Sun had published a letter to 
the editor urging voters to ‘give Dr. Theophanous the heave’. An-
drew Theophanous, a member of the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives, sued the publisher and the author of the letter for 
defamation in state court. As in Stephens, the proceedings pending 
in state court were removed to the High Court. The Court held that 
the existing law of defamation seriously inhibited freedom of com-
munication, but stopped short of endorsing an American-style 
‘actual malice’ requirement. Instead, the newspaper publisher 
needed only to show that it acted reasonably in the circumstances. 
The influence of the most important First Amendment case of 
the twentieth century, New York Times Co v Sullivan, on the judg-
ments in Stephens and Theophanous is well known.141 Less well 
known is that while the High Court was considering Stephens and 
Theophanous, Anthony Lewis, who had recently published his sem-
inal work on Sullivan, visited Australia.142 He met with the Justices 
of the High Court and spoke at a defamation conference.143 Lewis’s 
report in the New York Times extolled the international ‘ripples of 
freedom’ emanating from Sullivan, noting that Madison would be 
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pleased.144 These efforts paid off. Although Stephens and Theopha-
nous did not unreservedly embrace Sullivan because ‘it gives 
inadequate protection to reputation’,145 the High Court nevertheless 
‘owes a clear intellectual debt’146 to Sullivan — or, perhaps more 
accurately, to Lewis. When Stephens and Theophanous were de-
cided, Lewis wrote in the Times that they were ‘a startling testament 
to the continuing influence of the Warren Court [coming] from half 
a world away’.147 For Lewis, the ‘radiating influence’ of Sullivan 
sapped the conservative criticism of the Warren Court.148 
The constitutional defences established in Stephens and Theoph-
anous were grounded in the recently discovered implied freedom of 
political communication. In 1992, undeterred by the Australian 
framers’ conscious refusal to adopt a counterpart to the First 
Amendment, the High Court implied a freedom of political commu-
nication from the constitutional system of representative 
government. As subsequently refined in Lange v Australian Broad-
casting Corporation,149 the argument goes as follows. First, at 
Federation, ‘representative government was understood to mean a 
system of government where the people in free elections elected 
their representatives’.150 Second, ‘[c]ommunications concerning po-
litical or government matters between the electors and the elected 
representatives, between the electors and the candidates for election 
and between the electors themselves were central to the system of 
representative government’.151 Third, ‘the choice … must be a true 
choice with an opportunity to gain an appreciation of the available 
alternatives’, so ‘legislative power cannot support an absolute denial 
of access by the people to relevant information about the functioning 
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of government in Australia and about the policies of political parties 
and candidates for election’.152 
This is straight out of Madison’s playbook.153 When Andrew 
Koppelman summarised Madison’s ‘best argument’ against the Se-
dition Act of 1798, he could be speaking for the High Court:  
If public officials are to be held accountable by elections, then 
the electors must be able to discuss the merits of the officials. 
The argument is elegant and sound in part because it relies not 
at all on the [Constitution’s] ambiguous text. Rather, it infers a 
right of free speech from the structural commitment to elections 
… If citizens are voters, then it follows that they may vote out 
the incumbents. If they are to do that, then they must be able to 
communicate with one another about whether the incumbents 
should be voted out of office.154 
The High Court’s syllogism is identical. A constitutional commit-
ment to representative government, concluded the Court, 
‘necessarily protect[s] that freedom of communication between the 
people concerning political or government matters which enables 
the people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors’.155 The 
Australian Constitution embodies a Madisonian (or Meiklejohnian) 
conception of free speech.156 
Lange, decided in 1997, remains the leading case on defamation 
and the implied freedom of political communication.157 Lange, a 
former New Zealand Prime Minister, sued Australia’s national 
broadcaster in state court for defamatory statements made during a 
political affairs TV show. Like Theophanous and Stephens, Lange 
was removed, prior to trial, to the High Court. A unanimous Court 
held that ‘Theophanous and Stephens should be accepted as decid-
ing that in Australia the common law rules of defamation must 
conform to the requirements of the Constitution’, and that the com-
mon law, consistently with the constitutional implied freedom, must 
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provide a defence for ‘the mistaken publication of defamatory mat-
ter concerning government and political matters to a wide 
audience’.158 The Court ruminated on the symbiotic relationship be-
tween the national common law and the Constitution. The ‘common 
law must conform with the Constitution’ and, ‘[c]onversely, the 
Constitution itself is informed by the common law’.159 Because 
‘“the common convenience and welfare of society” is the criterion 
of the protection given to communications by the common law of 
qualified privilege’, ‘the content of the freedom to discuss govern-
ment and political matters must be ascertained according to what is 
for the common convenience and welfare of society’.160 The Court 
concluded that ‘[t]he common convenience and welfare of Austral-
ian society are advanced by discussion … about government and 
political matters’, that ‘[t]he interest that each member of the Aus-
tralian community has in such a discussion extends the categories of 
qualified privilege’, and that ‘those categories now must be recog-
nised as protecting a communication made to the public on a 
government or political matter’.161 
2. United States 
Over fifty years ago, the US Supreme Court held that a state’s 
law of libel ‘can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional 
limitations’, and ‘must be measured by standards that satisfy the 
First Amendment’.162 Sullivan thus established a ‘federal rule’163 
that the Court characterised as a ‘conditional privilege’:164 a public 
official is ‘prohibit[ed] … from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that 
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the statement was made … with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not’.165 The rule func-
tions as an added federal element that the official must prove when 
bringing a state-law defamation action.166 Justice Brennan’s opinion 
‘embedded’167 the federal rule in the state common law defamation 
action, ‘redefining the state tort itself’.168 The Supreme Court added 
a new federal element to the Alabama common law defamation tort. 
Of course, Sullivan stands for much more than a federal element 
added to a state tort. It is a triumph of civil rights and a vindication 
of a core aspect of the First Amendment. It has been called ‘an oc-
casion for dancing in the streets’169 and the most important First 
Amendment decision of the twentieth century.170 The Court re-
versed a damages award by the Alabama courts to a public official 
for libel based on a full-page advertisement in The New York Times 
in March 1960 describing police harassment and abuse in Montgom-
ery, Alabama. Sullivan’s federal rule encouraged criticism of public 
officials who enforced discriminatory laws and policies in the South. 
The Court established that the ‘central meaning of the First Amend-
ment’ is the abolition of seditious libel.171 Rather than displace an 
entire body of state defamation law with respect to public officials, 
the Court was at pains to analogise the federal rule to ‘[a]n oft-cited 
statement of a like rule, which has been adopted by a number of state 
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courts’ in libel actions.172 The Court relied on, and quoted exten-
sively from, an opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas establishing 
a qualified privilege, and ultimately concluded that ‘such a privilege 
is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments’.173 
Sullivan’s defamation progeny prospered. By 1977, a prominent 
torts scholar declared that ‘[w]e have the Supreme Court to thank’ 
for an ‘extensive[]’ and ‘sound and solid’ ‘reform[] [of] the law of 
defamation’, with ‘all the signs point[ing] to a very fine completed 
product’.174 The Court pressed Sullivan into the service of other torts 
too. The most consequential is intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (IIED). In Hustler Magazine Inc v Falwell,175 decided in 
1988, the Supreme Court imported Sullivan’s federal rule to an IIED 
suit under Virginia law. Falwell, a nationally known minister and 
commentator on politics and public affairs, sued the magazine for 
publishing an ad parody ‘offensive to him, and no doubt gross and 
repugnant in the eyes of most’.176 The Court held that public figures 
cannot recover damages for IIED when the conduct is the publica-
tion of a caricature such as an ad parody ‘without showing in 
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which 
was made … with knowledge that the statement was false or with 
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true’.177  
Snyder v Phelps,178 decided in 2011, is the Supreme Court’s lat-
est foray in this area. A jury awarded Snyder, a private figure who 
was the father of a fallen marine, damages for IIED against members 
of a fundamentalist church who picketed the funeral of Snyder’s 
son. Setting aside the jury verdict, the Court held that the First 
Amendment prohibited holding the church members liable for their 
speech because that speech was of public concern.179 There was no 
                                               
172 ibid 280. 
173 ibid 283. 
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mention of actual malice as formulated by Sullivan.180 The nature of 
IIED and its protected interests were irrelevant to the Court’s rea-
soning in Snyder. Rather, the Court framed the question presented 
and its holding in terms of ‘tort liability’181 and imposed a blanket 
First Amendment ‘defense in state tort suits, including suits for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress’.182 The reasoning and 
outcome of Snyder would be unaltered if any other tort were substi-
tuted for IIED. As long as the speech was on a matter of public 
concern — that is, as long as the speech attracted First Amendment 
protection — then the defendant is ‘shield[ed] … from tort liabil-
ity’.183 
These cases demonstrate the expanding reach of the First 
Amendment. In Sullivan, the ‘central meaning of the First Amend-
ment’184 was that ‘seditious libel could not be made the subject of 
government sanction’.185 Snyder, decided 47 years later, much more 
generally locates ‘speech on matters of public concern … at the heart 
of the First Amendment’s protection’.186 Interestingly, the expan-
sion of the First Amendment in the torts context has raised Erie 
concerns: ‘it remains remarkable that an entire area of the common 
law of torts has been remade by the Supreme Court, acting in the 
manner of a Court still in the grips of Swift’.187 The reality is worse. 
Snyder’s expansive conception of the First Amendment, and its in-
difference to state tort law, silences state courts and removes their 
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capacity to develop or author their own common law. This is despite 
the Court’s insistence in Snyder that ‘[o]ur holding today is narrow’. 
3. Speech Torts and Judicial Federalism 
Australian judicial federalism strengthens the implied freedom 
of political communication. It is common to observe that the First 
Amendment is a stronger guarantee of free expression than the im-
plied freedom of political communication. But in a specific context 
— the common law of defamation and other speech torts — the 
American and Australian free speech guarantees look very similar. 
That is thanks to their different versions of judicial federalism. 
Imagine for a moment that Australia had slavishly followed Ar-
ticle III. Were that the case, today the Australian Constitution would 
be functionally similar to American constitutional arrangements be-
fore the Civil War. The High Court would have lacked power to 
revise the state common law of defamation,188 and it would have 
lacked power to hold that a state’s constitution embodied its own 
implied freedom of political communication.189 Without its particu-
lar version of judicial federalism, Australia’s implied freedom 
would be seriously weakened. 
a) Institutional Dimension 
All the cases discussed above (Sullivan, Falwell, Theophanous, 
Stephens, Lange and Snyder) were decided by the apex federal court. 
But there are significant institutional differences. On the one hand, 
the High Court, in the exercise of its plenary authority, set precedent 
for state and federal courts by developing the unitary common law 
of Australia. On the other hand, the Supreme Court set precedent for 
state and federal courts on federal law only. Moreover, the lower 
courts played almost no role in the Australian cases Theophanous, 
Stephens and Lange. Each case was removed before final judgment 
into the High Court under section 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). 
The Court decided these cases at first instance; no lower court had 
determined the matter. The American cases, however, had been de-
termined by jury trial and on appeal prior to being heard in the 
Supreme Court. Sullivan was an appeal from the Supreme Court of 
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Alabama, which heard the appeal from the Alabama trial court; Fal-
well and Snyder were appeals from the US Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, which heard the appeals from federal district courts 
in that circuit. The Supreme Court therefore benefited from not only 
lower court reasoning but also the filtering function of the appellate 
process. Yet removal into the High Court carried significant effi-
ciency gains, settling significant questions of law before embarking 
on a costly trial.  
b) Jurisdictional Dimension 
As noted above, the High Court in Theophanous, Stephens and 
Lange exercised original jurisdiction; the Supreme Court in Sulli-
van, Falwell and Snyder exercised appellate jurisdiction. Ironically, 
though, the High Court had no opportunity to make or revise any 
findings of fact, whereas the Supreme Court was empowered by the 
First Amendment to do so. The questions reserved in the High Court 
were all questions of law (removal into the High Court most likely 
occurred before the factual record was settled). But under the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court is ‘obligated to make an independ-
ent examination of the whole record’.190 Indeed, one of Sullivan’s 
crucial holdings is that the First Amendment requires close scrutiny 
of an inferior court’s findings of fact.191 
The gestalt and atomised models of federal jurisdiction are also 
on display. In Australia, asserting a defence that arises under federal 
law grounds federal jurisdiction over the entire matter. The defences 
in Lange pleaded the implied freedom, which arose under the Con-
stitution and therefore ‘suffuse[d] the whole matter’ with federal 
jurisdiction.192 But in the US, Snyder’s statement that the First 
Amendment can act as a defence to state tort suits has different con-
sequences for federal jurisdiction. Merely asserting a federal 
defence does not suffice for federal question jurisdiction.193 Snyder, 
then, reflects a policy that American federal trial courts should not 
                                               
190 Snyder (n 178) 453. 
191 Sullivan (n 162) 284–88. 
192 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCATrans 85 
(Gummow J). 




 COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM  
be concerned with state tort cases where the only federal aspect is a 
First Amendment defence. The American equivalent of Owen 
Dixon’s Swan Hill tramp cannot claim federal jurisdiction.194 
c) Jurisprudential Dimension 
Both the US Supreme Court and the Australian High Court claim 
legitimate power to rewrite the common law in the name of federal 
constitutional free speech guarantees. Although its language applies 
only to the federal Congress, the Free Speech Clause was ‘incorpo-
rated’ against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The US 
Supreme Court therefore grounds its authority to rewrite state com-
mon law in the First Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth. 
The High Court claims legitimate power to rewrite the common law 
because of the implied freedom and the Court’s status as the ultimate 
author of the single national common law. The High Court’s inde-
pendent jurisprudential power ensures the reach of the implied 
freedom of political communication over state tort law. 
An interesting resemblance between Snyder and Lange, then, oc-
curs on the jurisprudential axis. Both federal supreme courts 
fashioned national common law defences. Lange developed the 
Australian common law of defamation by expanding the categories 
of qualified privilege. The Australian Constitution both legitimised 
and mandated the development of the national common law in con-
formity with the implied freedom of political communication, and 
the High Court followed the common law method to create a new 
qualified privilege for that purpose. This mechanism of constitu-
tional enforcement is indistinguishable from Snyder. Snyder’s 
intervention in Maryland law — holding that ‘[t]he Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment … can serve as a defense in state 
tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress’195 — was gnomic compared to Lange’s discursive elaboration 
                                               
194 Leeming (n 64) 34, quoting Owen Dixon KC’s evidence to the Royal 
Commission in 1927 (‘So, if a tramp about to cross the bridge at Swan Hill is 
arrested for vagrancy and is intelligent enough to object that he is engaged in in-
terstate commerce and cannot be obstructed, a matter arises under the 
Constitution. His objection may be constitutional nonsense, but his case is at once 
one of Federal jurisdiction.’). 
195 Snyder (n 178) 451. 
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of the national common law. The stylistic difference obscures that 
both federal supreme courts did the same thing: they created a con-
stitutional defence to tort actions. In fact, Snyder’s constitutional 
defence is expressed much more broadly as applying to all state 
torts. Lange was highly sensitive to the underlying tort action, cre-
ating a new qualified privilege for defamation only.196 
The comparative analysis suggests that the Supreme Court in 
Snyder is a Swift-plus court. There is a strong resemblance between 
the methodology of the High Court, which legitimately administers 
a national common law, and the Supreme Court, which does not. 
The High Court, when expanding the common law categories of 
qualified privilege, need not detain itself with American-style judi-
cial federalism norms. An Australian state has no constitutional 
claim to the status of ultimate sovereign authority over the common 
law that exists in the state. Interestingly, the Supreme Court took 
exactly the same approach in Snyder. Of course, the Supreme Court 
legitimately develops a ‘constitutional common law’,197 which in-
cludes the broad, all-purpose federal defence enacted by Snyder. 
This is not a claim that Snyder was beyond the Supreme Court’s 
power. It is an observation that it is difficult, as the Australian com-
parison shows, to distinguish between a constitutional or federal 
common law, on the one hand, and a Swift-plus, national general 
common law, on the other. 
Snyder’s indifference to state law can be explained by the subtle 
difference in the attitudes of the federal and state courts towards 
state law. As I argued above, US federal courts adopt a scribal atti-
tude to state law while Australian federal courts adopt an authorial 
attitude. This difference in attitude explains, I think, Snyder’s refusal 
to consider Maryland law in any detail. Ordinarily, federal court ap-
plications of state law are, as far as the state courts are concerned, 
merely advisory. Snyder avoided the risk that a lengthy discussion 
of state law would leave it open to circumvention by state courts 
saying that the Supreme Court misconstrued state law. There was, 
of course, no such risk in Lange because the High Court is the final 
                                               
196 It did signal that a state defamation statute did ‘not place an undue burden 
on communication falling within the protection of the Constitution’. Lange (n 1) 
575. 
197 Henry P Monaghan, ‘The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Con-
stitutional Common Law’ (1975) 89 Harv L Rev 1. 
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court of appeal on matters of state law; it is authoritative in its au-
thorial attitude. 
B. Freedom of Speech or Freedom of Contract? 
Australian judicial federalism augments the implied freedom so 
that, when applied against the common law of torts, it behaves just 
like the First Amendment. But when the common law enforces con-
tracts (obligations voluntarily assumed by parties ex ante) rather 
than torts (obligations imposed by law ex post), the implied freedom 
surges ahead of the Free Speech Clause. This section explores the 
untapped potential of the implied freedom to shape Australia’s com-
mon law of contracts. 
1. United States 
The story in the US is rather straightforward. In Cohen v Cowles 
Media Co,198 the US Supreme Court effectively held that the Free 
Speech Clause does not touch private contracts. After he had ex-
tracted promises of anonymity, a gubernatorial campaign worker 
supplied compromising information about a rival candidate to two 
newspapers. The newspapers broke their promises and named the 
source, Cohen, who was fired from his day job at an advertising 
agency. He sued the newspapers for breach of contract, subse-
quently abandoning that right of action in favour a promissory 
estoppel claim. The Court rejected the newspapers’ argument that 
the First Amendment precluded estoppel damages. The law of prom-
issory estoppel was generally applicable and ‘simply requires those 
making promises to keep them’.199 ‘The parties themselves’, said 
the Court, ‘determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any 
restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful infor-
mation are self-imposed’.200 Cohen v Cowles Media Co met with 
broad approval. Most commentators agree that promises between 
                                               
198 501 US 663 (1991). 
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private parties, whether enforceable by contract or promissory es-
toppel, do not implicate the Free Speech Clause.201  
The only contracts reviewable under the Free Speech Clause are 
those to which the government is a party. Governments may not 
condition benefits on the waiver of free speech rights. For example, 
a government may not fire public employees for speaking out on 
matters of public concern.202 Government ‘may not deny a benefit 
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech’.203 This is 
an application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine — or ‘doc-
trine’, as it is sometimes ridiculed.204 The unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine signals that confidentiality agreements pose 
First Amendment problems only when the government is a party. 
Importantly, not every speech restriction imposed by government on 
its employees is invalidated by the First Amendment: ‘when the 
government imposes speech restrictions relating to workplace oper-
ations, of the kind a private employer also would, the Court reliably 
upholds them’.205 
2. Australia 
In Australia, the story is unwritten. No court has squarely con-
sidered whether the implied freedom of political communication 
affects private confidentiality agreements. The most analogous case 
                                               
201 Daniel J Solove & Neil M Richards, ‘Rethinking Free Speech and Civil 
Liability’ (2009) 109 Colum L Rev 1650, 1701–02; Eugene Volokh, ‘Freedom of 
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People from Speaking About You’ (2000) 52 Stan L Rev 1049, 1057. At least one 
scholar disagrees, arguing that Cohen’s ‘most pernicious effect could be to help 
immunize property and contract rights from First Amendment scrutiny’. Alan E 
Garfield, ‘The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.’ (2001) 35 Ga L Rev 1087, 
1126. 
202 Pickering v Board of Education (1968) 391 US 563; Perry v Sindermann 
(1972) 408 US 593, 597 (collecting cases). 
203 ibid 597. 
204 Thomas W Merrill, ‘Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Pub-
lic Goods’ (1995) 72 Denver U L Rev 859, 859. 
205 Janus v American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
Council 31 (2018) 138 S Ct 2448, 2492 (Kagan J). 
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centres on the ‘implied undertaking’ of non-use of discovery mate-
rials. Under Australian law, ‘there is an implied undertaking, 
springing from the nature of discovery, by each party not to use any 
document disclosed for any purpose otherwise than in relation to the 
litigation in which it is disclosed’.206 Although once an express pre-
condition of discovery, now the implied undertaking is an obligation 
imposed by law, owed both to the other party and to the court.207 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the implied un-
dertaking, enforceable by contempt, did not conflict with the 
implied freedom, because ‘[i]t is not aimed at stifling political dis-
cussion’, but rather ‘maintain[s] the integrity of the administration 
of Justice’208 and protects ‘private rights to confidentiality’.209 The 
analogy to private confidentiality agreements is rather weak because 
the implied undertaking is imposed by law.210 Similarly, although 
equitable breach of confidence is likely qualified by the implied 
freedom,211 it is not an obligation assumed voluntarily. 
Despite the lack of direct judicial pronouncement, there is ample 
scope for the High Court to hold that contracts against the public 
policy of free political communication are unenforceable. The lead-
ing Australian cases articulate public policy in contract law as ‘some 
definite and governing principle which the community as a whole 
has already adopted formally by law or tacitly by its general course 
of corporate life, and which the Courts of the country can therefore 
recognize and enforce’.212 Courts emphasise freedom of contract 
and the difficulty ‘of formulating with any degree of precision the 
criteria or the circumstances which will justify a court in refusing to 
enforce a contract on the ground that there is a countervailing public 
                                               
206 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10, 32–33 (Ma-
son CJ). 
207 Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1995) 19 WAR 316, 321 (Ipp J). 
208 ibid 324–25 (Ipp J). 
209 ibid 343 (Anderson J). 
210 Interestingly, the US Supreme Court also balances free speech rights 
against abuse of judicial process. Seattle Times Co v Rhinehart (1984) 467 US 20, 
35–36 (‘The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of 
information under a State’s discovery rule is sufficient justification for the author-
ization of protective orders.’) (Powell J). 
211 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 
208 CLR 199, 224 [35] (Gleeson CJ). 
212 Wilkinson v Osborne (1915) 21 CLR 89, 97 (Isaacs J). 
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interest amounting to public policy’.213 And the jurisprudence is 
similarly clear that public policy is not static. Rather, ‘[f]rom gener-
ation to generation ideas change as to what is necessary or 
injurious’, so that ‘[n]ew heads of public policy come into being, 
and old heads undergo modification’.214 
Since the High Court recognised the implied freedom in 1992, 
reaffirming and applying it on many subsequent occasions, free 
speech on government and political matters qualifies as a definite 
and governing principle which the Australian community has 
adopted. The implied freedom is important in the development of 
common law principle. In Lange, the categories of qualified privi-
lege were expanded because speech on government and political 
matters served the ‘common convenience and welfare of Australian 
society’.215 Similarly, Australian society has adopted the definite 
principle of free and open discussion about government and political 
affairs as one of the ‘conditions necessary to ensure its welfare’.216 
It is, therefore, a head of public policy against which the validity of 
a contract may be tested. 
Contracts that remove information about government and polit-
ical matters from the process of public contestation would not be 
automatically invalid. As Australian courts regularly repeat, the im-
plied freedom is not absolute.217 The public policy of free political 
communication, like all grounds for refusing to enforce a contract, 
would not operate in an all-or-nothing fashion. Instead, it would be 
weighed on a case-by-case basis where ‘any opposing public interest 
must be identified and weighed in the balance’.218 Public interests 
like the administration of justice and national security could some-
times fall on the other side of the ledger to free political speech.219 
Free political communication is one important public policy; it 
would not override all others. Surely, however, a government offi-
cial’s interest in confidentiality, which he or she seeks to enforce by 
private contract, would rarely overcome the public policy of free 
political communication. 
                                               
213 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, 559 (Mason J). 
214 In re Morris (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 352, 356 (Jordan CJ). 
215 Lange (n 1) 571. 
216 In re Morris (n 214) 355 (Jordan CJ). 
217 Hamersley Iron (n 207) 323–24 (Ipp J), 342–43 (Anderson J). 
218 Hayden (n 213) 559–60 (Mason J). 
219 Hayden (n 213). 
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3. Enforcing Contracts and Judicial Federalism 
This section will develop in more detail some of the comparative 
themes raised above, focusing on the unique features of the intersec-
tion between free speech and the judicial enforcement of private 
contracts. It first closely compares some institutional aspects of the 
Australian High Court and the US Supreme Court. It then centres on 
the so-called ‘state action doctrine’ in the US and its absence in Aus-
tralia. It concludes by suggesting how the Australian High Court 
might develop the common law doctrine voiding contracts against 
public policy to conform with the implied freedom. 
a) Institutional Dimension 
Discussions about the institutional similarities between the Aus-
tralian High Court and the US Supreme Court often point out that 
both are common law courts.220 Yet this observation obscures more 
than it illuminates. Both courts have taken clear steps away from the 
traditional common law model of dispute resolution toward one of 
law declaration.221 The appellate docket of both courts is now almost 
entirely discretionary. In 1984, appeals as of right to the High Court 
were abolished; they are now only permitted by special leave.222 By 
1988, the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction was virtually 
eliminated.223 The purposes driving the enlargement of both courts’ 
discretionary dockets are very similar, if not identical: to conserve 
                                               
220 Michael Kirby, ‘The High Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of 
the United States – A Centenary Reflection’ (2003) 31 UWALR 171, 177; San-
ford H Kadish, ‘Judicial Review in the United States Supreme Court and the High 
Court of Australia: Part I’ (1958) 37 Tex LR 1, 1. 
221 For more on these two adjudicatory models, see Henry Paul Monaghan, 
‘On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters’ (2012) 112 
Colum L Rev 665, 668–73. 
222 Judiciary Amendment Act (No 2) 1984 (Cth). Before 1984, Australian 
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to an amount-in-controversy requirement, litigants could appeal as of right to the 
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223 Kathryn A Watts, ‘Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law 
Principles’ (2011) 160 U Pa L Rev 1, 7–18. 
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the US Supreme Court ‘as the arbiter of legal issues of national sig-
nificance’224 and to leave the Australian High Court ‘free to 
concentrate on constitutional issues and on fundamental issues of 
law’.225 
Overall, however, the High Court remains more closely aligned 
with the traditional dispute resolution model than the Supreme 
Court. For example, the Supreme Court exercises more control over 
the issues that it decides than the High Court. The Supreme Court’s 
habit of injecting and deciding issues not raised by the parties is well 
documented.226 Indeed, Cohen v Cowles Media Co was decided on 
the basis of an issue that neither party had raised below. The Court 
decided the case on a promissory estoppel theory, despite the fact 
that, in the words of Justice White, ‘a promissory estoppel theory 
was never tried to the jury, nor briefed nor argued by the parties; it 
first arose during oral argument in the Minnesota Supreme Court 
when one of the justices asked a question about equitable estop-
pel’.227 ‘It is irrelevant to this Court’s jurisdiction’, said Justice 
White, ‘whether a party raised below and argued a federal-law issue 
that the state supreme court actually considered and decided’.228 
Similarly, Snyder furnishes a ‘nice example of how forfeiture doc-
trines empower judicial issue selection’.229 The federal appellate 
courts considered the state tort law issues waived, establishing a 
platform for disposing of the case wholly on the basis of the First 
Amendment.230 
By contrast, the High Court exercises less issue discretion. Sup-
pose that a government official brings a minor civil claim231 for 
breach of a confidentiality agreement in the Magistrates Court of 
Tasmania. In minor civil claims, the default rule is that parties are 
                                               
224 Monaghan (n 221) 684. 
225 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 
June 1976, 2944 (Robert Ellicott QC, Attorney-General). 
226 Amanda Frost, ‘The Limits of Advocacy’ (2009) 59 Duke LJ 447; Mona-
ghan (n 221) 689–91. 
227 Cohen v Cowles Media Co (n 4) 666–67. 
228 ibid 667. 
229 Monaghan (n 221) 696. 
230 ibid 696–97. 
231 A ‘minor civil claim’ is ‘a claim or counterclaim for damages, or for the 
payment of money, if the amount claimed does not exceed $5000’. Magistrates 
Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 (Tas) s 3. 
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not represented.232 Suppose, moreover, that the defendant raises a 
defence based on the implied freedom. Because this defence ‘in-
volves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its 
interpretation’, the defendant must give notice to all Attorneys-Gen-
eral (federal and state).233 Each of those Attorneys-General has a 
right not only to intervene234 but also to remove the entire case be-
fore judgment to the High Court.235 The purpose of the removal 
process is to ensure that significant constitutional issues are decided 
by the High Court with minimum delay and cost.236 The High Court 
has no choice but to decide the constitutional issue. As the Austral-
ian Law Reform Commission put it, ‘any constitutional matter 
pending in any Australian court may be brought to the High Court 
for determination on the motion of an Attorney-General’.237 Alt-
hough the number of cases removed is small, they often settle 
important constitutional issues.238 The analogous procedure for the 
US Supreme Court, judgment before certiorari, is also deployed 
sparingly, but it is entirely within the discretion of the Court.239 The 
Court itself determines whether to short-circuit the deliberative and 
filtering function of the ordinary appellate process. 
If a contract defendant in Australia ever raises a defence 
grounded in the implied freedom, most likely the entire case will be 
removed to the High Court for determination before any lower court 
has considered the constitutional issue. At least in Cohen v Cowles 
Media Co, the Minnesota Supreme Court had considered whether 
the state law of promissory estoppel was consistent with the Free 
Speech Clause. But Theophanous, Stephens, and Lange were all re-
moved into the High Court before judgment. And indeed, two of the 
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233 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(1). 
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238 ibid 292 [15.6]. 
239 James Lindgren and William P Marshall, ‘The Supreme Court’s Extraor-
dinary Power to Grant Certiorari Before Judgment in the Court of Appeals’ [1986] 
Sup Ct Rev 259, 262–63. 
 
201
 COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL FEDERALISM  
three implied freedom cases currently before the High Court were 
removed.240 The other was brought in the Court’s original jurisdic-
tion (a state is a party).241 The US Supreme Court fashionably styles 
itself as a ‘court of review, not of first view’.242 In Australia, it is not 
unusual for the High Court to decide important constitutional issues 
in the first instance, even if it believes that the matter should have 
proceeded through the ordinary appellate process. 
b) Jurisdictional Dimension 
In the US, state action is a necessary prerequisite to the applica-
tion of the First Amendment. Cohen v Cowles Media Co positioned 
state action as the ‘initial question’ for triggering the protection of 
the Free Speech Clause.243 Without it, said Justice White, ‘the First 
Amendment has no bearing on this case’.244 The state action doc-
trine is not typically phrased as a jurisdictional issue. But it 
possesses jurisdictional features. It is an essential precondition to the 
application of the First Amendment, and perhaps cannot be waived. 
In the absence of state action, no First Amendment question can 
arise. It is therefore at least arguable that the state action doctrine is 
quasi-jurisdictional, as some federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
characterised the Eleventh Amendment,245 which is to say, ‘juris-
dictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s 
judicial power’, even if not ‘coextensive with the limitations on ju-
dicial power in Article III’.246 
Although the US Supreme Court has not squarely decided the 
issue, it is unlikely that the enforcement of a private contract 
amounts to state action. Justice White’s opinion in Cohen v Cowles 
Media Co suggests two components of the state action holding: first, 
                                               
240 Preston v Avery; Clubb v Edwards, Nos H2 & M46 of 2018; Comcare v 
Banerji, No C12 of 2018. 
241 Spence v Queensland, No B35 of 2018. 
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that promissory estoppel is ‘a state-law doctrine which, in the ab-
sence of a contract, creates [legal] obligations never explicitly 
assumed by the parties’, and second, that those ‘legal obligations 
would be enforced through the official power of the Minnesota 
courts’.247 In that regard, promissory estoppel is like tort liability: 
imposed by law rather than voluntarily assumed by the parties. To 
be sure, the Supreme Court famously held in Shelley v Kraemer that 
the enforcement by a state court of a racially restrictive covenant 
amounted to state action that violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.248 But that holding has been confined to its facts.249 The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, for example, that the judi-
cial enforcement of a settlement agreement ‘is not governmental 
action for First Amendment purposes’.250 And a federal trial judge 
recently observed that there is no state action when a court enforces 
a private contract. ‘To hold otherwise’, he said, ‘would mean that 
courts could never enforce non-disclosure agreements’.251 
Australian courts are not confronted with a similar ‘state action’ 
problem, because it is either assumed or not required.252 In the argot 
of comparative constitutional law, the implied freedom can operate 
horizontally, whereas the Free Speech Clause only operates verti-
cally.253 Because it follows the gestalt model, federal jurisdiction in 
Australia overtakes the whole matter as soon as a contract defendant 
raises the implied freedom. The implied freedom, then, is much 
more potent than the First Amendment when courts enforce private 
                                               
247 Cohen v Cowles Media Co (n 4) 668. 
248 334 US 1 (1948). 
249 United Egg Producers v Standard Brands Inc, 44 F 3d 940, 943 (11th Cir 
1995) (‘the reach of Shelley remains undefined outside of the racial discrimination 
context’); Lillian BeVier and John Harrison, ‘The State Action Principle and Its 
Critics’ (2010) 96 Va L Rev 1767, 1801 (suggesting that Shelley is only a ‘small’ 
exception to the state action doctrine). 
250 United Egg Producers (n 249) 943. 
251 Bronner v Duggan, 249 F Supp 3d 27, 41 (DDC 2017). 
252 Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of 
the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25 Melb U L Rev 374, 406–14. 
253 ibid 405 (arguing that the implied freedom’s horizontal operation, that is, 
between citizen and citizen, is indirect because it dictates the development of the 
common law); Mark Tushnet, ‘The issue of state action/horizontal effect in com-
parative constitutional law’ (2003) 1 Int J Const L 79, 81 (‘standard U.S. 
constitutional doctrine is that constitutional provisions do not have horizontal ef-
fect’).  
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contracts. This potency is amplified because in Australia the com-
mon law is a central institution. 
c) Jurisprudential Dimension 
If state action presents no obstacle, then broadly speaking there 
are two ways in which federal free speech imperatives operate 
against the enforcement of a private contract at common law. The 
first is where the federal constitution acts externally to the common 
law. On this view, the interaction between the constitution and the 
common law is one of rule conflict. The only operative question is 
whether enforcing the contract would impose liability on the defend-
ant for protected speech. The overriding question is whether the 
speech is protected; if so, then liability is foreclosed. A court is ut-
terly unconcerned with the intricacies of the common law and does 
not remould that law to conform with the constitutional norm. This 
view tracks, or at least shares some affinity, with a scribal attitude 
towards the common law. The second mode of enforcement is where 
the federal free speech norm operates internally to the common law. 
Here, a court first determines the content of the common law. The 
court then asks whether that content (comprising common law rules 
and principles) must be refashioned for consistency with the consti-
tutional free speech requirement. In other words, when necessary the 
federal free speech norm shapes the substantive principles of the 
common law. This view roughly corresponds to the authorial atti-
tude to the common law. 
These two modes of free speech enforcement against the com-
mon law are stylised extremes; the Australian High Court and the 
US Supreme Court have moved along the spectrum between the two 
poles. We could, for example, call the external or scribal model the 
Snyder or Theophanous model. The reasoning in Snyder is marked 
by its near-sole focus on speech and its near-total indifference to 
Maryland common law. As long as the speech attracts First Amend-
ment protection, the defendant is immune to damages. Similarly, all 
that can be ascertained from Theophanous is that the implied free-
dom ‘precluded “an unqualified application of the defamation laws 
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of Victoria to impose liability in damages in respect of political com-
munications and discussion”’.254 Precisely ‘what flows from that 
conclusion’, however, was unsettled by Theophanous.255  
By contrast, we could call the internal or authorial model the 
Sullivan or Lange model. In Sullivan, Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion analysed the rules and principles of Alabama common law, 
not just the judicial enforcement of verdicts. First Amendment scru-
tiny was applied to the law that claimed to legitimise such a verdict. 
In Lange, too, the High Court not only recognised that ‘the common 
law must conform with the Constitution’, but also, ‘[c]onversely, the 
Constitution itself is informed by the common law’.256 Common law 
developments ‘equally affect’ the implied freedom.257 Qualified 
privilege in defamation is granted according to the common conven-
ience and welfare of society. ‘Similarly’, concluded the High Court, 
‘the content of the freedom to discuss government and political mat-
ters must be ascertained according to what is for the common 
convenience and welfare of society’.258 
In their respective attitudes to the common law as affected by 
federal free speech mandates, the US Supreme Court and the Aus-
tralian High Court have moved in opposite directions. The Supreme 
Court commenced with a more internal or authorial approach in Sul-
livan, but more recently took a strongly external or scribal approach 
in Snyder. I have criticised this shift because of its negative effect 
on cooperative judicial federalism: it shuts down valuable intersys-
temic judicial conversation.259 In the US, this valuable conversation 
— cooperative judicial federalism — is nourished when state rights 
of action embed discrete federal issues (or vice versa). On the one 
hand, Snyder, which set aside a tort verdict without engaging in the 
underlying law, displaces vast swaths of the common law. Sullivan, 
on the other, is state-regarding. It took the internal point of view vis-
à-vis the common law of Alabama and opened a dialogue between 
state and federal courts on the narrowly tailored issue of actual mal-
ice in defamation.  
                                               
254 Lange (n 1) 555, quoting Theophanous (n 145) 187 (Deane J). 
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The High Court, in contrast, has moved from the relatively ex-
ternal or scribal Theophanous model to the more internal or 
authorial Lange model. Although he did not recognise the deep tran-
sition from the external/scribal to the internal/authorial, Buss did 
notice the ‘shift[] from the Theophanous approach, under which in-
consistent common law “yields” to the Constitution, to the Lange 
approach, under which inconsistent common law is “developed” to 
bring it into conformance with the Constitution’.260 But he found the 
shift ‘at once fascinating and baffling, though perhaps baffling only 
to American eyes’.261 For Buss, the change from Theophanous to 
Lange is as inscrutable as it is trifling. He argued that the distinction 
between Theophanous and Lange ‘is one of form, not substance, and 
thus it seems questionable whether one can characterise the distinc-
tion as an important one’.262 
It is important. It marks the movement from the external to the 
internal attitude to the common law. And this means that Lange at-
tains insight into an entire dimension of the practice of law that is 
missed by Theophanous.263 That dimension is the way in which par-
ticipants in the practice of the common law regard their own 
behaviour, taking common law principles ‘in one situation after an-
other, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the basis for claims, 
demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment, viz., in all the famil-
iar transactions of life according to rules’.264 Because Theophanous 
ignores questions about the internal character of common law argu-
ment, its ‘explanations are impoverished and defective, like 
innumerate histories of mathematics’.265 It matters, for example, 
that Lange in 1997 developed the common law consistently with the 
implied freedom by leaning heavily on a judgment of Sir James 
Parke written in 1834.266 This opinion predates Australia’s Consti-
tution by 66 years. The High Court’s reliance on Parke, a celebrated 
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English judge,267 could hardly be more consequential. It specified 
the sources of binding, or at least highly persuasive, authority for the 
application of the Constitution. In this way, Lange operationalised 
‘a fact of legal history’, namely, that Australia is constitutionally 
embedded in the common law.268 The Constitution is predicated on 
the continued existence of the common law. The Constitution shapes 
the common law, and the common law is necessary for interpreting 
the Constitution. They are mutually supportive, and each is medi-
ated by the other. 
Similarly, the US Supreme Court in Sullivan took an internal 
point of view towards Alabama’s common law. Sullivan drew from 
a rule adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1908 that anyone 
claiming to be defamed by communication on ‘matters of public 
concern, public men, and candidates for office’, ‘must show actual 
malice, or go remediless’.269 After noting that the Kansas rule ‘has 
been adopted by a number of state courts’, the US Supreme Court 
held that the ‘privilege for the citizen-critic of government’ was ‘re-
quired by the First and Fourteenth Amendments’.270 Sullivan, 
therefore, specified state court opinions as a privileged source of 
federal constitutional application, at least when the state action at 
issue is the judicial enforcement of common law torts. Sullivan’s 
internal attitude to the common law was sensitive to the states. 
It is legitimate, therefore, for the Australian High Court not only 
to subject a confidentiality agreement to free speech scrutiny. It is 
also legitimate for the High Court to suffuse with constitutional sig-
nificance common law judgments on the doctrine that voids 
contracts against public policy — even if those judgments predate 
the Constitution itself. And indeed, the great Sir James Parke once 
wrote forcefully of the public policy doctrine in contract law: 
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It is the province of the judge to expound the law only … not to 
speculate upon what is the best, in his opinion, for the advantage 
of the community. Some of these decisions … have become a 
part of the recognised law, and we are therefore bound by them, 
but we are not thereby authorised to establish as law every thing 
which we may think for the public good, and prohibit every 
thing which we think otherwise. The term “public policy” may 
indeed be used only in the sense of the policy of the law, and in 
that sense it forms a just ground of judicial decision. It amounts 
to no more than that a contract or condition is illegal which is 
against the principle of the established law. If it can be shown 
that any provision is contrary to well-decided cases, or the prin-
ciple of decided cases, and void by analogy to them, and within 
the same principle, the objection ought to prevail.271 
If there is a principle that is now firmly established in Australian 
law, it is the implied freedom of political communication. It only 
takes one clever contract defendant to plead an implied freedom de-
fence. Notices to all Attorneys-General will issue. And one of them 
will pluck that case from local court obscurity, foisting a significant 
constitutional issue on an unsuspecting High Court. When that hap-
pens, Sir James Parke, who died 33 years before the Constitution 
was adopted, may yet again influence its development. 
CONCLUSION 
Comparative judicial federalism is a neglected topic that can 
yield new insights and substantiate our intuitions. But it also points 
to broader inquiries. Whenever decisionmaking authority is distrib-
uted across coordinate bodies, the questions discussed in this Article 
recur. Universal jurisdiction in international law is one example. 
Administrative law adjudication is perhaps another. The starting 
point for analysis is to ask questions along the three dimensions iso-
lated in this Article. How do (or should) the decisionmaking 
institutions interact? What is (or should be) their jurisdictional allo-
cation? What are (or should be) their jurisprudential sources? 
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